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This groundbreaking volume explores the multicultural debate that has evolved in the United 
States and Europe since the cataclysmic events of 9/11. Instead of suggesting closure by presen-
ting a unifi ed narrative about cultural diversity, national identity, and social stratifi cation, the 
essays in this well-balanced collection present a variety of perspectives, each highlighting the 
undiminished relevance of key issues such as immigration, assimilation, and citizenship, while 
also pointing to unresolved confl icts over universalism, religion, and tolerance. Most importantly, 
this volume shows that the struggle over multiculturalism is not limited to the political domain, 
but also has profound cultural implications. American Multiculturalism after 9/11: Transatlantic 
Perspectives is an invaluable, thought-provoking addition to the debate about multiculturalism as 
central to the study of the United States in a global context.
Derek Rubin lectures in the American Studies Program at Utrecht University. 
Jaap Verheul is associate professor of history and director of the American Studies Program 
at Utrecht University.
These lively essays illuminate the ways in which multiculturalist initiatives in the United States and Europe 
have infl uenced one another with a variety of productive as well as unproductive effects, especially since 
the events of 9/11. The authors vindicate the promise of American Studies as a scholarly domain in which 
the trend from a preoccupation with “identity” to a concern for “solidarity” can be charted and critically 
interrogated.
 David A. Hollinger, author of Postethnic America: Beyond Multiculturalism
The thirteen new essays assembled in this book make many fresh and often surprising contributions to 
understanding the theoretical issues surrounding multiculturalism, the effects of the terrorist attacks 
of 2001 on debates about American ethnic diversity and national unity, and European and transatlantic 
perspectives on migration and religious difference.
 Werner Sollors, author of Beyond Ethnicity: Consent and Descent in American Culture and co-editor  
 of A New Literary History of America
American Multiculturalism after 9/11 is a timely and extremely important intervention in and reconfi guration 
of the debates over multiculturalism that took place after 9/11 on both sides of the Atlantic.
 Donald E. Pease, co-editor of Cultures of American Imperialism and The Futures of American Studies
R
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Introduction
Derek Rubin and Jaap Verheul
Within a month after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Lynne Cheney,
the wife of the Vice-President and former chairwoman of the National Endow-
ment for the Humanities, publicly attacked educators who had sought to promote
multicultural teaching and internationalism as a response to rising anti-Ameri-
canism. The notion that Americans needed to learn more about other cultures in
the world, she argued, was tantamount to admitting “that the events of Septem-
ber 11th were our fault, that it was our failure to understand Islam that led to so
many deaths and so much destruction.” Instead of teaching diversity and toler-
ance, teachers from kindergarten to the top colleges and universities would do
better to concentrate on the classics of world history and, most of all, the history
of the American nation. The best way to understand the world in a time of na-
tional crisis, she concluded, was to read Of Plymouth Plantation, the writings of the
founding fathers, or the heroic accounts of American soldiers during World War
II by Stephen Ambrose.1
By unapologetically promoting national history and patriotism over diversity
and tolerance, Cheney advanced her long-standing agenda to steer the national
curriculum clear of multiculturalism. Her decision to assail what she called the
“multicultural argument” in the wake of this national disaster also made clear
that the ongoing debate over multiculturalism, diversity, and national identity
was more alive than ever, as Americans struggled to make sense of “9/11.” It has
been debated whether this ominous date was a decisive turning point in American
and global history, or should be understood rather in the context of long-term
national and international developments and tensions.2 It certainly is true that
the American War on Terror, the invasion of Iraq, and the ensuing debate about
civil liberties for which Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo Bay became contested sym-
bols opened a new chapter in a long history of constitutional interpretation. More
importantly, the terrorist attacks by radical Muslims of foreign origin led Ameri-
cans to recast their perceptions of diversity and assimilation within a national
framework, and at the same time to reevaluate the position of the United States
in the world.
Cheney’s remarks are illustrative of several themes that are central to this vol-
ume. Her combative accusation unambiguously reminds us of the highly contro-
versial and contingent nature of multiculturalism, a concept that can be said to
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have developed in dialectical opposition to competing perspectives on citizenship
and plurality in Western society. The battle was still going on, she seemed to say.
Yet at the same time her argument made clear that both combatants and battle-
field had significantly changed after 9/11. The way she associated multicultural-
ism with the understanding of Islam and a failure to “encourage the study of our
past” in the context of Western civilization suggested a global perspective that
was new to the debate about cultural diversity. Both in the United States and
Western Europe, the term multiculturalism now became enlisted in the political
and academic discourses about the presence of Muslims within Western socie-
ties.3 Since this happened in different ways on the two sides of the Atlantic, while
both trajectories retained many common elements and dialogical moments, it is
well worth studying these changing approaches to multiculturalism from a trans-
atlantic perspective.
Multiple Multiculturalisms
American multiculturalism as a concept for understanding and promoting Amer-
ican diversity has always been contingent and controversial. As David Theo Gold-
berg convincingly argues in the introduction to his seminal anthology, Multicultur-
alism: A Critical Reader, its development can be understood as a reaction to
assimilationist, monocultural claims that had become the dominant and hardly
disputed discourse in the United States. Interestingly, Goldberg suggests that
this American monoculturalism was deeply informed by European cultural no-
tions of high culture. Based on a common transatlantic heritage, this “deeply
ethnoracialized Eurovision” was now used in the United States to support domes-
tic and geopolitical hegemony in a time of Cold War and imperialism. Multicul-
turalism emerged in the 1960s as a multiform revolt “against the monocultural
grain.” Fittingly, as a term that referred to plurality and difference, multicultural-
ism lacked consistency and unity. In fact, Goldberg emphatically warns against
any attempt to reduce the “multicultural condition” that emerged in politics, edu-
cation, and many other discourses to a single definition.4
Multiculturalism, indeed, has many genealogies. It is informed by well-estab-
lished notions about citizenship and assimilation, by the Civil Rights Movement
and the other emancipatory movements that promoted identity politics, and by
the cultural turn that has transformed the humanities since the 1960s. Originally
mostly used to describe accommodating policy directives that attempted to cope
with cultural, ethnic, and linguistic diversity in traditional immigration countries
such as Canada, Australia, and the United States, the term multiculturalism be-
came widely used in many different discourses where it was assigned a variety of
meanings. It can be described as a policy-oriented movement that promotes a
“multicultural society” marked by racial, cultural, and ethnic diversity. As Charles
Taylor points out, rather than aiming for greater social and economic equality,
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the movement has been driven as much by the “politics of recognition,” forcing
society at large to recognize and “incorporate” these minorities on an equal foot-
ing.5
Multiculturalism also forcefully and divisively entered the American university
campus. It became a rallying cry for new academic programs focused on minority
and “subaltern” groups. It also paved the way for new expressions of esthetic
appreciation in literary studies and forms of moral and emotional approval in
cultural studies. Fiction writers from many different cultural backgrounds were
included in textbooks and anthologies of American literature that found their
way into the academic curriculum. Moreover, multiculturalism gradually devel-
oped into a political theory that was analyzed and canonized in a number of influ-
ential scholarly studies published in the last decade of the twentieth century by
various political philosophers.6 Each introduced changing sets of adjectives to
differentiate between all these manifestations of multicultural ambitions, such as
soft and hard; assimilationist and radical; conservative, liberal, and critical; and
corporate and incorporating. Behind this plurality of “concerns and considera-
tions, principles and practices, concepts and categories,” however, multicultural-
ism is most of all a fundamental Weltanschauung, an all-encompassing view of
society, which Parekh describes as “a perspective on human life.”7 In all its
guises, it is a perspective on power and hierarchy in Western society.
Although even the conservative sociologist Nathan Glazer sarcastically con-
ceded in 1995 that “We Are All Multiculturalists Now,” the new call for diversity
had in fact already been forcefully disputed from several directions.8 Conservative
authors such as Allan Bloom and Dinesh D’Souza had lamented the demise of a
shared cultural tradition and sense of common American identity, and Samuel
Huntington had singled out multiculturalism as the most “immediate and dan-
gerous challenge” to the American creed and Western civilization which, if left
unopposed, could lead to “the end of the United States of America as we have
known it.” Multiculturalism was very much at the heart of the culture wars that
broke out when the United States entered the “multicultural decade” of the
1980s.9 The champions of cultural and ethnic diversity had also drawn friendly
fire from more left-leaning intellectuals, such as Arthur Schlesinger and Todd
Gitlin, who feared that the cultural turn would harm egalitarian agendas and lib-
eral coalitions. Liberal thinkers more fundamentally warned that the cultural es-
sentialist and particularistic aspects of multiculturalism challenged the universal-
ist and tolerant achievements of the Enlightenment project.10 Indeed, some liberal
scholars, such as David Hollinger and the so-called multi-racial theorists, had be-
gun to seek new, alternative models for American society that went beyond multi-
culturalism. In the field of literary studies, champions of multiculturalism, such
as Emory Elliott, explored the possibility of introducing a new esthetics into the
hitherto highly politicized debate about the multicultural canon.11
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Culture and Diversity after 9/11
It soon became evident that the horrific bombing of the Twin Towers had
changed the dynamics of the multicultural debate in important ways. As America
was forced to navigate between a heightened concern about national security and
a longstanding commitment to civil liberties, the debate between liberals and
conservatives in the United States polarized. Increasingly, multiculturalism be-
came a key term in the age-old struggle to define America. Significantly, more-
over, multiculturalism entered the international arena in ways it had never done
before. The contentious issue of cultural diversity that had long been a concern of
American intellectuals and politicians became acutely relevant in many European
countries as the threat of terrorism mounted and large-scale attacks were
launched in Madrid in 2004 and one year later on “7/7” in London. America itself
has had to contend with the implications of abiding by the multicultural ideal as it
has struggled to define its stance toward American Muslims and the Arab world
amidst the ongoing threat of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism.
This volume explores the many ways in which the multicultural debate has
evolved on both sides of the Atlantic since the cataclysmic events of 9/11. The
British sociologist Tariq Modood, describing the disillusionment with and anxiety
about multiculturalism after 9/11, recently rhetorically asked whether multicultur-
alism is still appropriate for the twenty-first century, only to confirm forcefully
that this certainly is the case. “It is the form of integration that best meets the
normative implications of equal citizenship,” he argues, “and under our present
post-9/11, post-7/7 circumstances, stands the best chance of succeeding.”12 Mod-
ood’s observation poses a particular challenge for the field of American Studies
that is worth considering briefly here because it speaks to the relevance of the
present volume.
Multiculturalism was traditionally studied through the lenses of a variety of
disciplines, and as such formed one of the central concerns of American Studies
scholars, many of whom were, and indeed still are, strongly influenced by cultural
studies.13 However, in recent years American Studies scholars have turned their
attention elsewhere, focusing on issues such as American culture in a transna-
tional or globalized context, while multiculturalism has been explored mainly by
political scientists. Surprisingly, however, in their discussions of multicultural-
ism, these political theorists have largely ignored the influence of 9/11 on the
multicultural debate.14 The present volume springs from the recognition that, in
light of the urgency of the many problems facing multicultural societies on both
sides of the Atlantic since 9/11, the field of American Studies has an important
role to play in this debate, especially the developments in multiculturalism have
been essentially cultural rather than political. American Multiculturalism after 9/11
therefore brings together scholars who focus largely on the cultural rather than
the political context and implications of multiculturalism and on the ways these
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are reflected in cultural texts of different kinds. Moreover, in doing so, rather than
view the multicultural debate as ongoing and uninterrupted, as their counterparts
in the political sciences have done, the contributors to this volume have tried to
take into account – and where relevant assess – the impact of 9/11 on the dy-
namics of American multiculturalism in a transatlantic context.
Multicultural Boundary Crossings
The book is divided into three sections, the first of which focuses on key theore-
tical issues concerning American multiculturalism and the ways in which these
are related to the transatlantic multicultural dialogue. In his ambitious essay,
“Multiculturalism and Immigration,” Paul Lauter argues that, rather than serving
as a catalyst for change in the dynamics of multiculturalism itself, the events of
9/11 highlight a dramatic shift that had begun earlier, from multiculturalism’s
concern with identity to the issue of immigration and the attendant problems of
separation and integration, which now constitute the main challenge to Western
societies. This has important consequences for the study of American society and
culture. For, if the problems faced by multiculturalism were of a national nature,
Lauter suggests those presented by immigration are international, in that they are
closely linked to economic globalization and the production of a globalized cul-
ture. This means, he writes, that whereas “[i]n the 1960s those of us concerned
with multiculturalism had to learn about the histories and contemporary dy-
namics of racism, Indian removal and dispersion, Chinese exclusion and Japanese
internment … we [now] need to learn about the economic and social meanings of
American subsidies for corn and cotton growers, or French support for sugar
beets and other domestic farm products.” He concludes that “[w]e need to com-
prehend these economic and political contexts within which culture is now being
produced, distributed, and consumed – indeed, the meanings of globalized cul-
ture as a commodity.”
In a groundbreaking essay, titled “Native-Immigrant Boundaries and Ethnic
and Racial Inequalities,” Richard Alba constructs a conceptual framework that
helps to determine the varying degrees to which multicultural tolerance has been
at risk in Western societies since 9/11, which seemingly heightened the danger of
radical Muslim influence among immigrant minorities. By comparing the United
States and Western Europe – in particular France and Germany – for how social
boundaries figure in the separation and integration of ethnic and racial minori-
ties, Alba demonstrates that multiculturalism is at risk in Western societies to the
degree that “Muslims form a large portion of the low-status immigrant popula-
tion and thus where religion figures importantly in the distinctions that natives,
whether secular or Christian, draw between themselves and disfavored immigrant
groups.” He concludes that, paradoxically, multiculturalism in its more liberal
form “has not been affected as much in the United States, despite the traumatic
introduction 11
impact of 9/11 there, as it has in some Western European countries.”More impor-
tantly, perhaps, Alba’s analysis of social boundaries and the roles they play in
reinforcing or dissolving social and economic differences between majority and
minority populations helps to identify the necessary conditions for attaining racial
and ethnic equality in Western societies, which, owing to immigration, are be-
coming increasingly multicultural.
In the final essay in this section, “Coherence, Difference, and Citizenship: A
Genealogy of Multiculturalism,” Ed Jonker points to the long and contested gen-
ealogy of multiculturalism by analyzing how the humanities and the social
sciences produced competing perspectives on social and cultural identity. By of-
fering an inventory of the multicultural debate in the humanities and social
sciences, Jonker’s essay serves as a useful framework for those by Lauter and
Alba. At the same time, it enters into a fascinating conversation with these essays,
because Jonker takes a stand on which theory is most pertinent to the post-9/11
world. As national states developed during the nineteenth century, he explains,
historians were actively involved in creating national identities and citizenship,
many taking their cue from nationalist German linguist Johann Gottfried Herder.
Although later historians abandoned these efforts to construct homogeneous na-
tional identities, political and cultural theorists such as Will Kymlicka, Bhikhu
Parekh, and Jacob Levy developed alternative discourses of national identity that
attempted to discard history altogether. Since these theorists were less successful
in explaining the multicultural disputes within changing civilizations, political
scientists such as Charles Taylor and David Hollinger developed new theories to
cope with difference. However, Jonker points out that the historical perspective
remains valid, as illustrated by the demand for national narratives in times of
political and cultural uncertainty. He reaffirms the need for “decent history” that
embraces the universal traditions of liberalism and human rights, but accepts that
pragmatic choices need to be made to allow these values to flourish in diverse
societies.
Cultural Reflections of the Unthinkable
The essays in the second section explore the impact of 9/11 on American multi-
culturalism by examining cultural texts of different kinds. In his compelling es-
say, “Indecent Exposure: Picturing the Horror of 9/11,” Rob Kroes explores the
functions and meanings of photographs of the horrific events of 9/11 taken by
amateur and professional photographers alike. While the function of most of the
photographs made public via the media and through various exhibitions in the
immediate aftermath of the bombing of the Twin Towers was therapeutic or heal-
ing, there were those, Kroes argues, that “induced contested readings that may
reflect differences inherent in multicultural societies.” In a section ironically
titled, “The Iconic Photograph That Never Was (Nor Will Be?),” he illustrates
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these differences with reference to the deeply unsettling photographs of individ-
uals who jumped to their deaths. In particular, he focuses on Associated Press
Photographer Richard Drew’s controversial photograph of one man falling
through the air, showing how ethnic background figured in the highly personal
ways in which people responded to this photograph when it was presented to
them as potentially being of a loved one whom they had lost in the bombing of
the Twin Towers. Although Kroes acknowledges that “[e]thnicity may be too
broad a category to account for the ways in which people reacted to the enormity
of 9/11,” he concludes that ethnic background does play an important role in
determining these reactions. “In the end,” he writes, “it will always be a matter
of individuals drawing on their life experiences, their memories and cultural re-
pertoires, including those that are ethnically rooted, when they attempt to give
meaning to 9/11.”
Where Kroes’s essay explores the impact of 9/11 on American multiculturalism
by examining responses to photographs taken of the event, Phillip E. Wegner’s
challenging essay, “‘The Dead Are Our Redeemers’: Culture, Belief, and United
93,” does so by analyzing the movie United 93. Although his focus is entirely dif-
ferent from Richard Alba’s, Wegner, too, offers a modification of the widely held
view that 9/11 damaged multiculturalism because it highlighted the risks of toler-
ating difference. His essay offers an analysis of United 93 to support his argument
that radical, conservative anti-multiculturalists and superficial, more liberal multi-
culturalists of the kind found in the Bush administration and in corporate Amer-
ica share a “destructive envy,” as he calls it, of the 9/11 terrorists for their will-
ingness to sacrifice themselves for ideals to which they were totally committed.
His reading of the movie shows how it presents the passengers aboard United 93
as representative Americans who usurped the terrorists’ willingness to die for
their beliefs by sacrificing their own lives for a higher cause, through violently
resisting those very same terrorists. Wegner argues that this transformation of
the victims of 9/11 into heroes willing to die for their ideals “makes the American
deaths on 9/11 not endings, but rather the crucial inaugural act, the moment
when things change, in the new infinite sequence of the war on terror.” He con-
cludes that this form of “commemoration and redemption” regrettably prevents
the kind of healing so sorely needed after 9/11 and points to the need for more
constructive alternatives.
In his essay, “Real American Heroes: Attacking Multiculturalism through the
Discourse of Heroic Sacrifice,” Michan Andrew Connor argues that the promo-
tion of New York’s firefighters as symbols of American courage and self-sacrifice
in the face of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers was a right-wing ploy
to discredit multiculturalism and justify American expansionism. Through a dis-
cussion of the public debate concerning the erection of a controversial memorial
statue modeled on a photograph depicting three white firefighters raising the
American flag at Ground Zero on September 11, Connor shows how right-wing
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commentators were able to discredit the ideal of multiculturalism and present the
predominantly white New York City firefighters as quintessential American her-
oes and models of ideal American citizenship. Rather than usher in a new phase
in the multicultural debate, Connor argues that 9/11 only intensified the right-
wing’s longstanding privileging of whiteness in the discourse of American hero-
ism and sacrifice, as part of their attempt to promote their racist policies and their
support of military action as a justifiable means of American expansion. He de-
monstrates this with a detailed reading of the pre-9/11 movie Armageddon and a
discussion of its relevance to the right wing’s post-9/11 promotion and justifica-
tion of the War on Terror.
In the next essay in this section, “‘America under Attack’: Unity and Division
after 9/11,” Mathilde Roza discusses the early post-9/11 poem, “Somebody Blew
Up America,” by radical black activist Amiri Baraka. In this poem, Roza points
out, Baraka violated every code of what was considered appropriate for poetry
written in response to the horrific attack on the Twin Towers. Instead of expres-
sing shock, sadness, and outrage at the death of thousands of Americans on that
fateful day, Baraka points an accusing finger and directs his anger at what he sees
as a racist white America that has historically excluded and inflicted suffering
upon African-Americans and other minorities. Roza’s essay examines the contro-
versy caused by Baraka’s public recital of this poem at a poetry festival in Septem-
ber 2002, where he made his appearance as the newly elected Poet Laureate of the
state of New Jersey, and which ultimately led to his losing this position. She
places her analysis of the attempt to silence Baraka alongside the controversy
concerning the 9/11 monument proposed by the New York Fire Department. Roza
demonstrates how the multiculturalist debate evolved, in that the emphasis on
difference and diversity came to be perceived by many Americans as irrelevant
given that the nation as a whole was under attack by Muslim extremists. What was
ultimately at stake in these two controversies, Roza argues, was the recognition of
difference as a means toward creating a just society, as opposed to the construc-
tion of a monolithic model of America that denied the significance of diversity in
the name of national unity.
In contrast to Roza’s focus on Baraka’s radical poetic response to 9/11, John-
Paul Colgan explores a “mainstream” author’s imaginative reading of the terrorist
attacks in his essay “‘This Godless Democracy’: Terrorism, Multiculturalism, and
American Self-Criticism in John Updike.” Placing Updike’s highly controversial
novel Terrorist (2006) in the context of his earlier work, and examining it in rela-
tion to novels by other mainstream writers such as Jay McInerney, Jonathan Sa-
fran Foer, Paul Auster, and Don DeLillo, Colgan analyses Terrorist for the ways in
which it gives new expression to Updike’s seemingly contradictory self-declared
conservatism and patriotism, on the one hand, and his critical stance toward con-
temporary America for the ways in which it has failed to live up to its promise, on
the other. This is highlighted, he argues, by Updike’s radical act of writing a novel
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that “comes very close to imagining al-Qaeda-style terrorism as a type of severe
critique of an America that has lost its way,” while at the same time criticizing
American multiculturalism for creating the conditions that make such an act of
terrorism possible. His reading of the novel demonstrates how the titular Muslim
terrorist serves as Updike’s mouthpiece for his criticism of the dissolution and
crass materialism that prompt his attempted terrorist act. Yet the fact that the
protagonist, who as a Muslim fundamentalist vehemently criticizes the freedom
and tolerance of multicultural America, is himself the child of a multicultural
union between an Egyptian father and Irish-American, “gestures, perhaps inad-
vertently,” Colgan suggests, “towards the views of American critics of multicul-
turalism, such as Samuel Huntington and Lawrence Auster, who see it as a funda-
mentally anti-Western ideology.”
In the final essay in this section, “Multiculturalism in American History Text-
books before and after 9/11,” Rachel Hutchins-Viroux examines the impact of 9/11
on the content of American history textbooks as contested sites for the definition
of American national identity. Hutchins-Viroux explains that “[t]extbooks em-
body a compromise. In order to sell, they must be acceptable to parents, teachers,
administrators, and, in general, citizens of divergent political leanings. As such,
they provide a meaningful representation of a consensual vision of American na-
tional identity.” Because the contents of American history books for primary edu-
cation were highly contested in the culture wars in the 1980s and 1990s, and con-
tinue to be at the center of important debates on national identity, she takes as
her case study a comparison of American history textbooks that were adopted for
use in primary schools in the state of Texas in 1997, which was the last time such
books were selected before 9/11, and 2003. American history books purchased for
primary schools in Texas, Hutchins-Viroux explains, serve as a useful national
indicator for two reasons: firstly, more than anywhere else in the nation, the state
has a say in determining their content, thereby guaranteeing that they closely
reflect a consensual view of American national identity; and secondly, because
the books purchased by the state of Texas are then sold nationwide by their pub-
lishers. Hutchins-Viroux compares these textbooks, examining them thoroughly
for the way they represent the make-up of American society through photographs
and illustrations, their choice and treatment of contested topics for multicultural-
ists and conservatives, the nature of the patriotic iconography and texts concern-
ing patriotism that they include, and their presentation of the events of 9/11. She
concludes from her study that the important gains that she found had been made
by multiculturalists in determining the content of the 1997 textbooks proved to be
lasting, in that the 2003 textbooks still reflected the multicultural nature of Amer-
ican society, and covered previously taboo topics such as the cruelty of slavery
toward African-Americans, and the injustice of the internment of Japanese-Amer-
icans during World War II. However, she discerns an unmistakable rightward
shift in the 2003 textbooks which, if not caused exclusively by the post-9/11 natio-
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nalistic upsurge, was certainly reinforced by the rise in conservatism that accom-
panied it.
Transatlantic Dialogues
Whereas the second section of the book focuses on American cultural texts, the
third section offers discussions of the impact of 9/11 on multiculturalism in the
United States and Europe. In his essay, “A Kinder, Gentler Europe? Islam, Chris-
tianity, and the Divergent Multiculturalisms of the New West,” Patrick Hyder Pat-
terson offers an insightful discussion and assessment of the effectiveness of what
he takes to be fundamentally different forms of multiculturalism in the United
States and Europe. These differences, he argues, are particularly emphatic and
visible when it comes to American and European responses to Islam and its fol-
lowers since 9/11. Concentrating on what he calls “mainstream multicultural-
isms,” Patterson begins by distinguishing between the American assimilationist
model, which he explains “is, at bottom, about finding ways to offer American-
ness to everyone, or as some critics from the left would say, to impose it,” and the
European anti-assimilationist model, which, “by contrast, has been one reluctant
to insist on the assimilation of newcomers, and often has not offered much real
prospect of it.” Patterson argues that although overall the American model may
constitute a harsher form of multiculturalism, the strict distinction between
church and state in the United States has paradoxically made it possible for Amer-
ican Muslims to integrate socially and politically, while maintaining their religion
in the private sphere, thereby rendering it unproblematic. In Europe, by contrast,
the seemingly more gentle policy of allowing minority groups to live alongside
the majority population rather than pressuring them to integrate or assimilate
has highlighted the cultural, and particularly the religious, differences between
European countries’ dominant Christian populations and their Muslim minori-
ties. The recognition of the problems ensuing from this, Patterson concludes,
may very well herald a gradual shift in Europe, from its anti-assimilationist variety
of multiculturalism to the American assimilationist model, which Europeans have
resisted for a long time, partly at least because it has been felt to pose a threat to
the dominant position of the Christian majorities.
In her essay, “Slavery, Memory, and Citizenship in Transatlantic Perspective,”
Johanna Kardux examines the many years of conflict and controversy leading up
to and following the construction of the African Burial Ground National Monu-
ment, which was finally unveiled in New York City in 2007, and the National
Slavery Monument in the Netherlands, which was unveiled in Amsterdam in
2002. Kardux demonstrates in her essay that “the call for slavery memorials in
these two nations also represents vital, if necessarily conflicted and contested,
attempts to renegotiate national and cultural identities, and to redefine citizen-
ship in a postcolonial and globalizing age. Seeking recognition and redress for
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centuries of willful amnesia, the slavery memorial projects in the United States
and the Netherlands attempt to re-imagine national, transnational, and multicul-
tural communities that are more responsive to the needs of citizens in our multi-
cultural societies today.” Her essay argues that the two monuments she discusses,
and the debates to which they have given rise, are both important forms of memor-
ialization or “collected memory” – rather than “collective memory.” This form of
memorialization enables previously silenced groups to be heard among a clamor
of voices. In making themselves heard they claim their rightful place in the on-
going debate on what constitutes a national past that does justice to the multi-
cultural nature of contemporary American and Dutch society.
In “Are We All Americans? 9/11 and Discourses of Multiculturalism in the Neth-
erlands,” Jaap Kooijman explores the role played by 9/11 in the construction of a
national identity that reflects the multicultural make-up of contemporary Dutch
society. He does so by focusing on the ways in which Dutch artists have appro-
priated the tragic events of September 11, 2001, in their responses to the rapid,
fundamental changes in Dutch society. These changes were dramatically high-
lighted by 9/11 and the political murders of Pim Fortuyn, the populist leader of
the successful Dutch anti-immigrant party who was shot by an animal rights acti-
vist on May 6, 2002; and the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh, who was assassi-
nated in the city center of Amsterdam by a Muslim extremist on November 2,
2004. Kooijman’s essay is a response to the well-known Dutch left-wing publicist
Paul Scheffer, who has criticized Dutch multiculturalism for creating ethnic seg-
regation and thereby laying the foundation for the radicalization of Muslim ethnic
minorities in the wake of 9/11 and the Fortuyn and Van Gogh murders. According
to Kooijman, “[b]y making a rigid distinction between ‘us’ (the Dutch national
collective) and ‘them’ (the Muslim ethnic minorities), Paul Scheffer implies that
‘our’ culture can be reduced to an identity that is predominantly formed by a
collective national history. Moreover, his statement ignores the fact that 9/11 and
the assassinations of Fortuyn and Van Gogh not only gave ‘many of them their
narrative’ but also ‘us’ a range of narratives, including some that polarize the
debate, as well as others that instead challenge the rigid ‘us’ versus ‘them’ di-
vide.” Kooijman backs up his criticism by analyzing two Dutch art films, The Amer-
ican I Never Was (2004) by Chris Keulemans and New York Is Eating Me & The Cactus
Dance (2005) by Jeroen Kooijmans, which employ the events of 9/11 as a means of
challenging the idea of a dominant Dutch national narrative in the “us” versus
“them” distinction implied by Scheffer.
Whereas Kooijman’s essay focuses on how Dutch responses to 9/11 figure in
constructions of a national identity, in the final essay in this volume, “‘How could
this have happened in Holland?’ American Perceptions of Dutch Multiculturalism
after 9/11,” Jaap Verheul focuses on how Americans employed the political mur-
ders of Fortuyn and Van Gogh in their constructions of a post-9/11 American na-
tional identity. Verheul explains how both of these political murders shocked
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Dutch society, and dramatically changed the political landscape and the intellec-
tual debate about immigration and integration in the Netherlands. Not surpris-
ingly, he argues, the murders and the ensuing public self-searching also cast the
Netherlands in the center of international attention. Verheul observes that espe-
cially the American media paid a great deal of attention to the turmoil and confu-
sion that gripped the Netherlands in the wake of these two events. American
commentators placed the murders and the ensuing public discussion in the con-
text of a conservative turn in European politics, the changing transatlantic rela-
tions after 9/11, and – most significantly – the urgent debates in Europe about
multiculturalism. Verheul explains in his essay how the American media vividly
predicted an end to Dutch tolerance, but mostly tried to draw lessons for Amer-
ican society from these events.
Together, the essays in American Multiculturalism after 9/11 illustrate the intensity
and diversity of the debate about multiculturalism after 9/11, both in the United
States and in Europe. Instead of offering closure by presenting a unified narrative
about cultural diversity, national identity, and social stratification, these essays
present a variety of perspectives and trajectories, each foregrounding different
voices and opinions. They suggest the undiminished relevance of key terms such
as immigration, assimilation, and citizenship, while also pointing to unresolved
conflicts over competing concepts, such as universalism, religion, and tolerance.
This volume also highlights the fact that these ongoing debates have acquired a
global dimension. Most importantly, however, it shows that the struggle over
multiculturalism is not limited to the political domain, but has more profound
cultural implications that become clear from a reading of cultural texts of differ-
ent kinds. Rather than offer a definitive conclusion, the volume is meant to stimu-
late further academic discussion about the ongoing debate on multiculturalism as
a concept relevant for the study of America in a global context.
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Would this book exist if September 11, the train bombings in London and Madrid,
the attacks in Mumbai, and the murders of Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh had
not happened? Probably not. All the same, I am going to argue that the acts of
terrorism like September 11 only amplified the sound of a tectonic shift in global
economic and social structures that has been gaining strength since World War
II. That shift is currently focused, in the United States and elsewhere – especially
Western Europe and Japan so far – on the questions of immigration: how much,
how fast, from where… and then what? These questions, which fundamentally
spring from a globalized and altogether unequal economy, have begun to replace
the earlier questions of identity that marked the debate over multiculturalism in
the 1970s and 1980s. Those identity questions remain of interest, but they were
largely matters of single national societies, as is signaled by phrases like “Asian
American,” “Native American,” “Black German,” “German Turkish,” “British
Asian,” and the like. The questions of immigration are those of global structures,
structures that have been imposed upon us by rampant and increasingly glob-
alized capitalism.
Multiculturalism focused on access and integration; but these are not the pri-
mary issues of globalization and the immigration it has generated. The issue
there is legitimization: whether one is, and is seen and received as, legal, legiti-
mate, fully a citizen. The issue of multiculturalism was identity: Who are we, and
who am I? The issue of immigration is integration and separation: Of what are we
– am I – a part, and who decides? The issue is not what constitutes an identity that
needs to be respected, but what constitutes a viable political community. It is
these issues I wish to discuss, and the new structures of inequality shaping this
particular moment.
Enduring Structures of Power
Before I do this, I want to reflect briefly about the successes and failures of that
earlier moment of multiculturalism. It began in the demands of the Civil Rights
Movement for access: access to the front of the bus, to the lunch counter, to uni-
versities and decent, desegregated schools, and above all to the voting booth.
While in the mid-1960s a few activists asked, “who wants to be integrated into a
23
burning house,” as the civil rights leader formerly named Rap Brown put it, most
people saw the goal as having access to the promises America had held out since
its earliest days. “Let us in,” most people said, “not as tokens, or with no deliber-
ate speed, or somewhere down the line, but Now.” “Freedom Now,” as the slo-
gan and chant had it.
To be sure, the general belief of those who formulated women’s studies, for
example, or the variety of ethnic studies programs that emerged in the 1960s,
was that institutions like colleges and universities, or courts, or even political
parties, would necessarily be transformed simply by what would come in the
wake of the entry of large new cadres of previously excluded people. They were
right… and they were wrong. As had been the case with the achievement of wo-
men’s suffrage, a half-century before, the addition of new constituencies to the
voter rolls, the student bodies, or even the curriculum, did not in and of itself
produce revolutionary change.
This is by no means to suggest that there have been no significant transforma-
tions brought about by the push for access. On the contrary, the color, ethnicity,
gender, and sexual orientation balances of various public bodies have altered no-
ticeably, and for the better. Hiring practices have changed through affirmative
action; the idea, if not the practice, of daycare has become commonplace; access
to the voting booth is no longer prevented by violence, though it is often under-
mined; public facilities and schools are no longer legally segregated, at least not
by race; abortion remains relatively accessible, as do a wider variety of career
opportunities, at least for some women. These are the real accomplishments of
the identity-based movements of the 1960s and 1970s. I do have to say that a book
like the Heath Anthology of American Literature – to cite my own favorite example – is
a better, more inclusive, more accurate and finally more interesting text than pre-
decessors of the 1950s, like 12 American Authors or even the Norton Anthology of the
1980s.
It would be remiss not to point out the situation of today’s black and Latino
communities, where more men are in jails than in universities, and where second-
ary schools are viewed as disastrous failures. It would be absurd not to point to
the wealth and income differentials making this period the most unequal in US
history. It would be dishonest not to understand how institutions like unions,
which have protected and supported working people, have been attacked, mar-
ginalized, and emasculated. To say this another way, what the movement – rooted
in multiculturalism and in the identity politics it produced – did not accomplish
was any significant alteration of the American structures of power, structures
based on increasingly pervasive class determinants.1 There are those, like Walter
Benn Michaels, who would argue that the 1960s movement’s focus on multicul-
turalism has had the effect, however unintended, of solidifying the American
class structure in all its brutality. This is certainly a question worth discussing,
but it is not my point here.
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I do, however, want to quantify the meaning of class today within the United
States and outside of it. Writing for CBS MarketWatch during the 2004 election
campaign, Thomas Kostigen noted that within the United States, the richest one
percent of the population “saw its financial wealth grow 109 percent from 1983 to
2001,” while the “bottom two-fifths watched as its wealth fell 46 percent.”2 Here
is another measure of the increasing inequality of wages and wealth in America,
as formulated by Michael D. Yates. Between 1979 and 2000, “the richest 1 percent
of all households, whose income is mainly from capital (or capital income dis-
guised as wages), grabbed an astonishing 38.4 percent of all the income pro-
duced over a thirty-one year period. The poorest twenty percent of households
took home a mere 0.8 percent of the total income. Consider,” Yates continues,
“that in 2003 there were 111,278,000 households in the United States. One per-
cent of this number is 1,112,780 households. These very rich households got a
share of the income increase forty-eight times higher (38.4 divided by 0.8) than
the 22,255,600 families which comprise the poorest 20 percent of households.”3
Writing in the Boston Globe and deriving his figures from the Congressional Budget
Office, columnist Derrick Z. Jackson puts it this way: “The share of America’s
income that went to the highest twenty percent of households increased from
45.5 percent in 1979 to 52.2 percent in 2003. The remaining eighty percent of
American households saw their share of the nation’s income drop.”
One striking measure is the gap between CEOs (and other managers) and
workers; the ratio was 42:1 in 1980; 107:1 in 1990, and now about “431:1, or $11.8
million to $27,460. … If the salaries of the average worker had kept up with that
of a CEO, he or she would be making $110,136. Had the minimum wage risen at
the same pace as CEO compensation, it would stand today at $23.01. The federal
minimum wage of $5.15 … [had] not risen since 1997.”4 Likewise with respect to
wealth, Yates notes, “In 2001, the richest one percent of all households had 33.4
percent of all net worth. The bottom ninety percent had 28.5 percent.” In short,
class disparities have grown wildly in the multicultural United States. At the same
time, the ranks of the very rich have also grown, and thus helped to sustain the
appearance and the pervasive ideology of open access.
Now, these figures concern only the richest country in the world, the United
States of America. Consider, then, some details about the rest of the world. Kosti-
gen summarizes thus:
Three billion people are living in “poverty” on less than two dollars per day,
800 million people lack access to basic health care, 17 million people – includ-
ing 11 million children – die every year from easily preventable diseases and
malnutrition, 2.4 billion people lack access to proper sanitation, 1.1 billion do
not have safe drinking water, 275 million children never attend or complete
primary school education and 870 million of the world’s adults are illiterate.5
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These figures are by no means independent of those I cited for the United States
or those one could produce for the concentrations of wealth and income in Wes-
tern Europe and in Japan. On the contrary, the enormous wealth of our societies
derives in significant measure, directly and indirectly, from the exploitation of
people in what used to be called the “third world.” Think about farm products,
like corn. The United States and Europe heavily subsidize the domestic produc-
tion of such products, which can be grown more cheaply domestically by capital-
intensive methods of cultivation: more machines, more fertilizer, more pesticide,
and bigger industrialized farms. The result is, for example, that Mexican farmers,
no longer able to sell their corn at a profit in competition with US corn, are forced
off their farms and into cities both in Mexico and in El Norte, where they become
cheap, exploitable labor and, of course, immigrants. That process is accelerated
by the conversion of corn to biofuel, which has helped make the cost of food in
Mexico double in the last year. Meantime, the American manufacturers still left –
as well as service providers – hold the whip hand over US workers and their de-
creasingly effective unions by threatening to move to low-wage venues like the
Mexican border, a process made considerably easier by NAFTA and other so-
called “free trade” mechanisms.
One result is a vast increase in the import of consumer and capital goods man-
ufactured abroad, a process that even further erodes jobs within the United States
and Western Europe without fundamentally improving the status of most workers
abroad. The process works this way, write Blau and Moncada: “Multinationals
such as Wal-Mart, Sears, and Tarrant Apparel Group first set up operations in
Mexico, where workers are paid $1.00 per hour, then move to China, where work-
ers make $.50 an hour, and then to Bangladesh, where workers make $.30 an
hour, and then to Mozambique, where they make even less.”6 Every move by a
factory or site of other low-skilled jobs from one country or area to another cre-
ates a new displaced group of workers, who are detached from their former
homes and ways of life, and likely therefore to become transnational migrants.
These statistics amply illustrate the increasing disparities between the rich in
our countries and the poor both domestically and overseas. Obviously, we are not
discussing the casual accumulation of some surplus value from a handful of
workers down in the Connecticut River valley, who labor for Mr. Lawrence or Mr.
Lowell. Rather, we are looking at the large-scale appropriation of the fruits of the
labor of millions of people at home, and increasingly overseas. My basic point is
this: the current system is producing not only the huge disparities in wealth, in-
come and life chances I have barely touched upon, but the very crisis of immigra-
tion now haunting Europe and America, like a specter of old. What the “West” (or
North if you prefer) has been doing is extracting enormous wealth – not just
hydrocarbons – from the “third world,” and in so doing setting off a huge flow
of immigrants – one might call them economic refugees – from those countries,
following the money, so to speak. Western countries continue to want to have it
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both ways; that is, devouring the financial fruits of what is called “neoliberalism”
globally, but trying to prevent the influx of impoverished foreign workers cast
loose from their roots elsewhere, precisely by the policies that produce Western
wealth.
As long as the current political economy of globalized capital rules, the West
will be importing social tension and conflict along with the enormous value it
extracts. In a peculiar and perverse way, there is a certain distorted truth to the
oft-repeated mantra of the Bush administration that “they” have to be fought over
“there” so that “they” don’t have to be fought “at home.” This mantra needs to be
understood not in the Bush military framework, but very differently. Unless the
West takes major steps to support, indeed to bring about, change in the economic
and social conditions of people in the impoverished world, it will increasingly
face the problem of finding ways to deal with the growing tide of immigration at
home.
Changing Patterns of Immigration
Immigration is rapidly growing, too, both in numbers and in proportion to the
resident populations in the United States and Western Europe. Likewise, the ori-
gins of immigrants have altered noticeably. According to US census figures, in
1950 those born outside the United States constituted 10,347,395 of a total pop-
ulation of some 150,216,110, or 6.9 percent. In 1970 – essentially before the im-
pact of changes in immigration law had set in – the figures were 9, 619,302 of a
total of 203,210,158, or 4.7 percent. But by 1990, immigration numbers had swol-
len to 19,767,316 of 248,709,873, or 7.9 percent,7 and by 2000 the total of the
foreign-born was 31,107,889 of 281,421,906, 11.1 percent, up some 57 percent in
a single decade, and the highest as a percentage of total population since 1930.8
In fact, these figures can be compared with the peak of turn-of-the-century num-
bers; in 1900, the foreign-born constituted 13.6 percent of the US population.
At least as important in setting the tone for the debate over immigration in the
United States, and elsewhere in the “West,” is where the immigrants are from. In
1970, European immigrants to the United States totaled 5,740,891, those from
Asia 824,887, and those from Latin America 1,803,970. By 1990, these figures
had altered to 4,350,403 from Europe, 4,979,037 from Asia, and 8,407,837 from
Latin America.9 The 2000 figures are even more striking: from Europe 4,915,557;
from Asia 8,226,254; from Latin America 16,086,974. Of this last group, over nine
million are from Mexico alone, which understates the actual number because
these are census figures and likely do not capture undocumented immigration
fully. Meanwhile the total of immigrants from northern and western European
countries shrank to just over two million by 2000.10
Such figures also do not capture the impact of immigration in particular areas,
where new arrivals are often concentrated. The long and short of it is that shifts
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in these dimensions have come to overshadow the earlier forms of change that
accompanied the Civil Rights Movement, and the subsequent struggles to estab-
lish multiculturalism as a central feature of American as well as of many Western
European societies. In many respects multiculturalism has come to be accommo-
dated within the basic structures of American capitalism, though disputes rage on
about just how that accommodation should proceed in education and culture.
Current harsh debates over immigration, the laws to make English the only legal
language, the increasing conflict between native minorities and incoming immi-
grant workers, the widespread attitude that mi casa no es su casa, and the worldwide
dimensions of the present struggles all suggest that we have entered a new histor-
ical moment.
Cultural Reflections of Global Inequality
How, then, does all this affect multiculturalism after September 11? Culturally, the
focus in American Studies has undergone an analogous shift, from a period of
multiculturalism to that of globalization. In the 1970s and 1980s, the major new
literary influences were writers of color, especially representative women like Toni
Morrison, Maxine Hong Kingston, and Leslie Marmon Silko, among many
others. They are still very significant players, of course. Increasingly, for the past
fifteen or so years, writers in Western languages, including English, exist and
create in a globalized culture, within which national boundaries are much less
meaningful, and in which authors like Salman Rushdie and Gabriel García Már-
quez – just to select two arbitrarily – generate immediate local impact.
This shift from the focus on domestic multiculturalism to a globalized “mi-
grant” culture began, I think, with the increasing attention to “borders” and
what Gloria Anzaldúa and Guillermo Gómez-Peña, among others, designated as
the “borderlands,” the areas that are defined not by particular national cultures
but by their very interculturality, hybridity, unsettlement.11 Anzaldúa, for example,
arrived in the Heath Anthology, if I may use that literary museum as a cultural
barometer, in the fourth edition, which came on the market in 2001. Preparing
that edition, we had a good deal of discussion about the international dimensions
of literature in what is now the United States, from its earliest days into the
twenty-first century.
This new angle of vision might be represented by the fact that the first 200-plus
pages of the anthology consist of texts written or spoken in languages other than
English. This development is stressed even more in the fifth edition, which con-
tained clusters in the early volume on “America in the European Imagination”
and on “Cultural Encounters,” which includes brief excerpts from theorists like
Mary Louise Pratt, Paul Gilroy, and Paula M.L. Moya and Ramon Saldívar. As we
prepared the new sixth edition, a major problem became how to represent the
contemporary globalizing of American culture in this anthology of US literature.
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Addressing that problem, it seems to me, is the underlying meaning of the debate
over the name of our enterprise, heretofore “American Studies,” as represented
by Janice Radway’s presidential address to the US American Studies Association
in 1998.12 For the very subjects of literary, historical, and social reflection and
analysis have modulated, from those focused within a national state to those in
which the cultural productions even within that state are at least as involved with
external as with internal cultural forces. Some ignorant critics, like Alan Wolfe for
instance, have accused people like Radway of being uninterested in, if not alto-
gether hostile toward, the United States. The issue is not lack of interest in the
culture, society and politics of the United States, but recognizing that one simply
cannot understand these phenomena in isolation. Whether one is talking about
hip-hop or current fiction, what is being produced in the United States exists in a
text-milieu, and increasingly a society, less defined by national boundaries than
by international flows of people, goods, and, of course, cultures.
Am I saying, then, that September 11 made no difference? By no means. We
have yet to know what all these differences might be. Still, in the United States,
unlike in Europe, the impact of globalization, manifest as a crisis of immigration,
seems quite distinct from the impact of September 11. After all, the overwhelming
bulk of immigrants to the United States were and are from Latin America and
Asia; the total of residents who identify themselves as of Arab origin, to take the
obvious case, is a relatively modest 1.2 million, and that includes anyone – Ber-
bers and Kurds, for example – from North Africa or much of the Middle East.13
September 11 did not change the sources of the new immigration, and in a sense
the events of that day remain largely marginal to the processes of globalization I
am describing. What that day did bring sharply into focus, at least for this child of
the Enlightenment, is the role of religion, and especially religious extremism, in
secular democracies.
Endangered Consensus
Do the events of September 11 present a ready-made metaphor for the impact of
religious fanaticism on capitalist democracies? Let me leave that question for a
moment and approach it through some combination of historical reflection and
personal experience.
Western secular democracies were established in somewhat different ways by a
series of compromises. These compromises enabled an increasing variety of reli-
gions, often brought with them by immigrants, to flourish, even as established
churches faded, often into little more than relics. In America, the form of reli-
gious expression called deism formed the core belief system of many, probably
most, founding fathers. Particular churches played little role in fostering revolu-
tionary ideology or practice, however. It was, rather, people like Thomas Paine –
infamously described by Theodore Roosevelt as a “dirty little atheist” – whose
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skills and ideology advanced the revolutionary cause. What Paine in particular
added to the equation was a deep skepticism of, indeed hostility to, organized
and especially sectarian religion. Consider the tone of this, one of my favorite
passages from Paine:
It is curious to observe how the theory of what is called the Christian Church,
sprung out of the tail of the heathen mythology. A direct incorporation took
place in the first instance, by making the reputed founder to be celestially be-
gotten. The trinity of gods that then followed was no other than a reduction of
the former plurality, which was about twenty or thirty thousand. The statue of
Mary succeeded the statue of Diana of Ephesus. The deification of heroes
changed into the canonization of saints. The Mythologists had gods for every-
thing; the Christian Mythologists had saints for everything. The church be-
came as crowded with the one, as the pantheon had been with the other; and
Rome was the place of both. The Christian theory is little else than the idolatry
of the ancient mythologists, accommodated to the purposes of power and rev-
enue; and it yet remains to reason and philosophy to abolish the amphibious
fraud.14
It is passages like this that got Paine posthumously into deep trouble in the nine-
teenth century. Today, however, Paine’s reputation has rapidly improved; some-
thing like three new books and a large number of articles on him have appeared
in recent years.15 He is seen increasingly as a historically significant player in the
Revolutionary era. The improvement in his political reputation seems now to have
helped justify the religious skepticism he so brilliantly articulated. Does a reaction
against the religious dimensions of September 11 and of other fundamentalisms
help explain Paine’s recent popularity? Does the interest in Paine represent a
growing discomfort, especially in secular democracies, with the rise of religious
extremism and the challenges such fundamentalisms pose to democratic values?
It is questions like these that September 11 continues to raise instead of the issue
of immigration, at least in the United States.
What Americans have failed to grasp by and large is why fundamentalist reli-
gions, especially Islam, have come to constitute the central oppositional force to
the West in many parts of the world. We have not perceived or accepted the im-
plications of the fact that it has long been Western policy to destroy the forms of
resistance presented by the Left, as in the Iran of Mossedegh, or even to encou-
rage religious fundamentalism that attacked communist influence, as in Afghani-
stan. Deprived of socialist or communist – much less secular democratic – forms
of opposition to the Western capitalist power that continued to consume their
bounty and control their daily lives, people in many parts of the third world, and
especially in the Middle East, turned to ever more extreme religious fundamental-
isms as the only available option against continued Western domination. But the
30 american multiculturalism after 9/11
events of September 11, and those in Madrid, London, and the Netherlands, made
apparent the basic conflict between radical Islamicist ideology and that of Wes-
tern democracy. This conflict had been papered over during the Cold War period,
when the United States and its allies supported any force, however corrupt or
malign, against Communism.
My point is this: while the dynamic of globalization, which I have here rep-
resented by the immigration crisis, may have been exacerbated by September 11,
it is by no means identical to it. The perception that Muslim fundamentalism and
Western secularism are at odds – who would have thought? – also ignores what
is to me a more basic question than whether the Prophet can come to table with
George Washington. The question is whether fundamentalisms of any religious
definition – Hindu, Christian, Jewish, Islamic – do or do not finally throttle avow-
edly secular democratic societies. If one concludes that they do, what is then to be
done? Multiculturalism does not provide answers.
My own approach to such questions grows from my experience working with
the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), a Quaker organization, during
the 1960s. Quaker meetings for business – the formal gatherings of Friends, at
which policies and their implementation are decided – are governed by the prac-
tice of consensus. That idea, or at least what was thought to be that idea, ap-
pealed to many movement activists, who urged that the practice be adopted in
their own organizations. Many people, however, confused unanimity with con-
sensus, but they are not the same. Among Quakers, a consensus is achieved
when no one exercises his or her responsibility to object to moving an action or
policy forward. I say “responsibility” because within a Quaker dispensation, it
would be as irresponsible for a Friend to allow an action offensive to his or her
basic values to move forward, as it would be to oppose, and therefore to block, an
action on narrowly personal or sectarian grounds. This concept of consensus was
not, I fear, widely understood in the 1960s, and certainly not shared outside
Quaker circles.
That is my main point: for any political practice like consensus to operate, a
consensus must already exist about its meaning, the rules by which it works, the
real meanings of alternatives and, most of all, the religious or philosophical con-
cepts about human beings and our societies underpinning an idea like consen-
sus-based decision making. After all, the political practice of the Quakers is
rooted in the idea that individual human beings have direct access to God and
may be sufficiently inspired by a holy spirit to speak out in Quaker meetings for
worship, or to withhold consent in meetings for business. If you do not believe in
a god whose spirit might on important occasions inspire your tongue with an
image of the divine, then consensus-based decision-making becomes an empty
and often dangerous form, because it is easily manipulated. Which is why con-
sensus-based decision-making is all but useless in most democratic organiza-
tions. Likewise, laissez-faire secular democratic social arrangements may seem
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pleasurably open to immigrant newcomers from more repressive cultures; but are
the premises on which such arrangements are erected recognized, much less em-
braced?
Secular democracy has been developed from certain basic ideas. In the United
States these ideas were particularly enunciated in the Declaration of Indepen-
dence and the later Bill of Rights. It may not be necessary to agree that our basic
truths are “self-evident,” or that it is a deistic “creator” who endows our “unalien-
able rights.” We might dispute that, though it is clear that neither Bibles nor
Korans, priests nor ministers, rabbis nor imams get into this act. No crucifix or
commandments or empowered prophet enters into this ground. What is indisput-
able is the idea, which America has struggled with for at least 230 years, that all
men and women are created equal, and that they all have equal rights, as later
defined in that Bill of Rights.
Reading Globalized Culture
Can the fundamental consensus about those rights, a consensus achieved
through much bloodshed and struggle, be sustained absent of a consensus about
the basis for them? Can such a consensus be achieved in the conditions of glob-
alization today, in which economic refugees find themselves pushed out of house
and home and into exile precisely by the same people, or at least the same society,
that acts out its indifference or hostility to their exile? Is the rage behind the
attacks of September 11 exactly the point at which the despair of unsettlement
and the force of globalization coalesce?
I do not pretend to have answers to all these impossible questions, though
certain things do seem reasonably clear to me. First, the situation of nation-states
with less explicitly defined founding documents than the United States is simply
more difficult. In such nations, the cultural settlements, so to speak, which
ground democratic politics are embodied in long-term practices and general as-
sumptions rather than in Declarations and manifestos. However much the De-
clarations and the Bills of Rights can be deconstructed, they do offer secular texts
of a power equivalent to those of sectarian religious dispensations.
Secondly, for those of us who do cultural and literary studies, the new situation
of globalization demands that we apply our talents for reading and analysis to
such documents. They cannot be left to the bloody hands of those who have
shaped the crises of global inequality and oppression. We have to examine such
texts with as much care and creativity as once we devoted to the Seneca Falls
Declaration of Sentiments, “The Yellow Wallpaper,” “The Revolt of Mother,” or
The Souls of Black Folks. We have to make more abundantly clear in our classrooms
why someone like Tom Paine, precisely in his union of secular democracy and
religious skepticism, is a writer for our own time.
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We need, too, in producing anthologies and syllabi, to find new ways to illumi-
nate the tensions, hopes, ideals, and despair of this new globalized moment. Just
as we learned to chart and teach the beauty and distinctiveness of multicultural
difference, so now we need to chart and teach whatever it is we find in the unset-
tlement, the bordered and borderless world, of immigration, globalization, and
movement across the planet. This is no easy task. In the 1960s, those of us con-
cerned with multiculturalism had to learn about the histories and contemporary
dynamics of racism, Indian removal and dispersion, Chinese exclusion and Japa-
nese internment, just to name a few examples. So now, we need to learn about
the economic and social meanings of American subsidies for corn and cotton
growers, or French support for sugar beets and other domestic farm products.
We need to comprehend these economic and political contexts within which cul-
ture is now being produced, distributed, and consumed – indeed, the meanings
of globalized culture as a commodity.
Just as in the 1960s and 1970s we had to learn about the work of women and
minority male writers who had never made it into our syllabi and graduate school
reading lists, so today we need to do lots of fresh reading. Just as Zora Neale
Hurston became an icon of multiculturalism – black, female, irreverent, forgotten
– or W.E.B. DuBois – activist, theorist, teacher, rebel, so today, we need to find
the writers who will speak to the globalized culture we can no longer avoid. They
may be fiction writers like Junot Díaz, Dominican and American, for whom the
interpenetration of old home and new constitutes a central dynamic. Or Helena
Viramontes, whose wonderful story “The Cariboo Café” offers a kind of paradigm
for the experiences of displacement to – and within – the United States. For my
own part, facing the daunting task of producing the revised sixth edition of the
Heath Anthology, I can only say that I feel much as I did in 1964, when I discovered,
or was told about, my fourth black writer, Paule Marshall. Change is afoot. How
shall we understand it, interpret it, and teach it? These, I think, are the questions
to which this present collection of essays has courageously committed us.16
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Native-Immigrant Boundaries and
Ethnic and Racial Inequalities
Richard Alba
On the surface, 9/11 may seem to have damaged multiculturalism throughout
Western societies, because of fears that tolerance for cultural difference will allow
radical Islam to proselytize further among immigrant populations. However, a
more thoroughgoing examination leads, I believe, to the conclusion that the fate
of multiculturalism is variable from one society to another, because it is tied to
the ways cultural difference is articulated by the construction of native-immigrant
boundaries. Multiculturalism, as will be apparent from the argument below, has
been especially at risk since 9/11 wherever Muslims form a large portion of the
low-status immigrant population, and thus where religion figures importantly in
the distinctions that natives, whether secular or Christian, draw between them-
selves and disfavored immigrant groups. Paradoxically, then, multiculturalism, at
least of a “soft” kind, has not been affected as much in the United States, despite
the traumatic impact of 9/11 there, as it has in some Western European countries.
My main concern in this paper is exploring conceptual approaches to the com-
parative study of immigrant-group incorporation in contemporary economically
advanced societies. The particular focus is on the second generation, those chil-
dren growing up in immigrant families; but especially those from families headed
by low-wage immigrants, as commonly found among Mexicans in the United
States, North Africans in France, and Turks in Germany. Such groups have en-
tered societies where today, more than ever, the level of educational attainment
determines life chances in the labor market. In particular, post-secondary creden-
tials are required to insure that young people can obtain “good” jobs (with the
quotation marks signifying that the relative goodness of jobs is socially defined).
In addition to sufficient educational attainment, the right early trajectory in the
labor market is necessary to position young people favorably. Given the starting
point for this second generation – growing up in families whose heads have very
limited education, and frequently leaving school without a diploma – climbing
the difficult educational ladder in such societies as France or Germany might
seem an impossible task.
It is very common, moreover, for second-generation youth to suffer from a
variety of ethnic penalties and yet to have opportunities for mobility and even
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assimilation. It is precisely in this area that I think conceptual work remains to be
done, especially in correlating the well-developed theories coming from the Uni-
ted States, such as segmented assimilation and new-assimilation theories, with
the circumstances in other societies such as France and Germany. I have identi-
fied three foci where this future work could be applied. The first is the ethnicity-
race distinction, which has worked well in the United States context and where
many of our ideas about assimilation vs. other forms of incorporation cluster. Yet
this distinction may not be easily applicable everywhere or across historical time.
Contemporary immigrant groups tend to display aspects of both concepts: North
Africans are, for instance, different on average from native French in phenotypical
appearance but also, quite importantly, in religion. It is not useful, I think, to
collapse our understanding of these differences into one or the other of these
aspects.1
A second focus for conceptual work concerns the differences, both obvious and
subtle, among these societies in their institutions, self-understandings, and his-
tories. There is an apparent path dependency in the incorporation of immigrant
groups in different societies, and we need a way to systematically include this in
our approach to studying incorporation. Finally, there is the question of how to
think about the relative chances of assimilation vs. something else, let us call it
“incorporation into a minority status,” which Alejandro Portes and Min Zhou
have theorized under the concept of “downward assimilation.”2
My argument will be that we cannot understand the contemporary stratification
dynamics in these societies without taking into account the efforts of privileged
native groups to maintain their privileges and relative social superiority. As I have
stated elsewhere, native groups typically seek to fortify the boundaries between
themselves and new immigrant groups.3 However, they do not have carte blanche
in doing so – they must build upon the already existing institutional and ideologi-
cal underpinnings currently viewed as legitimate; but these also serve to constrain
them in their efforts. Hence, the outcomes of the contemporary immigration
situation are not the same everywhere, nor do they necessarily lead to a rigid
stratification. While the social advance of some elements of the second genera-
tion occurs everywhere in North America and Western Europe, it is arguably
greater in settings where the boundaries between native and immigrant groups
can be blurred, meaning that under some circumstances the boundaries no long-
er unambiguously identify members of the two sides. It is also greater in situa-
tions that I will characterize, inspired by the somewhat old-fashioned stratifica-
tion concept of “structural mobility,” as involving mobility that occurs in a non-
zero-sum fashion; this could happen because of changes in the distribution pat-
terns of different types of jobs, or because of demographic changes that reduce
the flow into “good” jobs from those population groups that, in the recent past,
supplied the majority of this worker category.
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Bright Boundaries
From the perspective of a native majority, the ideal situation is approximated by
the kind of boundary I have labeled as “bright.” A bright boundary is unambigu-
ous – everyone knows at all times where he or she is placed with respect to it –
and charged with a hierarchical valence – one side is superior in social and even
moral terms, the other inferior.4 A bright boundary does not altogether prevent
social advance, but it permits it only under restrictive conditions, which include a
more-or-less complete assimilation. Advance thus takes the form of crossing the
boundary, a process akin to a conversion: in other words, a departure from one
group and discarding of signs of membership in it, linked to an attempt to enter
another group, with all of the social and psychic burdens a conversion process
entails – growing distance from peers, feelings of disloyalty, and anxieties about
acceptance. The black-white racial boundary in the United States has historically
represented the extreme form of a bright boundary. The case of the New York
literary critic and essayist Anatole Broyard, as depicted by Philip Roth in his novel,
The Human Stain, and analyzed by the literary critic Henry Louis Gates, Jr. in an
essay after Broyard’s death, exemplifies the kind of social advance I have in mind.
Broyard lived his adult life as a white man but was posthumously revealed to have
been born black. His passing as white required that he cut himself off from his
black relatives. Broyard’s children, who did not know of his racial past, only met
their relatives at his funeral, according to Gates.5
A bright boundary is intimidating to most members of a minority because of
the risks associated with an attempted boundary crossing: such an attempt may
be greeted with discrimination and ultimately rejection by those on the other side,
while it can forfeit the support of those in the group of origin, who deplore the
lack of loyalty displayed by the desire to leave them behind. The social psychology
of this situation was analyzed insightfully by Irvin Child in the early 1940s in his
book, Italian or American? Second Generation in Conflict, which examined the situation
of the Italian community in New Haven on the eve of World War II. Child de-
picted its members as hemmed in by a psychological double bind. If they at-
tempted to assimilate, they risked being rebuffed by the WASP majority, while
weakening or losing their ties to co-ethnics because of apparent disloyalty; if they
chose loyalty to the Italian group instead, they largely gave up on the chance to
improve more than marginally their social and material situation. Child found
many of them to be “apathetic” – his term – and unable to choose between these
two risky options. As one of his respondents plaintively expressed the dilemma:
“Then a lot of times in the show you see Mussolini on the screen and they all start
to razz him. Then I feel, ‘How the hell do I stand?’”6
To understand the nature of a native-immigrant boundary, we have to examine
how it is institutionalized, that is, the “web of interrelated” normative patterns
governing how the boundary is manifested to social actors.7 These normative pat-
native-immigrant boundaries and ethnic and racial inequalities 37
terns, exemplified by widely shared and often assumed expectations about which
and how religious holidays will be publicly recognized (for example Christmas,
but not Eid al-Fitr), determine the social distance between majority and minority
groups, and the difficulties associated with bridging it. Institutionalization, it
should be noted, is not simply a matter of the native-immigrant distinction itself,
but also of other distinctions, such as those in religion and language, correlated
with it. In an immigration society, this complex of distinctions is typically mani-
fest in many domains (implying that participants enact it with some regularity in
their everyday lives) and is associated with salient asymmetries in social status
and power.
The construction of immigrant-native boundaries is, in each society, a path-
dependent process hinging upon the materials available in the social-structural,
cultural, legal, and other institutional domains of the receiving society, as well as
on characteristics and histories the immigrants themselves present. Accordingly,
boundaries do not have the same character everywhere; and though invariably
they do allow for some assimilation to occur, the terms under which this happens
vary from one societal context to another.
One illustration of the bright-boundary situation is the citizenship dilemma of
second-generation Turks in Germany during the 1990s.8 As is well known, Ger-
man law at that time did not grant jus soli citizenship to the German-born children
of Turkish immigrants, but rather viewed them as having the same citizenship as
their parents, according to the jus sanguinis principle. To obtain German citizen-
ship then, the second (and even third) generation had to go through a naturaliza-
tion procedure that, until the law was mitigated in 1993, was no different from
what their Turkish-born parents would have had to endure, and required them to
relinquish their Turkish citizenship. Until the law changed, in fact, naturalization
decisions were made according to the judgments of state-level authorities; there
was no legal right to naturalize given that specific conditions had been fulfilled.
The decision to attempt to become a German citizen, then, involved a non-trivial
degree of risk for Turks. When I was in Germany in the early 1990s, I interviewed
some second-generation university students and found them mostly unwilling to
naturalize as Germans. When asked why, they frequently enough pointed to the
risks: as one university-educated, second-generation Turkish German told me, if
she took German citizenship and dropped her Turkish passport, there was no
guarantee that the Germans, many of whom were prejudiced against the Turks in
their midst, would not eventually change the law to expel the Turkish Germans;
where, then, would those who had given up their Turkish citizenship be left?
Now, one has to say that this bright-boundary situation proved unstable. After
German citizenship law was changed in 1993 to ease the naturalization of the
one-and-a-half and second generations, who had after all been educated in Ger-
man schools, the naturalization rate among the Turks increased notably. The in-
crease was accentuated by the decision of the Turkish government to facilitate the
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resumption of Turkish citizenship by those who disavowed it in order to natura-
lize, and the information about the procedure for regaining Turkish citizenship
became widespread after a mid-1990s article in Der Spiegel about this back-door
route to dual citizenship. The situation remains unstable, because the German
government has on occasion threatened to denaturalize those Turkish Germans
who had resumed their Turkish citizenship after naturalization. Another situation
that may test this principle of exclusive German citizenship could arise from the
1999 law granting provisional jus soli citizenship to the German-born children of
authorized immigrants. As is well known, this law requires these young people to
choose between German citizenship or their parents’ nationality by the age of 23,
and there are certain to be legal challenges to the requirement that they give up
their parents’ citizenship in order to retain German citizenship.
Religious Dimensions
In general, though, we should think of native-immigrant boundaries as an assem-
blage of specific settings in which the inequality between the native majority and
immigrant minority is spelled out and contested. For that reason, I believe it is
important to take even the religious dimension into account, although the socie-
ties presently receiving immigrants appear to be mainly secular. Yet underneath
the secular surface often lie institutional arrangements that marginalize the new-
comers. In this respect, France is particularly intriguing because, while the na-
tional ideology of laïcité proclaims a secular public sphere and an absolute separa-
tion of church and state, Christianity, especially in its Catholic version, has
nevertheless been granted a privileged position and is taken for granted in the
national identity. At the same time, Islam is pushed to the margins.9 One way
that this hierarchy is represented is through the list of government-sanctioned
national holidays, about half of which are Catholic holy days of obligation; the
list obviously goes beyond Christmas and Easter and includes, for instance, the
Feast of the Assumption (of the Virgin Mary), August 15. No Jewish or Muslim
holy days are included, although the Stasi Commission, which initiated the ban
on the wearing of the headscarf and other visible religious symbols, proposed
amending the national holidays to incorporate both non-Christian religions; but
this proposal was left on the cutting-room floor when the headscarf ban was en-
acted.
Another representation of this hierarchy is through religious buildings, a mate-
rial concretization of difference. France is filled with magnificent religious build-
ings from its Catholic past, such as the Cathedral of Notre Dame, located on the
spot where Paris is alleged to have its origins and where, I am told, the zero point
of the road system is located. All existing religious buildings standing in 1905,
when the French law on the separation of church and state was enacted, became
the property of the national and local governments and are maintained by them;
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religious congregations are nevertheless allowed to use them for services. At the
same time, mosques are barred from this status because they postdate 1905, and
they have proven difficult to build, often because of resistance from local resi-
dents. Most of the mosques and Muslim prayer spaces in France are makeshift,
converted apartments, former residential buildings and factories.10
A point often made in rebuttal of the above is that most North Africans in
France are not religious, and this may be so. Nevertheless, they surely understand
the message in this material and symbolic disparity: the culture that their parents
brought, and the religion to which they nominally belong, are regarded as infer-
ior. Just like Child’s respondent, they may feel, “How the hell do I stand?” This is
all the more evident should they attempt to resort to Islam as a way of claiming
“dignity” in situations where their limited prospects for joining the societal main-
stream weigh psychologically on them.11
Defended Privileges
Now I want to turn to a different facet of the position I laid out at the beginning,
namely the creativity of native majorities in devising mechanisms to preserve their
privileges. This agency – and, of course, one has to add the agency of the immi-
grant minority as well – implies that the study of inequality cannot rest on the
identification of mechanisms alone, because the mechanisms can change as the
native majority responds to changes in the situation as implemented, say, by the
state.12
The affluent members of the French majority work to preserve their privileges
through their influences on the educational system, which shares some similari-
ties with that in the United States but also exhibits some differences.13 Like the US
system, the primary and secondary schools children attend are determined by the
neighborhood of residence, and these are racially and economically segregated.
In fact, much like the US system, there is a great deal of segregation between
jurisdictions, legally incorporated places: in the United States, whites are concen-
trated in suburbs, while in France the immigrants are found there. In any event,
insofar as local authorities bear responsibility for education, this segregation
gives rise to clear-cut disparity in treatment.
However, there is a large difference between the systems in the degree to which
sub-national, as opposed to national, authorities are responsible for educational
funding, and this at first glance ought to create a greater tendency toward equality
among the educational institutions in France. For in the United States, there is
famously much greater fiscal responsibility in the hands of local and regional (in
other words, state) authorities, and accordingly substantial inequality among
schools and school districts, with heavily minority districts generally being the
least well-funded. In France, by contrast, the national government has a greater
role. Moreover, far more than in the United States, France has attempted to re-
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dress inequalities through the school system. For instance, in 1981 the French
government put in place a policy, the ZEP (for Zones of Educational Priority), to
provide additional funding to schools in difficulty according to criteria including
the percentage of immigrants in the catchment area. The French system has also
undergone a significant “democratization” in recent decades, with the aim of
opening up pathways for working-class and immigrant students to the baccalaur-
éat, the indispensable credential earned at the end of high school, which grants
access to higher education.14 A major element of democratization has been the
creation of new types of baccalauréat, deemed “professional” or “technical.” They
allow students who are not willing, or allowed, to commit to the classical curricu-
lum of the traditional baccalauréat, and who take an educational track that prepares
them for a career, to continue into the university system. In theory, these differ-
ences ought to lend themselves to greater disadvantages for the children of immi-
grants in the United States.
Yet, when we compare the educational attainments of two similar second-gen-
eration populations, Mexicans and North Africans, in the United States and
France, respectively, against those of the native majorities in these societies, the
degree of inequality appears very similar.15 At the lower end of the educational
distribution, marked by those who leave school without a secondary-school cre-
dential, the disparities in both countries are broadly similar, even though the ab-
solute percentages attaining a particular level of education are quite different. For
instance, Mexicans are between 2.5 and 3 times more likely than their Anglo
counterparts to leave without a high school diploma, and the ratio for the North
Africans in relation to the native French. At the other end, if we focus on the top
category of university education, designated in the United States as the attainment
of the bachelor’s degree and in France as more than two years at university, the
ratios of inequality are again very similar: among young men, the disparity is at
least 2-to-1 in both cases.
How is it, then, that the French system, whose underlying institutional struc-
tures appear more egalitarian than their equivalents in the United States, pro-
duces results so similar to those we find on the other side of the Atlantic? One
reason has to be that schools and native French parents, especially the more pri-
vileged ones, have reacted to the democratizing tendencies by creating new me-
chanisms supportive of inequality. One example is the growth of supplementary
educational activities during the primary years, such as so-called classes de nature,
involving excursions with a pedagogical character and even exchanges with other
countries, the latter often connected with instruction in foreign languages, with
costs paid by local school authorities and parents. Needless to say, the schools in
the more affluent areas organize such activities more frequently, because of par-
ents’ pressure on schools to provide this form of cultural and educational enrich-
ment and their willingness to pay the extra costs. Another example is the creation
by some secondary schools, especially those anxious to upgrade the social origins
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of their students and thus their reputations, of so-called hidden curricula (curricula
cachés), which typically involve difficult modern or ancient languages.
Middle-class French parents see mechanisms that create small advantages for
their children as essential because of how the stages of the French system inter-
lock to create ultimate disparities in life chances: the quality of the middle school
(collège) a child attends is determinative of the quality of the high school (lycée) he
or she can attend. The lycées make up a strictly hierarchical educational world, as
the differences in quality among them are so well recognized that the media have
published rankings of all the high schools in the country and, in response, so has
the Ministry of Education. These rankings are especially critical to parents and
students who aim for the uppermost strata of the educational system, the so-
called grandes écoles, the French equivalent to the Ivy League in the United States.
Admission to the grandes écoles is by competitive examination; however, to prepare
for the examination, students generally spend two years in so-called classes prepar-
atoires after high school. Attendance at a well-ranked lycée is a prerequisite for
entry to the classes preparatoires. In contrast to the United States, only one of the
grandes écoles, Science Po, has so far implemented an affirmative-action-like policy
of recruiting students from poor neighborhoods. The educational institutions
preparing young people for entry into French elites remain quite homogeneous.
The disparities between the native majority and the children of disfavored im-
migrants continue to grow once school is finished and young people confront the
labor market and its possibilities. Youth unemployment is high in France – widely
estimated at more than twenty percent of 18-24 year olds at the time of the Fall
2005 riots. One consequence is a systematic favoritism displayed by employers for
native French (and other groups that are viewed positively). The brunt of the un-
employment is borne by North Africans and a few other groups (including sub-
Saharan Africans).
In research that Roxane Silberman, Irène Fournier and I have conducted, the
discrepancy in unemployment between the native French and the North Africans
is marked for both sexes.16 The data come from the Génération 98 survey, in
which a random sample of all school leavers in 1998 was interviewed three years
later. Even after several years out of school, the ratio of North African-to-French
unemployment is 2-to-1. The higher rate of unemployment among the North Afri-
cans is somewhat explained by their lower average levels of schooling, but only
partly so. Moreover, even when the North African youth are employed, they work
at jobs that, in their perceptions, are more likely to be below their level of compe-
tence. They are also more likely to be pessimistic about their future employment.
Discrimination by employers appears to be part of the explanation for these
labor-market disparities. The North Africans (and sub-Saharan Africans) report,
according to the survey, very high levels of multiple incidents of discrimination at
the hands of employers. Discrimination is especially likely to be reported by
young men, almost a third of whom say that they have been victimized more than
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once. This discrimination is not just racial – only half of the North Africans who
have suffered discrimination believe that skin color is at its basis. It is also ethnic
and cultural – and hence more than half perceive their names as a characteristic
singling them out.
These reports of discrimination do not correspond very well with the level of
education – it is not, in other words, that the less well-educated, who suffer from
higher levels of unemployment, report discrimination as the cause. If anything, it
is the best-educated among the North Africans, those with university educations,
who are more likely to report discrimination. Among the young men, it appears
also that the perception of discrimination is the highest among those with the
deepest roots in metropolitan France, in other words those who have parents
born there. This suggests, not unreasonably, that those who perceive themselves
as most entitled to equal treatment are the most sensitive to unfairness at the
hands of employers.
So far, we have been analyzing ethnic stratification in a way that is quite con-
genial to most sociologists, and suggests a picture of a relatively stable stratifica-
tion order between the native majority and at least some immigrant-origin mino-
rities. This picture does not preclude boundary crossing for some members of
these minorities, but it suggests that it is unusual. The picture I have drawn may
lead some to wonder what has happened to the assimilation possibilities de-
scribed in Remaking the American Mainstream.17
Opportunities for Assimilation
Now I want to shift gears by suggesting that, in all the economically advanced
societies, the potential exists for greater porousness, if not blurring, in native-
immigrant boundaries through the socioeconomic advance of substantial por-
tions of the current second generation. One potential cause lies in changing de-
mography, in the eventually declining numbers of natives in the age cohorts com-
ing to maturity, and hence in the decreasing numbers of natives from the more
privileged social strata, who would be expected to monopolize the better posi-
tions in the work force. The beneficial consequences of this changing demo-
graphic for immigrant-origin minorities are certainly not guaranteed to occur,
but if members of the second generation are poised to take advantage of the
openings, their advance would certainly be supported by ideologies of equal op-
portunity which are widely accepted in all these societies.
Opportunities of the sort I am about to present are rarely the subject of socio-
logical examination, as the focus – indeed, the obsession – of sociologists is gen-
erally with the documentation of inequality and the identification of the mechan-
isms that produce it.18 I believe that identifying opportunities for change and the
contingencies that, according to sociological knowledge, are likely to affect the
outcomes should be considered as equal responsibilities.
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I will use changes already ongoing in the United States to make these points. I
view these changes as an instance of a phenomenon I have argued has affected
the assimilation of Italian-Americans and other European ethnics during the
twentieth century, namely “non-zero-sum mobility.”19 I will regard mobility as
“non-zero-sum” when it does not require downward mobility by more privileged
groups to occur. During the mid-twentieth century, such mobility was generated
by changes in the occupational structure, which is to say the distribution of the
workforce across occupations, such that openings were created in the middle and
upper portions of this structure; at the same time, there was an enormous expan-
sion in post-secondary education, which trained many second-generation (and
third-generation) ethnics to take these positions. Upward mobility of this sort by
less-favored groups is less likely to be accompanied by an intensification of com-
petition along ethnic and racial lines, allowing for the relaxation of boundaries.
This is what happened during the mobility of the European ethnics, who were
able to convert their socioeconomic progress into social proximity to other
whites, as evidenced by decreased residential segregation and increased intermar-
riage.
Is mobility of this sort occurring in the United States today? I suspect that it is,
although my evidence for the mobility having a non-zero-sum character falls well
short of proof.20 There are two special features of the US context which should be
borne in mind and are ambiguous with respect to the non-zero-sum aspect: one
is that the United States has rather strong anti-discrimination laws, which as Alba
and Nee argue has had an impact on opening up the mainstream labor market to
minorities; and the other is that affirmative-action policies, however disputed they
may be, are still meaningful in some institutional sectors, above all in post-sec-
ondary education, and they create opportunities for immigrant and non-immi-
grant minorities to obtain the educational credentials needed to position them-
selves to take jobs in the upper tiers of the workforce.21
This impact can already be seen in the recruitment into “good” jobs in the
American economy. Suppose we define such jobs in terms of the best-paid occu-
pations. For this exercise, let us define such occupations as those accounting for
twenty-five percent of the full-time labor force (the top quartile of jobs). Not all
the holders of these jobs, it should be underscored, are found among the best-
paid workers; these cross-sections of the labor market are defined in terms of the
characteristics of occupations, not of individuals, some of whom are, in any
event, just beginning their work careers. Looking at the labor force in this way
does allow us to see how individuals of different racial, ethnic, and nativity sta-
tuses are distributed across positions associated with systematically different po-
tentials for economic reward.
When the data from the 2000 US Census are analyzed, one finds that the social
origins of the incumbents of the best jobs in the US labor force are shifting,
because of demographic changes and also probably because of affirmative action.
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In the oldest age group, individuals aged 55-64 in 2000, 84 per cent of the holders
of the best jobs were native-born non-Hispanic whites; in other words, members
of the dominant majority population of the society. This fraction shifted very
slightly in the next oldest age group (45-54 in 2000), but changed more notice-
ably with each younger group. Among those aged 25-34 in 2000, 74 per cent of
the top quartile jobs were occupied by native-born whites. Indeed, 22-23 per cent
of these top jobs were held in this age group by non-whites and Hispanics; this
fraction doubled between the oldest and youngest cohorts.
To be sure, equal chances to occupy the best jobs has not been attained: whites
remain highly privileged. A substantial portion of the non-whites and Hispanics
who are entering these jobs come from the ranks of immigrants, not native-born
minorities. However, the proportions occupied by native-born blacks and Hispa-
nics, in particular, are clearly rising. From a paltry five percent of the top quartile
jobs in the oldest age cohort, their share rose to ten percent in the youngest.
Nevertheless, the large fraction of jobs held by foreign-born Asians deserves to
be noted: they hold six percent of the top quartile jobs in the youngest age group.
Fading Boundaries
What sorts of changes are to be anticipated by, say, 2020? Overall change in the
composition of the top jobs is programmed by the succession of cohorts, which
will lead to the massive disappearance from the labor market of the jobholders
who were aged 45-64 in 2000. These are the cohorts most dominated by native-
born non-Hispanic whites, and their places will be taken by those aged 25-44 in
2000, where the presence of non-whites and Hispanics has increased.
What will the composition of the younger cohorts look like in 2020? It is im-
possible to say for certain, in part because the answer must depend on future
immigration. But two observations point to further increases in the proportions
of minorities in top jobs. One is the decline in the absolute number of native-born
non-Hispanic whites available to take them; because of the timing of the post-
World War II baby boom, this is particularly noticeable in the birth cohorts that
in 2020 will supplant the 35-44 year-olds of 2000. The native-born white holders
of top jobs in that age group were recruited from a baby-boom contingent which,
despite the mortality by early middle age, still numbered nearly thirty-one million
individuals. However, as of 2000, the 15-24 year-olds who will replace them con-
tained only twenty-four million native-born non-Hispanic whites, and mortality is
likely to winnow this group by about half a million between 2000 and 2020. By
comparison, there is a roughly stable parity in native-born whites between the 25-
34 year-olds of 2000 and the group that forms their replacements, aged 5-14 in
the census.
However, even there stability will not guarantee the whites’ share of these jobs,
for their number is likely to increase. Between 2000 and 2020, Census Bureau
native-immigrant boundaries and ethnic and racial inequalities 45
population projections suggest a total population increase on the order of twenty
percent. Very likely, the occupations in the top quartile will expand at least as fast
as the rest of the labor force, if not faster (as shown by the projections of the
Bureau of Labor Statistics about future changes in the American job scene), and
recruitment will have to expand accordingly. That will probably mean that the
share of whites in these jobs will decline sharply. The fall-off is likely to be espe-
cially pronounced among the 35-44 year-olds of 2020: if the recruitment of na-
tive-born whites to these jobs remains at the same proportion relative to the pop-
ulation base as it was in 2000, then there will only be enough of them to fill about
sixty percent of the available positions.
A drop this great may be an unlikely outcome, and in any event one cannot
predict the future changes in top jobs with any precision. Perhaps the recruitment
of native-born whites to these jobs will cut more deeply into that population
group in the future than it has in the past. Perhaps the decline in the availability
of qualified non-Hispanic whites will be compensated by greater immigration.
We do not know, but forecasting some degree of continuing decline in the non-
Hispanic white share of the best-paid occupations seems a safe bet, given the
changes of the recent past and foreseeable demographic shifts.
These changes do not mean an end to racial and ethnic inequalities. When
groups are compared in the aggregate, they will continue to show large average
disparities. Behind these disparities, though, there will be some reshuffling, as
the overlaps between the overall distributions of white and minority status in-
crease. This is another way of saying that a growing number of minorities will
interact on a regular basis and as equals with whites, as well as with others whose
origins are different from their own, and most whites will find themselves in-
creasingly confronted with inescapable diversity. This interpenetration of social
worlds is anticipated by assimilation theory.
In sum, the next two decades will offer an extraordinary opportunity for minor-
ity mobility and for a dismantling of the major racial/ethnic boundaries of US
society, which David Hollinger has described with the phrase, “ethno-racial pen-
tagon.”22 Yet, other than a more diverse mainstream than exists today, it is im-
possible to be very precise about the nature of the changes that may occur. This is
in part because they will not be dictated by demographic and socioeconomic
structures, which are to a great degree predictable, but forged by human agents.
Thus, among the questions that remain to be answered are the following:
First, to what extent will socioeconomically mobile minorities be able to realize
broader social gains from their entry into higher-status occupational spheres?
Assimilation in its broadest sense depends on the ability to integrate into main-
stream social settings – to mix with whites and others of the same socioeconomic
strata and, thereby, to provide a favorable starting position for one’s children. An
enormous stream of research about African-Americans shows that, because of
discrimination and institutional racism, they have generally been unable to realize
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these gains – for instance, they have usually been confined to largely black resi-
dential areas regardless of their economic attainments.23 What research there is
suggests so far that Asians and light-skinned Hispanics are not as constrained in
residential choice as blacks historically have been.24 However, this is just one in-
dicator of ability to integrate, and the research on it is hardly definitive.
Second, to what extent will majority-group Americans be willing to invest in
the educations of minority and immigrant-origin youth, to enable them to take
advantage of the opportunities for mobility now opening up?25 The public-school
system in the United States, especially in heavily minority areas, is increasingly in
disarray, troubled by segregation and inadequate funding (such as California’s
Proposition 13). Poor educational institutions will limit the ability of youth from
low-income families to rise far above their origins and seize the occupational
positions becoming available because of the decline in the number of whites.
Third, will future changes affect African-Americans and immigrant-origin
groups equally? One of the profoundly rooted patterns in US history is the prefer-
ence for immigrants over native minorities, especially African-Americans. This
pattern operated during the twentieth century, in the ability of once-despised
southern and eastern European groups, such as the southern Italians, to distance
themselves from black Americans and rise into the white American main-
stream.26 This historical process is of course the subject of “whiteness” literature,
which has emphasized the policies and devices that enable ethnics of recent im-
migrant origins to separate themselves from blacks and to gain acceptance as
whites. There is a substantial risk of this pattern repeating itself in the contempo-
rary era. This risk is visible in two ways: the continuing preference of majority-
group Americans for immigrants, who are seen as unlike blacks in the degree to
which they work hard to improve their lives and to provide opportunities for their
children; and the emerging tensions between immigrants and black Americans.
In a study of new Latin American immigrants in the smaller cities of upstate
New York, my colleagues and I have found that the immigrants find African-
Americans to be very hostile, while white Americans are perceived as welcoming
or, at worst, neutral.27 Hence, the immigrants, who often live side by side with
African-Americans in very poor neighborhoods, are motivated to separate them-
selves from native-born minorities as soon as they can. This could lead to the
emergence of the African-American/non-African American distinction as the key
fault line in US society.28
The demographic dynamics I have identified as at work in the United States are
not to be found there alone. The foreseeable demographic changes in European
societies point in the direction of racial and ethnic shifts across birth cohorts that
are as pronounced as those in the United States, and to shortages in the labor
market as well (particularly in countries like Germany, which have experienced
low levels of fertility in the native population for a sustained period). These demo-
graphic conditions could favor non-zero-sum mobility for the European-born
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and/or -raised members of immigrant minorities who have acquired the educa-
tional, cultural and social capital to take advantage of opportunities for socioeco-
nomic advancement. If such non-zero-sum mobility does develop, then the
brightness of the boundaries that currently distinguish the native population
from the immigrant-origin one could fade, at least on some levels of these socie-
ties. This claim is, granted, still quite hypothetical, and demography is not des-
tiny, because the ultimate outcomes will be shaped as much by human agents as
by demographic and socioeconomic structures. We can only think fruitfully about
boundary change if we have concepts acknowledging the possibility of it occur-
ring, and helping us to identify the conditions that facilitate it.
The Social-Boundary Concept
In conclusion, I have tried to establish three central points in this essay, which
has been concerned with the role of social boundaries in the construction, main-
tenance and reduction of racial and ethnic inequalities arising from contemporary
immigration of third-world immigrants into the societies of North America and
Western Europe. I have argued, first, that the character of these boundaries is not
the same everywhere, for they depend on social-structural, cultural, legal, and
other institutional domains of the receiving society, as well as on characteristics
and histories that the immigrants themselves present. This character has conse-
quences for the opportunities available to minorities.
The second and third claims concern changes that boundaries may undergo.
On the one hand, the native majority, the dominant population in the society, may
seek to reinforce boundaries in order to preserve its privileges in the face of the
increasing racial and ethnic diversity produced by immigration. On the other
hand, boundaries may be challenged and eventually reduced in their salience by
non-zero-sum opportunities for second-generation mobility, foreseeable as a re-
sult of demographic change throughout the advanced economies; this change is
associated in particular with the declining size of the birth cohorts of the majority
population that will be entering adulthood during the next quarter-century. All
three of these points are intended to demonstrate the usefulness of the social-
boundary concept for illuminating the forces affecting racial and ethnic inequal-
ity.
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Coherence, Difference, and Citizenship:
A Genealogy of Multiculturalism
Ed Jonker
Debates on social and cultural identity have a long, rich, and diverse history. The-
ories of multiculturalism and social pluralism are fairly recent additions to a long-
standing dispute on the nature of culture and society. The most vehement po-
lemics developed during the twentieth century, while the roots of these
conflicting theories go back to the nineteenth, and even the eighteenth century.
The conflicting interpretations offered by Enlightenment and Romanticism, often
characterized as “human” universalism versus “cultural” particularism, opened
up discussions of political loyalties and cultural preferences that preoccupy many
Western countries to the present day.
The framework of this discourse has not really been changed after September
11, 2001. The ensuing War on Terror only exacerbated disputes on loyalty and
citizenship. It still threatens to narrow down the debate on multiculturalism to
the position of the Islamic minorities in Western countries. That is one of the
grounds for putting recent debates in a broader perspective.
A natural starting point for tracing the history of these disputes is the genesis
of modern citizenship in the context of the nation-state. The humanities and so-
cial theory played a significant role in this discourse about citizenship. Initially,
they were the producers of the new, often conflicting identities. Historians, lin-
guists, and philosophers developed the concepts instrumental in creating national
identities. In that sense, the humanities contributed to social and political exclu-
sion. Later, many historians and cultural scholars regretted the role their disci-
plines played in nation-building. In the wake of World Wars I and II, they tried to
set the humanities free from this legacy by helping to deconstruct nationalism.
Not everyone was convinced by their attempts, however. This distrust gave rise
to a second, parallel discourse, born out of misgivings about the historicizing
humanities. Ideas of nationalism were replaced by notions of multiculturalism.
Many political and cultural theorists distrusted historical arguments as such and
tried to get rid of history altogether. They did not succeed. In the face of current
political and cultural uncertainties, historians have again been asked to deliver
narratives of social cohesion and national purpose.
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The Historiography of Coherence
Nations require a unified national citizenship. Generations of historians have
contributed to the making of these national identities, sometimes in a purely ro-
mantic and particular fashion, sometimes with a more enlightened and universal-
ist flavor. To this end, they have developed a whole range of political and cultural
concepts, which can be divided into two different traditions. A somewhat older
historiographic dichotomy is that between “objective” and “subjective” concep-
tions of the nation. The objective conception is founded on the idea of shared
characteristics based on descent or on a common culture. This often boils down
to a shared language. This idea is the basis for cultural nationalism, as formu-
lated by the German cultural thinker Johann Gottfried Herder. He deemed com-
munal identities “objective” because their cultural character exists independently
of the preferences of their individual members. Their cultural peculiarities are
primordially determined. An echo of this view is still to be heard in the definition
of citizenship on the basis of the jus sanguinis, that is: biological descent. The
subjective concept, on the other hand, does not look for predetermined biological
or fixed cultural inheritances, but perceives the nation as a free act of willpower,
as a “daily plebiscite,” in the famous catchphrase of the French philosopher and
historian Ernest Renan.
The objective concept of nationhood has of course been heavily attacked by
historians and political scientists, who associate it with the delusions of racial
purity and pseudo-biology that have given birth to the twentieth-century geno-
cides. The same goes for the idea of cultural primordialism, the idea that cultures
possess a timeless core, and in some mystic way are present before they come
into existence. Contemporary anthropologists and historians see these commu-
nities of descent as cultural constructions. The rigid, stable cultures of Herder
are now primarily viewed, in the well-known phrase of Benedict Anderson, as
imagined communities. Both of these objectivistic concepts – the biological and the
cultural – are distrusted and condemned as “essentialist,” a term of abuse for
attempts to justify a fixed cultural and national unity with the argument that it
simply has always existed. Opponents accuse essentialist thinkers of creating a
kind of right of first birth for their own “kin,” thereby excluding outsiders and
new immigrants.1
The subjective idea of the nation has a somewhat more positive standing. The
concept is not German, but French in origin, and is therefore less associated with
the hateful idea of Blut und Boden (blood and soil). Adherents of the subjective view
present it as voluntaristic in the sense that, in theory, individuals are free to de-
cide whether they want to participate in the national community. On closer in-
spection, however, the “daily plebiscite” turns out to be a binding and long-last-
ing collective identity. It has an enduring continuity and shows traits of a concept
of the general will, the volonté génerale, which is not always really democratic. The
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related definition of citizenship, that of the jus soli, may distance itself from deter-
ministic blood ties, but it allows the inhabitants of its soil no room for opting out,
certainly not on a massive, collective scale.
In practice, this voluntaristic nationalism was very much akin to its objectivistic
counterpart. Renan developed his subjective idea of nationalism in the service of
French nationalist revanchism after the lost Franco-Prussian War of 1870.
Although the inhabitants of Alsace used the German language and were of Ger-
manic descent, Renan declared that they had chosen to belong to France, at least
from the French Revolution onward. That decision extended to the generations of
Alsatians who were under German political rule after 1870. Renan did not really
ask for a daily confirmation: “Frenchness” more or less had become a part of the
“genetic” make-up of the Alsatians.
With the benefit of hindsight, we can now see that both models of identity, the
subjectivist and the objectivist, are imagined communities to which the believers try
to ascribe a transcendent nature that denies the historical, contextual, and contin-
gent character of these social configurations. This tendency to reification has
been intellectually enhanced by the inclination of many social scientists and hu-
manities scholars to think in terms of orderly, tidy, coherent, and stable research
units. Continuity and familiarity also are political desiderata. We see this reflected
in the recent demand for cultural and political canonization. Politicians hope to
foster social cohesion by promoting a coherent national identity.2
The Historiography of Difference
So, most historians and social scientists have come to regard both the subjectivist
and the objectivist concepts of national and cultural identity as “essentializing”
constructions. In the past two or three decades, historiography and cultural stud-
ies have moved in a new direction. They have taken leave of coherence and are
foregrounding differences. In trying to avoid essentialism, historians and anthro-
pologists emphasize the cultural diversity and the provisional nature of cultural
units and political arrangements. They prefer to speak of the informal fragmenta-
tion hiding behind the façades of official uniformity, of the contingency of exis-
ting institutions, and of the temporality of solutions. Coherence has become a
doubtful axiom, politically and culturally, as well as from a scholarly point of
view. Nation-states are presented as accidental constructions, cultural homogene-
ity as temporary, and coherent explanations as superficial and misleading.
We hear the distant drums of postmodernist deconstruction. After the demoli-
tion of the grand narratives with their vast coherence, even minor counter-narra-
tives or micro-histories with modest, “thin” coherences have been severely criti-
cized. Distrust of big structures and traditional consistency has become
pervasive.3 Postcolonial theories have torn apart Western imperialist assump-
tions. The European colonial empires turn out to have been cultural, multi-ethnic
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patchworks, just like their predecessors, the older Asiatic empires. The same ap-
plies to the modern nation-states in Europe itself. Whether they presented them-
selves as “objective” ethnic nations or as “subjective” civic nations is considered in-
consequential. Both lines of argument are now regarded as the ideologically
motivated masking of underlying cultural diversity.
Recent historiography tends to see modern nation-states not only as artifacts,
but also as failures. The result is, as Donna R. Gabaccia argues, that “…in both
Europe and in the neo-Europes created by its empires around the world, earlier
histories of homogeneous nations have given way to explorations of relations be-
tween national states and their diverse populations.”4 She characterizes this mul-
ticultural approach in recent historiography in these words:
Some of these “multicultural’’ histories acknowledge that nations are multi-
ethnic; that is they recognize that nations include people who speak different
languages or worship and live in quite diverse ways. Other multicultural his-
tories focus on the diversity of cultural identities among citizens who have
origins in other countries or who have experienced various forms of religious,
racial, or ethnic persecution.5
The history of traditional immigration countries like the United States, Canada,
and Australia can no longer be written within the framework of concepts like that
of the nation of immigrants or the famed melting pot. Historians today prefer to
speak of the salad bowl, the mosaic, or the kaleidoscope to acknowledge the lasting
existence of multi-ethnicity. Americans are fond of hyphenated identities, made up
of at least two components: African-American, Native-American, Asian-Ameri-
can. Even these are contested concepts. The label Asian-American, for example,
seems to designate a class of American citizens, who happen to be non-white,
non-black, and non-native. The artificiality of this administrative coherence has
been criticized. Rather than “Asian”, is their cultural identity not primarily Chi-
nese, Japanese, or Korean? Even these classifications may themselves be too
broad and artificial.
Latin-American countries like Brazil and Mexico boast their multi-ethnic and
hybrid character. Creolization has changed from a word of abuse into a proud
statement. Racial diversity has been proclaimed the essence of Brazilian identity.
Mexico has proudly announced the advent of a new “cosmic” race, resulting from
inter-racial breeding. While understandable as a counterpoint to the traditional
identity politics of the United States, these attempts at nation-building on the
basis of multiculturalism are just as artificial as the older mono-cultural European
examples. It makes one sympathize with those political thinkers who want to try
and go “beyond ethnicity.”6
The recent historiography of Europe shows comparable trends. The artificial
and provisional nature of existing nation-states is highlighted. The unification of
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Germany in the nineteenth century is now depicted as the formation of a nation
of immigrants. France is a mosaic of distinct regional identities, and Italy is a
hodgepodge of fragments that have never really been glued together. Crown wit-
nesses for this pluralistic interpretation of national histories are the newly rejuve-
nated regional identities in Europe. The current vitality of Scottish, Catalan, Bas-
que, and Corsican communities is cited as proof of the demise of the
homogeneous nation-state.
Paradoxically, these regional or even local ethnicities are rather credulously
portrayed as natural, homogeneous units. That minorities constitute imagined
communities, in the same way dominant majorities do, is disregarded. Their ex-
clusivist and sometimes oppressive character is often overlooked, even in the face
of nasty internal conflicts on the nature – the essence – of these small, seemingly
harmless identities. To be fair, it must be said that these problems of parochial-
ism, exclusiveness, and intolerance within small communities have recently been
more openly debated.7
The Condition of Late Modernity
Many Western intellectuals feel a heavy responsibility for the political and ethical
quality of debates about identity and citizenship. Because the main intellectual
culprit in this debate still is Western nationalism, they prefer to discuss these
issues in the more universalistic framework of modernity and modernization.
To many social and political thinkers, traditional historical representation is an
awkward guide in these matters. The close ties modern, Western historiography
has had with national identity and white colonialism form an uneasy legacy.
These philosophers, sociologists, and political scientists think that history be-
longs to the past. History, in the disciplinary shape we recognize as familiar, is a
product of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. It belongs to the period of
“heavy modernity.” This expression was coined by the British-Polish sociologist
Zygmunt Bauman. By heavy modernity, Bauman means traditional modernity,
built on heavy industry and sturdy institutions like companies, banks, stock ex-
changes, labor unions, and nation-states. These states possessed clearly demar-
cated territories and coherent cultural identities. This is where history came in
handy: it offered an identity to a national community living in an organized coun-
try. In this setting (national) historiographies delivered their contributions, for
better or for worse.
Now the situation has dramatically changed. We no longer live under condi-
tions of heavy modernity, with its reassuring continuities. Instead we have en-
tered the stage of late modernity, which Bauman calls “liquid modernity.” Here
uncertainties abound: heavy institutions are withering away, national states are
giving way to international corporations, and national governments are losing
power to supranational alliances. Cultural identities are not stable, but called into
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question. Citizens of late modernity are free-floating individuals, looking for new
affiliations and new loyalties. When they find them, they will be of a contingent
and temporal nature. Liquid modernity breeds a nomadic consciousness.8
The German social philosopher Ulrich Beck is of the opinion that we live in an
age of risk production. Traditional modernity, with its centralized economic and
political institutions, realized a controlled wealth production. Now, at the begin-
ning of the twenty-first century, we have lost control. Beck states that we live in a
“risk society”, with different uncertainties than those earlier generations encoun-
tered. The risks we now run are of a global, fundamental character; they threaten
the existence of the human species. Traditional control mechanisms, mostly on a
national scale, no longer work. They are incapable of containing these risks.
What is needed is a new organization of society and politics, with new associa-
tions of conscious citizens. We require a new awareness of the risks we run in
perpetuating traditional modern economic and political practices. Beck aims for
a “reflexive modernity” in which we acknowledge and act upon our ecological
responsibilities.9
In a comparable way, the British sociologist Anthony Giddens speaks of “man-
ufactured uncertainties” in an age of high or late modernity. He is somewhat
more optimistic and practical than Beck. The risk society we live in is also a trust
society. What needs to be done is to organize “active trust” in new domains of
sub-politics, like schools and health care centers. Giddens pleads for “institu-
tional reflexivity” and a reform of the welfare state. This is in essence what Beck
too is after.10
It would be wrong to dismiss these theories out of hand as another episode of
a-historical sociological overconfidence. Bauman, Beck, and Giddens are not an-
nouncing that we live in a totally new, post-modern condition. They link late
modernity to its heavy or traditional past. High modernity is considered an ex-
acerbation of trends already visible in earlier modern societies. These social
thinkers are in fact trying to make sense of our new surroundings. One could
even maintain that they are searching for a new historical worldview, developing
a new historiographical framework.
Significantly, historians are not of much help in this quest. Professional history
seems to be sedentary, not nomadic. What history has on offer is either tradi-
tional heritage or academic critical precision. The best that historians can deliver
on a grander scale seems to be doomsday scenarios on failing civilizations, like
Jared Diamond’s Collapse and Richard Posner’s Catastrophe.11 That is heavy history
indeed. No wonder that many thinkers turn elsewhere for more creative incen-
tives.
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Citizenship without History
This aversion to history has been translated into systematic theories on citizen-
ship. In this field, many efforts have been made to circumvent history. One of the
most appealing experiments is John Rawls’s theory of justice. Rawls tried to rea-
son out an idea of human rights and freedom by abstracting from the historical
environment. His vantage point for the design of a just society is reasonable
thinking without contextual impediments. He argues that members of a society
should define their “primary goods” behind a so-called “veil of ignorance,” un-
hampered by historical memories or interests. These goods turn out to be basic
human rights, together with a political system that safeguards the freedom of
individuals. Rawls’s original position in his Theory of Justice from 1971 has been
severely criticized for being naive and a-historical.
Multiculturalist and postmodernist critics have accused him of extolling a par-
ticular solution, that of Western liberalism, into a universal directive for political
organization. Though later, in his 1995 work Political Liberalism, Rawls came round
to a position of granting the possibility of several ways of conducting decent pol-
itics, to many adherents of cultural pluralism this still was not good enough. They
pin down Rawls and other liberals as protagonists of Western hegemony.12
Remarkably, these pluralist and multiculturalist critics do not have much use
for historical arguments. For instance, the Canadian theorist Will Kymlicka, one
of the foremost political thinkers on multiculturalist citizenship and minority
rights, explicitly discards historical arguments. Only because people have been
taught to treasure them, he argues, can these historical representations not be
totally ignored. Unhappily, they mostly stand in the way of resolving conflict
situations.13
What makes historical thinking difficult to stomach for these often anthropo-
logically oriented thinkers is the tacit definition of cultural identity many histor-
ians exploit. In particular, the cultural theory of Herder, the darling of many his-
torians, is frowned upon. The tradition of Herder seems at first glance a
pluralistic and tolerant one. Herder thought that all cultures have an undeniable
right to existence, though he was somewhat fonder of great nations than of smal-
ler ones. As a rule, though, cultural communities may expect that other groups
acknowledge and respect their cultural activities as valuable.
According to the British political philosopher Bhikhu Parekh, this is only a
halfway house. Parekh values Herder’s attempt at a hermeneutic understanding
of foreign cultures. Herder’s accomplishment certainly is to view cultures as sepa-
rate and at the same time equal to each other. Yet his cultural pluralism is only
partial, because he sees distinct cultures as tension-free, harmonious wholes.
Herder, Parekh says, is allergic to the idea of contradictions within cultures: “He
cherishes a cultural plural world, but not a culturally plural society.”14 Parekh sees
this idea of coherent cultural units as false. The postulation of stable, demarcated,
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and autonomous cultures or communities allows no room for divergence and is
in fact essentialist. Parekh sees as the net effect that in the United Kingdom
responsible multiculturalism is defined in a way that has a suspicious likeness to
liberal, protestant citizenship.
In his The Multiculturalism of Fear, Jacob Levy, too, describes Herder as a danger-
ous guide to solving actual multicultural problems. First, there is Herder’s moral
imperative. Members of a culture are entitled to express and fulfill their cultural
needs. This means that they are not only allowed to enjoy their culture, but that,
in addition, they have the moral obligation to do so. This moral mission has led
to many political disasters. Second, Herder’s definition of culture also is problem-
atic. Herder delineated cultural communities mainly along the lines of shared
languages, a criterion that boils down to the demarcation of ethnic-national uni-
ties. Inside these nations, no internal divisions could exist. Nations were thought
of as homogeneous, coherent, cultural and moral unities. That, Levy argues, has
rarely, if ever, been the case in reality. Cultural and political differences do not
confine themselves to national boundaries; they are disputed within contested
national societies, which in addition change over time. We recognize here the
historiography of difference, the only kind of history that is acceptable to the
participants in this discourse.15
Coping with Difference
The common wisdom among these scholars is that there exist not so much
clashes between essentialist cultural blocks as disputes within changing civiliza-
tions. The way to deal with such cultural and political conflict is not to try and
homogenize societies. Multiculturalists like Will Kymlicka advocate a political re-
cognition of cultural differences. The phrase politics of recognition has been made
famous by the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor. Taylor has written a famous
historical analysis of the genesis of the modern self, but at heart he remains a
philosopher and theologian. This results at one point in a remarkably anti-tradi-
tionalist way of thinking. Taylor and other multiculturalists have been accused of
uncritically venerating each and every cultural practice which, critics maintain,
makes them conservative allies of obscurantist traditions. This is not totally fair.
Certainly, Taylor thinks that it is important to value foreign cultures. He is not
over-idealistic about this in that he does not think that we will all live together
happily ever after. He proposes more realistic ways of coping with cultural differ-
ences.16
Consequently, Taylor regards cultures not as mysterious, sacrosanct entities
immune to criticism or change. He translates his dispassionate position into a
striking anti-heritage argument. Existing cultures do not ipso facto have the right
to eternal perpetuation. Taylor sees no moral obligation to guarantee the life of
each and every cultural community through countless future generations. In this
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respect, Taylor is in agreement with the German defender of enlightened moder-
nity Jürgen Habermas, who opposes the artificial conservation of outdated cul-
tures. If a culture is not viable under conditions of late modernity, it will disap-
pear; there is no moral imperative to support non-viable cultural arrangements.
Habermas objects to the often-made analogy with ecological conservation. Cul-
tural survival is not comparable to species preservation, because a culture has to
be consciously willed by its participants. Individuals must have the right to give
up cultural practices and to leave their cultural communities behind. The philoso-
pher Anthony Appiah has made a similar observation. He holds that cultural con-
servation may seem a lofty ideal, but that it can restrict the autonomy of individual
and even of future participants. New generations will be groomed to conform to
the social expectations of “their” culture. This would force people to act out con-
ventional life scripts written for them by others.17
The American intellectual historian David Hollinger seeks to go beyond multi-
culturalism to “postethnicity.” He asks for a rehabilitation of the liberal genera-
tions that dominated the intellectual debates from the 1930s to the 1960s. He
mentions social scientists such as Franz Boas, Margaret Mead, Ruth Benedict,
Robert Merton, and (even) Talcott Parsons. These thinkers stood in the tradition
of the Enlightenment, advocated universal human rights, and used generalizing
social-scientific concepts for the explanation of social and cultural behavior. We
can now see that their cosmopolitanism was less encompassing than they them-
selves thought it to be. Their universalism was of a very Westernized kind. In
criticizing this, from the 1970s onward the intellectual trend has been one of
“historicity” and “localism.” In the footsteps of Thomas Kuhn, Clifford Geertz,
and Richard Rorty, everything was reduced to local knowledge. The emphasis
changed from species-centered analysis to ethnos-centered empathy. The intellec-
tual effort concentrated on problems of cultural understanding, which unfortu-
nately took the form of uncritical acceptance of each and every assertion of collec-
tive cultural identity. Hollinger supports the American historian Peter Novick,
who deplores the fact that the old democratic war cry of Carl Becker – every man
his own historian – has degenerated into a conformist straitjacket in which every
group has to pay tribute to its own provincial history.
The cure, Hollinger thinks, may be a shot of good old universalism. The older
liberal generations may have been somewhat particular in their definition of
world citizenship, but they meant well. Their merit is that they spoke out against
racism, nationalism, and other forms of obscurantism.18
History’s Revenge
Yet, something seems amiss with these systematic analyses, whether they have
been inspired by universalism or motivated by a comparative multiculturalism. In
both strands of thought, culture remains an elusive and uncomfortable category.
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Of course cultural convictions and practices can be analyzed rationally, but that
does not guarantee a real understanding of what makes them tick. Moreover,
culture and religion breed identities that certainly are contextual constructions,
but some of them prove very persistent. Perhaps coherent and steady cultural
identities do exist after all?
In “liquid,” late modernity, nations and nationalism still, or again, are anchor-
ing points. National identities are shored up to provide emotional assurance to
frightened citizens. The British-French-Jewish-American historian Tony Judt has
expressed his unease with the recent return of national history in Europe. He sees
the resurgence of heritage as a nostalgic defense mechanism against psychic
angst of the insecure future. Unknown risks are threatening existing social prac-
tices; uncertainties abound.19
Because these feelings of anxiety have become politically significant, many gov-
ernments in Western countries are trying to boost morale by (re-)creating na-
tional historical and cultural consciousness. In France, history teachers are now
by law obliged to explain to their students that the French presence in its former
colonies, especially Algeria, has benefited the people living there because they
were offered the rewards of French civilization. The message is of course that
this mission civilatrice now has to be repeated in the French banlieues. Although not
formulated as bluntly everywhere, many countries have launched programs of
“civic enculturation” in which history education plays a vital role. The United
States has waged its cultural wars over the National History Standards, in Ger-
many the position of the Leitkultur has been enhanced, and the Dutch have been
presented with a government-sponsored history canon.20
Why is this revival of heritage tied up with national histories? Because, Judt
says, there is no real European identity. The only two things the vast majority of
Europeans have in common are soccer and the welfare state. The European Com-
munity may be an economic reality, but the social and cultural arrangements are
organized along national lines. The European Community is inhabited by consu-
mers; national states are peopled by participating citizens. Judt concludes that “…
men live not in markets, but in communities.”21 In times of uncertainty it is still
the national government that provides its citizens with safety and protection. This
shelter also requires cultural and emotional attachment.
For the same reasons, civic nationalism does not work. It refutes the older
emotional roots of national communities. This cannot succeed, for nations are
not of a rational but of an affective nature. This is the thesis of Anthony Smith in
his Antiquity of Nations:
All nationalisms are committed to the Romantic ideals of cultural diversity,
authentic self-expression, and will in action, even where some of them supple-
ment these ideals with other, more “civic” and liberal notions.22
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Because nations are inherently exclusive of outsiders, any effort to sanitize them
is, to Smith, doomed to failure. In times of adversity, social and economic antag-
onisms will be unavoidably translated into old ethnic enmities. To understand the
tenacity of these processes, we would do well to look at the long-term ethnic
sources of nationalist identity. To this end, Smith advocates an ethno-symbolist
approach. Is this a new name for cultural history? Certainly his way of thinking
shows an affinity with Herder. To be fair, Smith does not think of nations as
primordial, essentialist entities. Nations are cultural constructions, imagined
communities if you like, but as such, old, tough, and stable cultural units that are
not easily dissolved or controlled. Judt reluctantly concedes that for the foresee-
able future, nations are here to stay. Contrary to Smith, he hopes for the develop-
ment of an open, hospitable kind of nationalism that is not exclusive or xenopho-
bic.23
Decent History
What moral and methodological lessons can be learned from this debate? How do
scholars in the humanities and the social sciences meet their ethical and aca-
demic responsibility? Clearly, there are some intellectual do’s and don’ts in the cur-
rent debates on identity, loyalty, and citizenship. Social solidarity and cultural
coherence are not accepted as natural, self-evident phenomena, but instead we
perceive these as man-made constructions that need explaining. Such explana-
tions are meant to demythologize grand narratives of everlasting communities,
with their absolute claims on the loyalty of their members. The defenders of co-
herent identities are unmasked as an essentialist rearguard, composed of wicked
abusers of power.
While such deconstruction is a necessary and sensible thing, it may result in a
politically overcorrect one-sidedness. When all forms of solidarity and community
are ipso facto suspect, when every tradition becomes an invention, distrust has
run wild. This is not to deny the analytical and intellectual gains we have made.
Awareness of the constructive nature of cultural, social, religious, and political
coherence helps us realize how vulnerable our social arrangements are. These
seem firmly anchored, until they are put to the test. Social and cultural rituals
may fail, political procedures can go wrong. They demand continual mainte-
nance.24
Such maintenance can only be achieved by responsible and informed citizens
who freely engage in dialogue and deliberation. Essential to this process are indi-
vidual human rights, derived from liberalism. Theoretically, these fundamental
rights are systematic and universal. In practice, they can only flourish in the con-
text of collective identities, of cultural communities. So universalism has to be
squared with particularistic peculiarities. There are no fix-it-all solutions to this
problem of combining Enlightenment and Romanticist strands of thought. In
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political practice we will have to make pragmatic choices, without unduly com-
promising basic principles. In cultural theory, we can and should acknowledge
competing points of view, without resorting to ethical helplessness or intellectual
incapacity. What we need is a decent theory of history.
An interesting proposal to this end has been made by the German philosopher
of history Jörn Rüsen. Basically, he wants historians to make intercultural com-
parisons. In order to create a framework for this, he needs to posit a general
standard of cultural behavior. This approach resembles that of anthropology in
its quest for human universals. Rüsen himself refers back to the cultural theory
of Herder which, as we have seen, is something many anthropologists would
rather not do. Rüsen tries to connect the general concept of Humanität, human-
ity, with that of particularity and diversity by paraphrasing Herder: “This idea of
humankind conceptualizes the unity of the human species as being manifest in a
variety of cultures and historical developments.”25
Distinct cultures and particular historical periods are regarded as individual
expressions of general human qualities. Their cultural forms may be outlandish,
sometimes odd, but they are not totally alien to us. We are able to understand
foreign cultures, because they embody special blends of essential characteristics
we recognize in various civilizations, including our own. This line of reasoning is
not only a remedy against ethnocentrism; it will protect us from radical cultural
relativism as well. Rüsen is not a friend of naive multiculturalism or uncritical
particularism. His message is that if we give up on our capacity for mutual human
understanding, we will fall into cultural despair. When we start thinking it impos-
sible to reconcile diverse cultural perspectives, we threaten to bring on the clash
of civilizations we want to prevent.
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Indecent Exposure: Picturing the Horror
of 9/11
Rob Kroes
In the wake of the terrorist onslaught of 9/11, there might have been more of an
ethnic backlash than in fact occurred. Among the many historical parallels that
came to people’s minds, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was one. Yet the
aftermath of that event, the “relocation” of all people of Japanese origin from the
Pacific Coast states to internment camps, was never suggested as a model for the
treatment of Arab or Muslim minorities in the United States after 9/11. Indeed,
there were a few nasty incidents, but if anything, the official response, from the
White House on down, aimed at containing such retaliatory impulses. President
Bush had the right instincts in his September 11 address to the nation when he
said: “This is a day when all Americans from every walk of life unite in our resolve
for justice and peace. America has stood down enemies before, and we will do so
this time. None of us will ever forget this day. Yet, we go forward to defend free-
dom and all that is good and just in our world.”1
Although we may differ in our views on how the president later pursued this
course, his call at the time chimed well with the nation’s needs for rituals of
collective mourning and displays of patriotism. Indeed, “Americans from every
walk of life,” in all their ethnic diversity, united in their expressions of grief and
common nationhood. The Stars and Stripes were once again the emblem of such
national unity, truly representing Americans of all stripes. Only later would ethni-
city become a dimension of the government response to the threat of terrorism.
Attorney General John Ashcroft, who oversaw the entire domestic response to the
attacks of September 11, among many other projects launched the Special Regis-
tration program. In the words of Georgetown Law Professor David Cole, this
amounted to a national campaign of ethnic profiling that required all male immi-
grants from Arab and Muslim countries (some 80,000 men) to report to immigra-
tion authorities and be fingerprinted, photographed, and interviewed, regardless
of whether there was any other basis for suspicion than ethnicity.2
Nor should the impression of America closing ranks behind its President and
Commander-in-Chief lead us to forget those dissenting voices, which in the days
following 9/11 argued that America was reaping what it had sown in preceding
decades, in variations on the theme of “blowback,” as historian Chalmers John-
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son uses the term.3 Susan Sontag, true to her calling as a public intellectual,
raised the unwelcome questions, asking: “Where is the acknowledgement that
this was not a ‘cowardly’ attack on ‘civilization’ or ‘liberty’ or ‘humanity’ or ‘the
free world’ but an attack on the world’s self-proclaimed super-power, undertaken
as a consequence of specific American alliances and actions?”4 True to his name,
black preacher Jeremiah Wright, in the grand manner of the sermon as jeremiad,
reminded his flock that 9/11 was a matter of “America’s chickens coming home to
roost.”5 His was a voice and a view that would later come to haunt a member of
Wright’s congregation, Barack Obama, during the Democratic primaries in 2008.
Yet, if the point of this paper is to look for ethnic difference in the response to
9/11, I will be looking elsewhere. I will train my lens differently, and focus on the
role that photography has played in visually conceiving of the enormity of 9/11
and helping people cope with this traumatic event. Many were the uses of photo-
graphic documents. They were aimed predominantly at staunching the emotional
wounds inflicted by the terrorist onslaught, at helping people restore the bonds of
family, neighborhood, and nation in the wake of the violent rupture of 9/11. How-
ever, there are instances where photographic images induced contested readings
that may reflect differences inherent in multicultural societies. I will explore such
instances in the course of my argument.
Shock and Awe in New York City
I was on the phone when it happened. I was talking to my wife across the Atlantic
from Boston. I had flown in the previous night from Washington DC to Logan
Airport. My landlady came up, frantically gesticulating. “Rob, come, you must
see this.” I followed her to the TV room and stood transfixed. One of the towers
of the World Trade Center in New York was ablaze. Then a plane, ever so tiny it
seemed, slammed into the second tower, exploding in a burst of fire and debris. It
was an arresting moment, and my mind duly froze it. My thoughts, like those of
everyone watching this, instantly went out to what must be going on inside the
towers, to people trapped on floors above the level of impact, to others trying to
escape the inferno. There were a few images of people jumping to their self-cho-
sen deaths, tiny figurines tumbling down – yet as I remember them forever sus-
pended in flight. As I watched the fires rage, there were eerie moments of déjà-vu,
of Hollywood images popping up, almost instantly, yet inadmissibly, aestheticiz-
ing the spectacle. I stood ashamed at my own train of associations. Then, as I
remember it in almost slow motion, the giant towers imploded, one after the
other. There were images of people in the streets, running for cover, chased by a
billowing cloud of dust and smoke.
The rest of that day, images of the disaster were replayed over and over again
on all major channels. Nevertheless, some instantaneous editing took place.
Images of people falling, unavoidable in the initial direct reporting, were, if
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shown at all, carefully contextualized, as in the case of two people holding hands
as they tumbled down. In one therapeutic talk show, the falling couple was seen
as an emblem of human grandeur far transcending the inhumanity of the terror-
ists. Yet the bulk of the images being replayed were those of the second plane
coming up and hitting the second tower, strangely naturalizing the event as if it
were a matter of a volcano bursting, causing death and devastation. Images of
people running, the awareness of people missing, of thousands dead, of others
bereft and grieving, stories of heroic rescue actions by firemen, produced an in-
stant narrative of a cataclysm, an emergency of stupendous proportions affecting
each and all, regardless of individual station or status. It caused an outpouring of
solidarity, of people thronging to give blood, of wakes all over town to help peo-
ple cope with grief and revive the bonds of community.
Old memories of heroism in the face of disaster inspired public rituals, as in
the case of firemen raising a flag on the rubble of the Twin Towers while taking
their choreographic cues from the famous Iwo Jima photograph by AP staff
photographer Joe Rosenthal.6 Television images may have produced the “flash-
bulb memory” of the event that millions share, yet photography played an indis-
pensable role in anchoring the moment in individual memory. It did so in a num-
ber of ways. Photojournalists rushed out to document the disaster. Some could
not reach the site and took panoramic photographs from across the Hudson or
East River, freezing consecutive dramatic moments in the midst of a Manhattan
skyline that looked otherwise unperturbed. Others managed to get close and were
able to put a human face on the disaster.
The evening newspapers of that day relied on photographic witness to a larger
extent than normal. Within days many newspapers brought out special editions,
prominently featuring photographs documenting the attack on the towers as well
as the public’s response to it. Part of the response in the days following Septem-
ber 11 crucially centered on photography. People wandered about Ground Zero
holding up photographs of dear ones that were missing, and before long the New
York Times would publish a daily section with photographs of individuals killed in
the towers’ collapse, accompanied by short biographical notes. Also, by late No-
vember, a variety of 9/11-related exhibitions had been quickly organized, espe-
cially in New York where local audiences were in need of collective, therapeutic
relief from the trauma they had suffered. The displays were constantly crowded.
Some, like a museum show that featured the work of members of the elite Mag-
num Photos news agency (who happened to be in town for their annual meeting
on the weekend preceding 9/11) were exclusive; others, like “This is New York: A
Democracy of Photographs,” were radically inclusive and unedited. Any snapshot
taken that day was accepted.
In the nature of such responses to urgent emotional needs, many were transi-
ent. Shows came to an end, newspapers were discarded. A range of publications
did preserve selected images for later use. As selections, though, they pose their
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own problems for the collective memory of the event and its impact. On this
point, in a collection published by Magnum Photos, Thomas Hoepker, vice-presi-
dent of Magnum, has this to say:
I strongly believe in documentary photography, in taking pictures of real life.
When I looked at the pictures from our photographers, there were some that
were wonderful or clever compositions, but they emphasized the artistry in
photography rather than telling the story. We didn’t put those pictures in this
book. I don’t think they belong in this book because they do not serve its
purpose, which is to bear witness. In a moment like this you must be very
humble. When something like this happens, nothing you do can adequately
respond to the monstrosity of the event.7
Hoepker himself had been unable to make it to Manhattan and was stuck on the
other side of the East River. From there he took photographs, several of which are
reproduced in the Magnum volume, of a stark Dante-esque quality, showing
downtown Manhattan engulfed in an unspeakable inferno. One, tellingly, has a
cemetery in the foreground, sunlit and peaceful, with a shrouded Manhattan
farther off. Yet, in weighing his own photographs with a view to including them
in the book, he must have used criteria for selection other than just the one of
unwanted artistry. One of his photographs from across the river shows a group
of young people taking a rest, chatting, having a drink, a bicycle parked in their
midst. They are relaxed, and have their backs turned toward the Manhattan in-
ferno, displaying utter disinterest in what is happening. This too, of course, was
part of the public response, yet not a part that Hoepker wished to integrate in his
construction of the memorable. The photograph, I assume with Hoepker’s per-
mission, was included in a volume, entitled Underexposed. As the editor, Colin Ja-
cobson, explains, it “investigates some of the most glaring examples of photo-
graphs which have been banned, doctored, suppressed or manipulated in order
to dupe the viewer.”8 The volume had initially been planned as a special issue of
Index on Censorship, an international magazine that had for thirty years devoted
itself to defending free expression. In the volume as it was then separately pro-
duced, Hoepker’s image is the concluding example in a collection of hundreds of
photographs meant to reveal the hidden history of the twentieth century through
“photographs the public weren’t supposed to see.”9
We will never know the full extent of the self-censorship and manipulation
behind the public construction of disaster striking downtown Manhattan, of the
many ways of bearing witness and of responding to this traumatic experience.
Professional photographers may have different criteria when they order photo-
graphs in the service of collective memory than ordinary citizens do. Yet all relied
on the medium of photography to help them remember what had happened.
Television footage and newspaper photographs allowed the whole world to be a
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witness. Yet locally, among the residents of New York’s boroughs, there was a
different need for visual documentation, a different mnemonic urgency, a hunger
for photographs that local residents had collectively produced and went on to dis-
play in an impromptu show of about five thousand pictures, taken by three thou-
sand photographers, in an empty shop fifteen blocks away from the disaster. In-
itially a therapeutic self-help venture for those affected, the project expanded into
a photographic documentation exercise intended both as an archive and as an
alternative media publicity outlet. In a display of visual control reclaimed from
the media, it showed what local people had seen and what they wished to remem-
ber. As an all-volunteer effort, a selection of photographs from the show went on
tour to a number of cities in the United States and Europe, at locations including
the MoMA in New York (February-May 2002).10 The initiator of this project, Mi-
chael Shulan, in summarizing its particular characteristics, describes it as not so
much a conventional art exhibition as an improvised memorial for the dead and
an exercise in documenting the monstrous, with the fundamental principle that it
was open to anybody and everybody. As Shulan writes in the introduction to the
exhibition catalogue: “In order to come to grips with all this imagery which was
haunting us, it was essential, we thought, to reclaim it from the media and stare
at it without flinching.”11 Surprisingly, then, the catalog ends with the ultimate
symbolic gesture of suturing: the concluding pages show us a view of the Man-
hattan skyline intact once more. As if time were cyclical, a return to the past may
suggest a view of the future. Only so, in cyclical time, may one hope to reach
closure.
Iconic Photographs and Their Afterlife
Why is it that photographs have a power of epic concentration, condensing larger
moments in history into one iconic image? The quest for an answer may lead us
to reflect on the way the human mind stores arresting moments. Psychologists, in
their use of the metaphor of “flashbulb memories,” suggest an analogy between
pictures of the mind – photographs taken by the human eye – and the medium of
photography.12 The power of iconic photographs derives precisely from our feel-
ing that such photographs have done the work of memory for us. They have an
impact on the human mind similar to what our eyes would have, had we been
present. They produce “flashbulb memories” for us, turning us into vicarious
witnesses, irrespective of distance and time. Crucially, the effect has to do with
what one student of the medium has called “le silence sauvage de la photogra-
phie,” the savage silence of photographs.13 They speak no words, use no rhetori-
cal flourish, no linguistic embellishments or evasions. They freeze transient mo-
tion into lasting stillness. Neither film nor television footage has this power of
silence. Stopping time and motion, photography “emplit de force la vue,” forcibly
fills up our view.14 Photographs come to us like documents from “the other side,”
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beyond time, beyond life. They are like testaments, last wills drawn up in the
service of memory.
The power of photography, thus conceived, is intrinsic to the medium. It does
not critically depend on artistry or aesthetics, on an inner vision in the mind of
the photographer seeking expression. Iconic photographs, freezing history into
memory, have an autonomous expressive force unconnected to authorial intent
or control. The afterlife of such photographs is most clearly the area where the
photography of history blends into the history of photography. From this per-
spective, photographs most clearly take their place as agents of history, rather
than being its mere reflection. From the moment that photographs acquire iconic
status and enter the realm of the mass circulation of images, they begin to affect
history rather than merely reflect it.
The Iconic Photograph That Never Was (Nor Will Be?)
There is a rich visual record of the traumatic events of 9/11, the day that terror
(and, as it later turned out, terrorists) struck the United States. Among the various
sites where hijacked planes crashed, the attack on the World Trade Center in New
York is most richly documented. Tens of thousands of stunning photographs,
which will forever reflect the images that burned themselves into our collective
memory, show the many faces of the cataclysm. Many have become iconic
through the epic concentration that their frames provide to what at the time may
have seemed unfathomable. They now appear as capturing the essence of the
moment, the horror, the heroism, as well as the grim beauty of it all. Yet this was
not a volcanic eruption, not a natural disaster. This is what men did to fellow
human beings. They had set out indiscriminately to bring thousands to an un-
timely death.
Indiscriminately indeed, because their act of terrorism killed thousands, re-
gardless of their religion, gender, class, race, ethnicity, or age. Images of those
rushing from the scene of evil, or of the faces of those staring in horror and grief
at the scene of carnage which arose literally out of the blue, depict the range and
variety of people living or working in downtown Manhattan as almost a represen-
tative sample of America’s multicultural and multi-ethnic society. If the attack
was indiscriminate, so too, it may appear, was the response to it. No discrimina-
tion was made: America responded as one, grieved as one, closed its ranks as
one. How then, using photographs or other documents relating to 9/11, can one
begin to explore the question of ethnic distinctiveness in the way that Americans
responded to the tragedy?
Here a closer reading of one particular photograph may suggest an approach to
exploring this question. It is the picture that is now emblematically referred to as
the falling man. It recently provided Don DeLillo with the title for his novel on the
tragedy of 9/11. Or in fact, more than just the title; the falling man is a haunting
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presence in the story itself. Drawing on the rich resonance of the falling man as a
remembered iconic image, DeLillo, in an inspired distancing strategy, introduces
not the person so unforgettably caught in mid-fall by a camera, but the enigmatic
character of a performance artist, David Janiak, who specializes in re-enacting the
fall, or more dramatically: the photographic still, hanging upside-down above the
pavement, secured to a harness. In DeLillo’s words: “There was something awful
about the stylized pose, body and limbs, his signature stroke. But the worst of it
was the stillness itself.”15
Only much later in the novel is the connection between the photograph and the
re-enactment made explicit. Upon reading an obituary of David Janiak in the
newspaper, dead at 39, apparently of natural causes, the woman protagonist of
the novel does an advanced computer search and reads about a dispute over the
issue of the position Janiak assumed during the fall, the position he maintained in
his suspended state. Was this position intended, she reads, to reflect the body
posture of a particular man who was photographed falling from the north tower
of the World Trade Center, head first, arms at his sides, one leg bent, a man set
forever in free fall against the looming background of the column panels in the
tower? “She did not read further but knew at once which photograph the account
referred to. It hit her hard when she first saw it, the day after, in the newspaper.…
Headlong, free fall, she thought, and this picture burned a hole in her mind and
heart, dear God, he was a falling angel and his beauty was horrific.”16
Thus, almost in passing, DeLillo evokes the afterlife of a single photograph
that managed to burn holes in the minds and hearts of so many. DeLillo himself
creatively adds to the afterlife of the photograph through imagining an imperso-
nator, David Janiak, whom he could flesh out to the point of giving him a generic
Slavic ethnicity, while leaving the original iconic falling man an anonymous enig-
ma. There is more we can say here, however, about the afterlife of this photo-
graph and the ways people found to accommodate its unsettling impact.
At the time of the attack on New York’s Twin Towers, many sat in front of their
television screens, trying to imagine in anguish and impotence what was going
on in the towering inferno of the World Trade Center. Yet one response among
those trapped in the buildings above the level of impact was clear for all to see.
Rather than burn or choke to death, people in their hundreds had opted for a
death of their own choosing, delivering themselves to the pull of gravity as they
jumped from windows on all four sides of the towers. Television images showed
many of these hapless individuals until the various channels covering the events
stopped broadcasting them. The images were deemed too gruesome, too unme-
diated a confrontation with the horror of the moment. An additional considera-
tion may have been that the images were seen as appealing to the voyeurism of
the spectators, as too much of an unseemly intrusion into the utter loneliness of
those who were only seconds away from death.
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Although the “jumpers” epitomized most starkly the horror and tragedy of the
event, images of their freefall were safely tucked away from the public gaze, pre-
venting their becoming part of a collective memory that would soon be cast in
terms of the heroism and bravery of the victims and their saviors. Yet the mental
shock and trauma of those who beheld the spectacle of so many people falling,
and who will never forget the loud thud of bodies hitting the ground – “It was
raining bodies,” one firefighter wailed in shock once he was safely back at his
station – does seem to need its own closure through sharing the memory with
others.17
What is it exactly about images of these anguished people falling to their
deaths that elicits public reticence? Is it the gulf between the jumpers’ final ex-
perience, lasting not more than thirty seconds, and that of a larger public yearn-
ing to empathize, yet prevented doing so? Is it so hard to recognize a redeeming
grandeur in the jumpers’ fate? Tellingly, one photograph related to this particular
tragedy did make its way around the world and reached iconic status. One of the
falling people, Esquire magazine later reported, “hit a fireman on the ground and
killed him; the fireman’s body was anointed by Father Mychal Judge, whose own
death, shortly thereafter in one of the two towers, was embraced as an example of
martyrdom after the photograph – the redemptive tableau – of firefighters carry-
ing his body from the rubble made its way around the world.”18 Apparently Father
Judge’s display of compassion and humane grace in the hour of his own death
made it easier to see redemptive value in the photograph, and to evoke empathy
from many.
The rich store of photographs and of film and television footage may allow
makers of historical documentaries to return to the images of falling people and
to contextualize them carefully. Ric Burns, for example, in his documentary film
New York: The Center of the World, has a section on 9/11.19 He has chosen to give it
the narrative structure of a Biblical passion play, telling a story that makes it clear
to the viewer that the horror of the terrorist onslaught has given rise to the collec-
tive redemption of New Yorkers. Good in the end emerged from evil. In spite of
the risk of seeming disrespectful to the dead, Burns has not shied away from
showing footage of people leaning out of the upper floors of the two towers,
clinging to windowpanes first, then choosing a freefall to certain death. The cam-
era pans from body after body falling down to the stunned faces of the crowd.
“My God. Oh, my God,” is the continuing litany one hears. There is one voice,
though, addressing the cameraman – one must assume – shouting: “You can’t
take pictures of this.” That voice must have spoken on behalf of all those whose
gut feeling was one of revulsion against filming this particular aspect of the hor-
ror of the World Trade Center attacks.
That feeling must have prevailed in the days following 9/11. The history of a
photograph of one man falling, taken by Associated Press photographer Richard
Drew, testifies to this urge to suppress. Drew had trained his telephoto lens on
74 american multiculturalism after 9/11
one man and shot eight frames. Back in his office at the Associated Press, as
Esquire magazine reported later, “he inserted the disc from his digital camera into
his laptop and recognized, instantly, what only his camera had seen” with its
uncanny power to catch the unconscious optics of human perception, “das optisch
Unbewußte,” in Walter Benjamin’s words.20 A moment no observer’s eye could
have consciously noticed was forever frozen in a frame. There was something
iconic in the extended annihilation of a falling man. Drew did not even look at
any of the other pictures in the sequence. He didn’t have to. “You learn in photo
editing to look for the frame,” he says. “You have to recognize it. That picture just
jumped off the screen because of its verticality and symmetry.”21 The next morn-
ing the photograph appeared on page seven of the New York Times and in a number
of other newspapers across the country. Yet, as Richard Drew remembers it,
“[m]ost newspapers refused to print it. Those who did, on the day after the World
Trade Center attacks, received hundreds of letters of complaint. The photograph
was denounced as coldblooded, ghoulish and sadistic. Then it vanished.”22
Drew had photographed dying before. As a 21-year-old rookie photographer on
a supposedly routine assignment, he was standing behind Robert F. Kennedy
when he was assassinated. He was so close that Kennedy’s blood spattered onto
his jacket. He kept taking photographs, even when a distressed Ethel Kennedy
tried to fend off the intrusive camera eye. Nobody at the time refused to print
those photographs. They became iconic images and established Drew’s fame.
What then is it about Drew’s image of the falling man that people find so offen-
sive?
As Tom Junod describes the photograph in Esquire magazine, it differs from all
other photographs of people falling from the twin towers. All the other images
show people “who appear to be struggling against horrific discrepancies of scale.
They are made puny by the backdrop of the towers, which loom like colossi, and
then by the event itself.”
They flail, twist and turn, their shoes fly off. There is no semblance of control.
The man in Drew’s picture, by contrast, is perfectly vertical, head down, seem-
ingly poised and in full control of his posture. The image, Junod goes on to say,
movingly and perceptively,
shows him in perfect accord with the lines of the buildings behind him. He
splits them, bisects them: Everything to the left of him in the picture is the
North Tower; everything to the right, the South. Though oblivious to the geo-
metric balance he has achieved, he is the essential element in the creation of a
new flag, a banner composed entirely of steel bars shining in the sun. Some
people who look at the picture see stoicism, willpower, a portrait of resigna-
tion; others see something else – something discordant and therefore terrible:
freedom.23
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He does not appear intimidated by gravity’s lethal force; rather, he seems to defy
it. His arms are by his side. His left leg is bent at the knee, almost casually. He
offers the ultimate image of grace in the face of death. Yet only seconds before or
after, like the others who had jumped, he had flailed, twisted, and turned. No
human eye could have caught this passing moment of transcendence.
To those who are willing to set aside their sense of disrespectful intrusion, this
detached reading of the photograph suggests all the elements that make for an
iconic photograph. In its suggestion of grandeur and grace, in its intertextual
evocation of Jasper Johns’ many variations on the theme of the American flag, it
would appear to offer, in epic concentration, all that brought out the best in Man
in the face of a Man-made cataclysm. It would seem to make it the perfect Amer-
ican icon, representing the resilience of Americans at a time of national sorrow.
But there are those who may never summon such Olympian detachment and
see the redemptive power in the picture of the falling man. As Tom Junod tells the
story, there have been attempts to establish the identity of the man in the photo-
graph. Different trails led to different potential relatives and may give us a clue to
the ethnically different ways of interpreting the act of jumping to a chosen death.
One trail led to a Catholic immigrant family from Latin America, the Hernan-
dezes, another to a woman from Connecticut. The Hernandez family, when con-
fronted with the photograph, refused to accept that the photograph might show
their husband and father, who had been a restaurant worker on the top floor of
the World Trade Center. As they saw it, he would never have jumped. They viewed
the decision to jump as a betrayal of love, as an unconscionable suicide that goes
against everything their religion teaches them. The woman in Connecticut had
lost two sons in the terrorist attack, both working on the equity desk of an invest-
ment firm in the Twin Towers. From a different religious and cultural back-
ground, she looked “at the decision to jump as a loss of hope – as an absence
that we, the living, now have to live with. She chose to live with it, not by angrily
rejecting the picture, but by looking, by seeing, by trying to know – by making an
act of private witness.”24
Yet a third trail led to the family of a black preacher from Mount Vernon, New
York. The man in the picture may have been Jonathan Briley, the preacher’s son.
The strong religious worldview of the family may have inspired them to see the
falling man in a different light. As his sister Gwendolyn ruminated, “I never
thought of the falling man as Jonathan, I thought of him as a man that just took
his life in his hands for just a second. Did that person have so much faith that he
knew that God would catch him or was he afraid to experience the end up there? I
hope we’re not trying to figure out who he is and more to figure out who we are
through watching it.”25
These different responses may suggest a more general clue, based in different
ethnic cultural traditions, to the widely different ways in which Americans have
coped with images of people jumping to their deaths from the Twin Towers. I
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know of no research data to confirm this hunch. On the Internet, though, long
lists can be found of statements by individuals, paying homage to whoever they
think the jumper may have been, Norberto Hernandez or Jonathan Briley. The
attempts at identifying the lone jumper may have served many people to cope
with the enormity of so many unidentified, anonymous people choosing to jump
and fall to their deaths. It may help them to sympathize and find the redemptive
quality in all these singular desperate acts. These statements, highly personal as
they are, do give a sense of the variety of ways in which people can now respond
to the spectacle of “the falling man.” Ethnicity may be too broad a category to
account for the ways in which people reacted to the enormity of 9/11. In the end it
will always be a matter of individuals drawing on their life experiences, their
memories and cultural repertoires, including those that are ethnically rooted,
when they attempt to give meaning to 9/11.
There may come a time when Drew’s picture will be seen and remembered in
its full iconic power, finding its place in the continued quest for the meaning of
9/11. Struggling to come up with the proper language, the proper metaphors, for
understanding what the collapse of the Twin Towers may have signified, those
reflecting on the meaning of Ground Zero may well come to construct their nar-
ratives around the central metaphor of the fall, in all its rich, intertextual reso-
nance. In a perceptive essay, Devin Zuber, like Walter Benjamin’s flaneur redivivus,
reflects on the changed reading of Roy Shifrin’s Icarus, one of the largest and most
unknown public sculptures in lower Manhattan, several blocks north of the
World Trade Center. The sculpture depicts Icarus at the very end of the Greek
legend. The torso is headless and wingless, tilted at such an angle as to suggest
not Icarus’s winged ascension, but his fall from the sky. The sculpture was posi-
tioned in such a way that the form was perfectly juxtaposed against the looming
bulk of the Trade Center towers. At night, one had the perspective of the statue
falling down the dark space between the two towers. Only now can the sculpture
assume its full mythological power as an emblem of human hubris “before the
fall.”26 If the statue can be seen to prefigure 9/11, Art Spiegelman, in his In the
Shadow of No Towers, after the fact creatively reconfigures the imagery and meaning
of falling from the sky.27 Once again using the medium of the comic book, or
graphic novel, that he had used to such great effect before in Maus, Spiegelman
tries to control the traumatic impact of witnessing the events of 9/11, and the
flood of his earlier traumatic memories as a secondary Holocaust witness that
9/11 triggered in his mind. Plate # 6 of In the Shadow of No Towers shows on the
left-hand side a full-length image of the tower in the last moments before its
collapse. A man is seen jumping from it, preferring the freedom of the sky above
death by fire, performing, as the text has it, “a graceful Olympic dive as his last
living act.” The amazing thing is that the author admits that he is “haunted now
by the images he didn’t witness.” What turned him into a secondary witness,
much like the protagonist of Maus, may well have been Drew’s image of what
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truly was a graceful Olympic dive captured by Drew’s camera.28 Thus, in his own
creative way, Spiegelman too illustrates the way in which a person’s repertoire of
memories, ethnically rooted, may affect the reading of 9/11.29
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“The Dead Are Our Redeemers”:
Culture, Belief, and United 93
Phillip E. Wegner
It has become something of a commonplace to suggest that one of the fatalities of
9/11 – alongside the US Constitution, democratic institutions, procedural justice,
and civil liberties – has been multiculturalism, especially in the form of broad
tolerance for diverse cultures and their practices. In no way do I want to deny the
fact that in the weeks and months following 9/11 there was a marked upsurge in
xenophobia and its accompanying violence.1 Moreover, even the most superficial
of web searches will yield evidence of a continued virulent loathing of multicul-
turalism on the part of radical religious conservatives.2 In European countries,
too, the “War on Terror” became an excuse for banning forms of religious ex-
pression, such as the wearing of headscarves.
However, I want to argue that the case has always been more complicated than
such a narrative would allow. President George W. Bush himself famously issued
a call after 9/11 for increased tolerance of Muslims and their culture. What can be
called “corporate multiculturalism” appears to continue on unabated in the pres-
ent. In this form of managed multiculturalism, diversity has become an adminis-
trative instrument where, as Susan Hegeman argues, “it seems to come down to
the rather trivial matter of one’s Christmas dessert menu, which is to say that
cultural difference (already somewhat shallowly conceived) is nothing much
more serious than a set of innocuous consumer choices.”3
According to Slavoj Žižek, the particular concept of culture underlying this
form of multiculturalism represents “the very field of disowned/impersonal be-
liefs – ‘culture’ is the name for all those things we practice without really believ-
ing in them, without ‘taking them seriously.’” Žižek further argues that what re-
mains most intolerable for multicultural tolerance, especially in the form
practised by the Bush administration or corporate America, are those who in fact
act according to deeply held beliefs: “And is this also not why we dismiss funda-
mentalist believers as ‘barbarians,’ as anticultural, as a threat to culture – they
dare to take their beliefs seriously?”4 However, it is exactly at this point that the con-
servative anti-multicultural position and liberal multiculturalism would seem to
converge. For clearly evident in their common stance toward “others,” such as
Muslim fundamentalists, is what Friedrich Nietzsche describes as ressentiment, a
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destructive envy aimed at those imagined to possess a secret key to happiness – in
this case, the capacity to “take their beliefs seriously” and to act accordingly.5
That is, both sides resent these imagined others-who-believe, precisely to the de-
gree each group fervently wishes to be described as such. One of the deepest
attractions of 9/11 for both groups was that it seemed to offer the opportunity to
fulfill this fantasy.
Ward Churchill’s Battle over Victimhood
I want to argue that this complicated nexus of attitudes toward belief, victimhood,
and multiculturalism is on display in one of the first major Hollywood film repre-
sentations of the events of 9/11: Paul Greengrass’s 2006 film, United 93. Before
turning to the film, however, it is useful first to look at a very different and far
more controversial document: Ward Churchill’s now infamous essay, “Some Peo-
ple Push Back: On the Justice of Roosting Chickens,” first published in the im-
mediate aftermath of 9/11. This essay and the ensuing debate surrounding it ren-
der in stark relief much of what is at stake in the struggle over the representation
of the events of September 11, 2001. Churchill’s essay was one of a number of
efforts in those first weeks and months to counter the rapid, organized, and con-
certed efforts to hegemonize the traumatic event of the al-Qaeda strikes, to pro-
vide legitimation for the implementation of the global post-Cold War neoconser-
vative agenda announced a few years earlier by the Project for the New American
Century.6 Much of Churchill’s essay is devoted to challenging the rapidly rigidify-
ing characterization of those who died that day, both those involved in the terror-
ist acts and those who died as a result of the attacks.7
Like other similar efforts, Churchill’s essay was at the time almost completely
ignored by the media. It remained obscure until January 2005 when, as a result of
his being invited to speak at Hamilton College in upstate New York, Churchill’s
essay was “rediscovered” and read on Fox News’s conservative talk show, The
O’Reilly Factor. The subsequent sensational media firestorm resulted in the cancel-
lation of Churchill’s talk by the university administration, an attack on Churchill
in the Colorado state legislature, calls from the governor for his firing from the
university, and subsequent investigations into his earlier scholarship and public
claims of Native American heritage. Finally, as a consequence of this unprece-
dented public outcry, Churchill was dismissed from the university in summer
2007, purportedly for “research misconduct.” However, a jury concluded on April
2, 2009, that he had been wrongfully dismissed from his position, as “political
views had been a ‘substantial or motivating’ factor in his dismissal.”8
Apparently at the heart of the controversy was a paragraph in which Churchill
offered his assessment of those killed in the towers:
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Let’s get a grip here, shall we? True enough, they were civilians of a sort. But
innocent? Gimme a break. They formed a technocratic corps at the very heart
of America’s global financial empire – the “mighty engine of profit” to which
the military dimension of US policy has always been enslaved – and they did so
both willingly and knowingly. Recourse to “ignorance” – a derivative, after all,
of the word “ignore” – counts as less than an excuse among this relatively
well-educated elite. To the extent that any of them were unaware of the costs
and consequences to others of what they were involved in – and in many cases
excelling at – it was because of their absolute refusal to see. More likely, it was
because they were too busy braying, incessantly and self-importantly, into
their cell phones, arranging power lunches and stock transactions, each of
which translated, conveniently out of sight, mind and smelling distance, into
the starved and rotting flesh of infants. If there was a better, more effective, or
in fact any other way of visiting some penalty befitting their participation upon
the little Eichmanns inhabiting the sterile sanctuary of the twin towers, I’d
really be interested in hearing about it.9
It is important to analyze why this paragraph in particular provoked such a violent
and excessive hysteria upon its belated “discovery.” On the one hand, Churchill’s
argument directly challenges the characterization of all those murdered that day
as “innocents.” Indeed, this is precisely the term that is repeated throughout the
Colorado State House of Representatives’ unanimous resolution of February 2,
2005, passed in response to the Churchill controversy. The resolution begins,
“WHEREAS, The tragedy of September 11, 2001, marked one of the darkest days
in American history; and WHEREAS, The terrorist attacks cost more than 3,000
innocent people their lives.” Its final “whereas” clause again asserts: “The victims
at the World Trade Center were innocent in every sense of the word and should
always be remembered as innocent victims of an unprovoked attack on America.”
The resolution then claims that Churchill’s crimes are three-fold: he “strikes an
evil and inflammatory blow against America’s healing process”; his “essay con-
tains a number of statements and contentions that are deplorable and do not
reflect the values of the people of the State of Colorado”; and most significantly,
he “claims that the victims at the World Trade Center were not innocent,” as he
“goes on to compare the innocent victims of the September 11, 2001, attacks to
Adolph Eichmann, the man who executed Hitler’s plan to exterminate the Jews
during World War II.”10
This last claim is of particular interest in this context, for it suggests that part
of the loathing directed toward Churchill’s essay is provoked by the ways in which
it potentially disrupted a process begun in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, and
continuing throughout the next few years, aimed at creating an identification be-
tween the US victims of the al-Qaeda attacks and the Jewish victims of the Nazi
Holocaust.11 Such an identification of the victims of 9/11 and the Holocaust was
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also reinforced in the choice of Daniel Libeskind, then best known for his stun-
ning Jewish Museum in Berlin, as the lead designer for what would become a
World Trade Center memorial site.12 Moreover, such a self-identification of the
United States with Holocaust victims – another example of what Žižek refers to
as a “brutal instrumentalization of the Holocaust” for political ends – furthered a
continued self-erasure of the nation’s own history of genocidal violence, not only
abroad, but most immediately, for Churchill at least, directed against the aborigi-
nal peoples of the North American continent.13 Indeed, Churchill concludes that
in addition to the ghosts of Iraqi children killed by US-imposed sanctions and
strategic bombing, there were many others who made an appearance on 9/11, “a
vast and silent queue of faceless victims, stretching from the million-odd Filipi-
nos slaughtered during America’s ‘Indian War’ in their islands at the beginning
of the twentieth century, through the real Indians, America’s own, massacred
wholesale at places like Horseshoe Bend and the Bad Axe, Sand Creek and
Wounded Knee, the Washita, Bear River, and the Marias.”14 It is these unnamed
and uncounted victims of genocide that Churchill in turn would ask us to “never
forget.”
Thus, in his challenges to institutionalized US myths, both newly minted and
long established ones, Churchill becomes for his most virulent critics at one with
the terrorists, his violence more symbolic but no less destructive. One of the more
depressing spectacles surrounding Churchill’s dismissal from the University of
Colorado were those academics who tacitly, if not explicitly, supported this ac-
tion, arguing that Churchill was simply receiving a long-overdue comeuppance
for his repeated violations of proper academic protocol. In this way, it became
clear that Churchill himself, no less than the al-Qaeda terrorists, became the ob-
ject of ressentiment, at once loathed and envied for his “beliefs” and, even more
significantly, for his willingness to act upon them.
Another damning statement occurs in the next paragraph of Churchill’s essay:
“The men who flew the missions against the WTC and Pentagon were not ‘cow-
ards.’ …. Whatever else can be said of them, the men who struck on September 11
manifested the courage of their convictions, willingly expending their own lives in
attaining their objectives.” The implication that these men were willing to sacri-
fice their very lives for deeply held beliefs, and that in this possibility, if not in
their actions themselves, there might be something worthy of admiration, risked
transforming these figures of monstrous Evil (“cowards”) into human beings en-
gaged in a struggle for justice (“courage of their convictions”). Moreover, in their
evident capacity for belief, the terrorists exposed something we in the West at the
end of the post-Cold War 1990s seemed to lack. This humanization of the terror-
ists thus threatened the entire ideological structure that had been built upon 9/11,
and which in turn was used to justify a war in Iraq that was, at the moment of the
controversy surrounding Churchill’s essay, taking a turn for the worse. For all of
these reasons, Churchill’s essay was perceived as such a terrible menace. Church-
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ill himself was condemned as “an outright collaborator with the nation’s enemies
at a time of war.”15
Dedicating 9/11 in United 93
Films like United 93 and World Trade Center (2006) offer rejoinders to Churchill’s
representation of both the terrorists and those who died in the attacks. Oliver
Stone, in his promotional statements for World Trade Center, declares that his film
is “a story about the men and women who fought back.”16 Stone here, uncon-
sciously I am sure, echoes the title of Churchill’s essay, suggesting that what is
really the site of struggle in both World Trade Center and United 93 is the identity of
who in fact is “fighting back” on 9/11. In this way, United 93 participates in the
process that Susan Willis names the “federalization of 9/11”: “Employees of pri-
vate enterprise have become with their deaths America’s war heroes.”17
Interestingly, while the most reproduced images from that day, including in
United 93, are of the planes striking the two World Trade Center Towers, many of
the earliest fictional film treatments of 9/11 – the television docudramas, 93: The
Flight that Fought Back (2005), Flight 93 (2006), and, of course, United 93 – focus on
what was in fact the un-witnessed, and more significantly unrecorded, downing of
United Flight 93 in rural Pennsylvania. United 93 is composed of two different
alternating narrative strands. First, we are offered a plot focused on the initial
recognition of and response to the attacks, presented to us through the diverse
viewpoints of those working in eastern seaboard Federal Aviation Administration
facilities and in a military command center.18 Then, we are given a pseudo-docu-
mentary recreation of the events on board the doomed flight. The two narratives
run parallel to each other, and each is thus meant to address the same question,
albeit on different scales: when precisely does the War on Terror begin? Indeed,
in the initial screenings of United 93, the film concluded with a title card on a
black screen that read: “America’s war on terror had begun.”19
The film opens with images taken from everyday life: people arriving at the air-
port or at work, engaging in small talk about family, work, and their plans for the
future, eating breakfast, and so forth. This is interspersed with other images
whose uncanny effects are the product of retrospection, transformed as they are
into premonitions of things to come: a “God’s-eye-view” aerial camera shot of
Manhattan with Islamic prayers being chanted in the background; a fixed shot of
an American Airlines plane taking off; the World Trade Center towers glimpsed
briefly through the window over the shoulder of one of the terrorists on United
93. The deliberately measured and ominous pace of this early section of the film
contrasts with the frenetic action of its later moments, suggesting that some-
where in between something has occurred that “changes everything.”
Yet when can this change be said to have occurred? Such a question is crucial,
the film suggests, for it is this change that marks the real beginning of the new
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global situation of the War on Terror. Such a change has clearly not yet occurred
when, in the very first sign that trouble is brewing, an air traffic controller has
trouble contacting American Flight 11; nor when he briefly hears “foreign-sound-
ing” voices coming from the plane’s radio. Nor has it yet occurred when those
working in the air traffic control center realize they have a hijacking situation on
their hands; nor even when a tape recording of a cockpit broadcast is analyzed
and the ominous note that “we have hijacked planes” – in the plural – is first
sounded. Even more significantly, it has not yet occurred even when the head of
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) tells his staff to turn on the television,
and together they see the image of the gaping hole in the smoking first World
Trade Center tower. Nor has it yet begun even when the air traffic controllers
realize that their missing plane is the one that has crashed into one of the towers,
and that a number of others have been hijacked as well.
Something similar occurs in the narrative strand focused on the events unfold-
ing on board Flight 93. It is clear, for example, that this threshold has not yet
been passed, even when the terrorists explode into action, stabbing a flight atten-
dant and one passenger, exposing what we know to be a fake bomb, murdering
the pilot and co-pilot, and taking over the plane. Indeed, the European-accented
voice of one of the passengers advises everyone to remain calm – if they do so, he
assures them, their attackers will let everyone live. He thus reframes the events
according to an old and familiar paradigm, that of the classic aircraft hijacking.
Of course, this initial misreading of their situation will prove disastrous.
In order to effectively answer the question of when things do change and the
War on Terror has thus begun, there is another detail from the early section of the
film on which I would like to put some emphasis. As the hijackers first take their
seats in the La Guardia terminal, the camera cuts to one of their fellow passen-
gers, as he talks on his cell phone. In a beautiful example of Brechtian estrange-
ment, the audience realizes at this moment that many of the people around them
are similarly engaged in cell-phone conversations. This image is so estranging
because it is another premonition of the well-known fact that the plane’s passen-
gers communicated by cell phone with people on the ground and left final mes-
sages with loved ones.20
Within the discursive economy of Greengrass’s film, this image plays another
significant role for, I would argue, the film maintains that it is only through the
representation of the attacks by way of communication technologies – that is, in
their mass-mediated repetition – that the true meaning of these events finally takes
hold and a new field of action emerges. In this way, the film brilliantly highlights
the role of the media and new communication technologies in shaping the emer-
gent global regime known as the war on terror.21 In short, as United 93 presents it,
these technologies provide what Fredric Jameson calls the “cognitive mappings”
of the first events of the new War on Terror.22
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This is clearly the case on board the plane, as it is precisely at the moment
when the passengers learn through their cell phone conversations that both the World
Trade Center towers and the Pentagon have been struck that they understand that
this event is something different – a “suicide mission,” as one passenger puts it –
and they begin to prepare themselves to “fight back.” However, the representa-
tion in the first narrative strand, of this moment when the entire nation is trans-
formed into combatants in a new global war, is even more startling. In a breath-
taking visual sequence, the film gives us, first, the perspective of the men working
in the control tower of Kennedy Airport when they see Flight 175 on its collision
course with the south tower of the World Trade Center. This is followed by a cut
to a full-screen image of the CNN broadcast of the plane hitting the tower. Final-
ly, we are offered the viewpoint of those working in the military center as they
witness the crash, mediated through the television screen. Crucially, it is only
after this televisual event that the men in charge of the two facilities acknowledge
the new realities they are confronting. FAA chief Ben Sliney chillingly states that
of the thousands of aircraft still in the air, “Anything is suspect now.” The com-
mander of the military facility also acknowledges this new reality when he says,
“We need rules of engagement.” A little later, Sliney declares his impatience with
a military liaison who, still operating according to the old paradigm, can only
present him with official updates: “No, I need action,” he asserts. Finally, when
he does act, issuing the command to close international airspace, he can now
confidently do so under the firmly held belief that “we’re at war with someone.”
Of course, the same is true for the terrorists on board United 93, as when they
learn through the plane’s communication screens that the two towers have been
successfully hit, one of them declares, “Tell the others our time has come.”
A similar transformation overtakes the passengers on board the plane. The film
shows us that through their actions, they join the initial combatants in the new
war on terror – and ultimately, of course, some of the war’s first casualties – as
they “fight back” against their captors. The film presents this transformation as a
switching of places with the terrorists, the passive innocent victims becoming the
aggressors. This is borne out visually, through the representation of the attack on
the hijackers, in a way that recalls the earlier savage violence perpetrated by the
terrorists themselves. At this later point, a group of American men literally swarm
over the body of the first hijacker, before repeatedly smashing his skull with a fire
extinguisher, blood flying everywhere. Even more significantly, the film suggests
that these people recognize that in fighting back in this way they, like the hijack-
ers, are engaged in an act of collective suicide. The passenger who is to pilot the
plane says that if they are not to crash, they need to seize control of the cockpit in
what everyone understands to be an impossibly swift fashion. This then cuts to
scenes of many of the passengers contacting their loved ones and leaving their
wrenching farewell messages.
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In this way, the film uses the collective iconography of the passengers – inten-
tionally identified throughout as a group – to imagine all of those who died that
day as engaging in an act of sacrifice, and thereby partaking in what Ross Birrell
describes as the movement from a “restrictive” to a “general economy of suicide-
terrorism.”23 Crucially, this film and similar documents enact an erasure of the
suicide-sacrifice of the terrorists, and the adoption of this general economic logic
by the plane’s passengers. This too suggests that what is truly threatened by
Churchill’s essay is the identity of the sacrifice. Who really commits “suicide” on
9/11, making the ultimate sacrifice of their lives for a higher cause: those who
crashed the planes into the towers and the Pentagon, or those who were killed?
Who, in other words, has broken with a weak sense of cultural identity and em-
braces belief, the supreme confidence in the truth and necessity of their actions?
The brilliance of United 93 lies in its illustration of precisely the moment when the
passengers, as symbolic figures for the United States more generally, take over
the place of the terrorists and emerge as heroic emblems of those-who-believe.
A similar vision of the transformation of the American nation was articulated
only days after 9/11, when the Republican Party activist and Newsday columnist
James P. Pinkerton declared that the events of September 11, 2001, represented a
“crushing defeat for irony, cynicism, and hipness” – values associated with a lax,
broadly tolerant, multicultural liberalism, most clearly expressed, according to
Pinkerton, in one of the hit television shows of the dissolute 1990s, Seinfeld. That
day taught us all the importance of belief, “that there’s more to life than nothing,
that some things really matter.” Of course, Pinkerton has a specific and deeply
nationalist set of beliefs in mind. “The victors now,” he crows, “are sincerity,
patriotism and earnestness.”24
This transformation makes the American deaths on 9/11 not endings, but
rather the crucial inaugural act, the moment when things change, in the new
infinite sequence of the War on Terror. Again, this momentous change would
have been confirmed in the original ending title card, “America’s war on terror
had begun.” Žižek points out that such a claim has very little to do with the actual
participants in these events; rather, it takes place in a long line of similar “ele-
mentary ideological acts of self-legitimization,” beginning with Abraham Lin-
coln’s Gettysburg Address. Žižek writes:
By dedicating ourselves to the task of successfully bringing to an end the work
of those who sacrificed their lives, we will make sure that their sacrifice was
not in vain, that they will continue to live in our memory; in this way, we will
effectively commemorate them; if we do not accomplish this task of ours, they
will be forgotten, they will have died in vain. So by dedicating the place to their
memory, what we actually do is dedicate, legitimize ourselves as the continua-
tors of their work – we legitimize our own role. This gesture of self-legitimiza-
tion through the other is ideology in its purest: the dead are our redeemers,
88 american multiculturalism after 9/11
and by dedicating ourselves to continuing their work we redeem the redee-
mers.25
It is thus precisely fictions like United 93 that prevent the healing disingenuously
called for by the Colorado legislature in their resolution condemning Churchill,
keeping open the deep wound of 9/11 as such narratives do. This is made explicit
in the case of this particular film by the black void that fills the screen at the
moment the plane crashes into the ground. A similar process occurs in the origi-
nal designs for the commemoration at the World Trade Center site. As one com-
mentator aptly put it, “[t]he ruling above-ground gesture of Libeskind’s plan,
seen especially in the towers that would ring the site, is that of the shard, the
sharp fragment unleashed by shattering or explosion. Combined with the idea of
keeping the pit as open as a fresh wound, the shards seem to aestheticize the
violence of Sept. 11.”26
How we might begin to close such wounds and construct other forms of com-
memoration and redemption of all the 9/11 dead remain crucial tasks for the fu-
ture.27 This would involve what Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok call a true
mourning, a “decrypting,” working through or “introjection” of this trauma in-
stead of a crippling “incorporation” into our national psyche of the open trauma
of this event, keeping us locked in a repetitive and destructive cycle of violence.28
Such an alternative set of practices would overcome the identification of the Unit-
ed States as a victim in the current global situation, and contribute in an impor-
tant way to the project of moving beyond the false opposition of corporate multi-
culturalism and inflexible nationalist “beliefs” that is still very much part of our
cultural landscape.
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commemoration that we find being worked out in some of the most interesting of the
post-9/11 fictions, including Foer’s Incredibly Loud & Extremely Close, Art Spiegelman’s In
the Shadow of No Towers (2004), Katharine Weber’s Triangle: A Novel (2006), and Don
DeLillo’s Falling Man (2007).
28. See Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok, The Wolf Man’s Magic Word: A Cryptonomy, trans.
Nicholas Rand (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986). Interestingly,
images of empty crypts also play a role in two of the earliest documents to address the
9/11 attacks: the science fiction film, Terminator 3: Rise of the Machines (2003) and Foer’s
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Incredibly Loud & Extremely Close. I discuss the Terminator trilogy in Life Between Two Deaths,
chapter 3.
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Real American Heroes: Attacking
Multiculturalism through the Discourse
of Heroic Sacrifice
Michan Andrew Connor
“I’d marry any fireman or policeman right now”: Whiteness and 9/11’s Heroes
One of the most significant popular cultural outcomes of the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, was the elevation of a set of national heroes. New York’s fire-
fighters became symbolic embodiments of American courage and self-sacrifice in
the face of danger, and thus models of ideal citizenship. While this imagery of
heroism was opportunistically used to justify imperial projects of war, I argue
that it was also harnessed to serve the ongoing domestic right-wing cultural agen-
da of defending the privileged cultural, political, and economic standing of white
men, though these projects are closely intertwined. The ease with which post-9/11
heroism was appropriated by right-wing causes is evidence of more than mere
opportunism in seizing a cultural moment. Rather, manipulators of the image of
firefighters as heroes tapped into a deeply entrenched and longstanding Ameri-
can popular culture script that defines the most compelling forms of heroic action
as white. This script was in turn used to defend white privilege and to advocate
for war.
Acclaim for firefighters was overwhelming. One conservative publication resur-
rected the hubristic self-identification of late 1990s Wall Street traders and de-
clared the city’s firefighters and emergency workers “the real masters of the uni-
verse”: “Big, beefy working-class guys became heroes once again, replacing the
telegenic financial analysts and techno-billionaires that had once held the nation
in thrall.”1 Fisher-Price enjoyed revived sales of its existing “Rescue Heroes” toy
line because it featured New York’s rescue workers. A comic book featuring those
same rescue workers raised proceeds for the relief of the families of World Trade
Center victims.2 Firefighters and cops were back in style. Kate Kennedy, a web
editor for the right-wing Independent Women’s Forum, even declared, “I’d marry
any fireman or policeman right now. On the spot. We could go to Vegas.”3 If
marriage offers from Phyllis Schlafly disciples constituted the pinnacle of cultural
prestige, the blue-collar heroes of New York had reached it.
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Beyond the acclaim paid to firefighters, however, the concept of heroism was
deployed to indicate particular forms of cultural virtue and construct categories of
ideal citizenship. Overwhelmingly, the heroic image of firefighters, police, and
rescue workers was harnessed to already existing right-wing narratives. Firefight-
ers were used to legitimize attacks on “big government,” affirmative action, and
the supposed feminization of American culture.4 Further, this heroic image was
racialized as inherently white, allowing it to be connected to what George Lipsitz
calls the central ethos of post-civil rights conservatism, “a countersubversive con-
sensus mobilized around the alleged wounds suffered by straight white men,”
their privileged status notwithstanding.5
A controversy over the memorialization of the New York firefighters who
served at the World Trade Center illustrates this phenomenon. The FDNY and the
city, working with a private funder, chose to model a memorial statue on a photo
taken of three firefighters raising the American flag at Ground Zero on September
11. The three firefighters in the photo were white, but the city requested that the
statue depict one white, one African-American, and one Hispanic firefighter to
reflect the racial diversity of the department, the city, and the victims of the at-
tacks. This decision quickly drew denunciation from the right as an example of
“political correctness”6 and a “wretched… alter[ation of] historical reality to im-
pose proper quotas on past events.”7
In response, the right mobilized two related discourses. First, the National Re-
view and other conservative periodicals argued that the decision had created a race
issue where none was previously present. Rather than representing three fire-
fighters who happened to be white as symbols of “duty and sacrifice, the two
virtues to which all firefighters… gave their lives,” the proposed monument would
force all who saw it to think about race.8 This argument of course ignored the fact
that whiteness is itself a socially constructed racial identity, and that race is inher-
ently present in depictions of white persons. Second, the publication charged that
the “diversity” of the statue misrepresented the fire department, which was over-
whelmingly composed of white men, while black and Hispanic firefighters con-
stituted less than three and four percent, respectively, of the FDNY’s ranks.9 The
National Review authors typically attributed this demographic imbalance to individ-
ual preference and aptitude, implying both that few minorities could handle the
job and that fewer were even interested: “These firefighters say that you can’t
force minorities to apply for the job, and that it would be morally wrong and
possibly dangerous to the public to alter the entrance requirements for the sake
of creating a more diverse workforce.”10
There are substantial reasons why the white-ethnic composition of the FDNY is
disproportionate to that of the city at large, many of which relate to the organiza-
tion of white firefighters to defend civil-service jobs with pensions and a politi-
cally strong union. Lipsitz defines such preserves as a “possessive investment in
whiteness” which pays material and cultural dividends to whites at all levels of the
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class structure, while explaining racial inequalities – as the National Review did –
as outcomes of individual differences in skill, ambition, and competence.11 If fire-
fighting is culturally understood as a blue-collar occupation, its financial rewards
are nonetheless more commensurate with the profession’s cultural esteem. Dan-
gerous and difficult though it is, firefighting is a privileged occupation. That pri-
vilege in New York has been protected by and for whites through the operation of
ethnic fraternal societies as channels of opportunity and promotion within the
FDNY.12 This shadow bureaucracy within the FDNY appears to enshrine a culture
of whiteness in the department. A 2002 discrimination complaint against the
FDNY lodged with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission al-
leged that the Department operated at every stage, from recruitment to promo-
tion, to deny opportunity to nonwhite applicants.13
Because they evaded the question of the historical production of whiteness in
the FDNY, right-wing commentators were able to fall back on the comfortable
assurance that the 9/11 rescue effort “was essentially a display of heroism by mul-
ticulturalism’s villain class – white males. An estimated 319 of 343 firefighters
who gave their lives at the World Trade Center on September 11 were non-Hispa-
nic whites.”14 With the issues of discrimination and history safely excluded from
discussion, National Review authors rhetorically positioned themselves to present
the testimony of white firefighters as morally compelling evidence of the unfair-
ness of the proposed memorial, and therefore of multiculturalism writ large. The
authors denied that the individual firefighters involved sought fame or recogni-
tion except for their department as a whole, but nonetheless insisted that the
authenticity of the memorial would be irreparably harmed through the depiction
of non-white firefighters.15 What these firefighters appeared to be expressing was
an inability to conceive of heroism without a white face. This inability derives
from the specific history of the FDNY, but also from a deeply ingrained American
symbolic vocabulary of heroism composed chiefly of white symbols.
The ease with which the right has appropriated the notion of heroism to its
agenda suggests that the discourse of heroism was not crafted of whole cloth
after 9/11; rather, it is a persistent trope in American popular culture, whose his-
tory shows how the privileged status of whiteness has been woven into the con-
cept of heroism through stage and screen images. That history profoundly affects
notions of cultural citizenship, by giving whites nearly exclusive access to a widely
accepted cultural means of validating oneself as a worthy American. Two concep-
tual frameworks are useful to this investigation. The first framework is the melo-
dramatic as a mode of American popular entertainment. As Linda Williams has
thoroughly demonstrated, in the melodramatic mode, suffering creates political
legitimacy in which racial anxieties and antagonisms are expressed in a moral
economy of villainy and victimization.16 Williams identifies two chief subject
types, typified by the suffering black man of Uncle Tom’s Cabin and the threatened
white woman of Birth of a Nation. Neither of these figures, however, seems to fit
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the project of valorizing firefighters.17 Building on Williams’s insights into melo-
drama, I argue that a concept of sacrifice as a special sort of suffering focuses
attention on the losses of the relatively privileged, emphasizing the free will of
the subject, making it potentially more rhetorically powerful, and certainly more
suited to right-wing discourses, than suffering.
Richard Dyer provides a second framework for understanding the racialized
discourse of heroism by locating the whiteness of the sacrificing subject within
the technology of film, arguing that conventions of lighting, narrative, and fram-
ing make light-skinned (white) actors appear to embody a “spirit” signifying a
self-possession which transcends their bodily existence.18 The normalization of
light-hued faces as the industry standard for calibrating lighting and exposure
results in a potent visual metaphor for spirit, in the light reflected from white
faces and absorbed by darker faces onscreen. Lighting practices institutionalized
as operating procedure both reflect and shape conceptions of racial hierarchy, as
“movie lighting relates people to each other and to setting according to notions of
the human that have historically excluded non-white people.”19 For screen her-
oes, Dyer argues, whiteness is necessary to make physical prowess appear as self-
mastery. Structures of narrative that lead toward self-mastery through duty and
sacrifice are supported by visual conventions elevating white heroes’ suffering to
the level of sacrifice.20 Thus, narrative and visual conventions in film constitute a
double layering of hegemonic whiteness at the core of the medium.
Such a bias has consequences for the maintenance of cultural hegemony. T.J.
Jackson Lears has argued that through a racialized “spontaneous philosophy,”
hegemonic values influence politics by “the tendency of public discourse to make
some forms of experience readily available to consciousness while ignoring or
suppressing others.”21 This suggests that the common sense evidenced by FDNY
members over the statue controversy was based in part on their unconscious re-
ferencing of images of heroism from other moments of national crisis. The tech-
nological biases of film, in addition to whatever political commitments were held
by various parties to the memorial controversy, help to explain why neither these
firefighters nor, apparently, the general public were readily able to conceive of
non-white images of heroism. Although film images alone do not create white
dominance, they are useful for protecting it and inherently less useful for chal-
lenging it.
Representations of white working-class masculinity have been shaped in the
late twentieth century by a host of forces, including rising demands for economic
and political empowerment by women and racial minorities, in the context of a
crisis of American dominance in world affairs. Lipsitz contends that the selective
representations of working-class whites, as either forgotten subjects unfairly vic-
timized by politics or heroic subjects of efforts to restore American glory and
power, have been prominent in filmic representations of the Vietnam War since
the 1980s. These films have buttressed a conservative politics that recognizes
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class inequality but shifts blame for the unfair burdens borne by working-class
whites into politics of resentment against women and minorities.22 The military
context of films like Rambo: First Blood Part II provides an obvious link between
war, masculinity, and whiteness, “establishing patriotism as the site where class
antagonisms between men could be reconciled in national and patriotic antagon-
isms against foreign foes and internal enemies”.23
However, images of heroic whites have been used to narrate other national
crises since Vietnam, even as the economic injuries affecting the white working
class have been purged from the national discourse, where neoliberal economics
reign supreme and class is described in terms of lifestyle rather than in terms of
economic inequality. Sacrifice, rather than suffering, is a melodramatic framing
of heroic action ideally fitted to the hegemonic values of this era. By valorizing
white sacrifice, heroism is sufficiently separated from uncomfortable discussions
about social class so that it can be transferred to any emergent crisis. Reactionary
uses of sacrificing heroism emerged so readily after 9/11 because they had been
rehearsed for a generation in other contexts.
Armageddon: Heroic Whiteness on the Pre-9/11 Screen
A similar use of racialized imagery of heroism can be discerned in that powerful
form of American (and global) popular culture, film. The 1998 film Armageddon,
directed by Michael Bay, is generally regarded as intellectually insipid and visually
bombastic. One reviewer declared that it “decisively crosses the line from mind-
less, relatively painless garbage into a whole new dimension of summer-movie
hell.”24 It is significant, however, as an example of a fictionalized threat to Amer-
ican hegemony in a historical moment of domestic prosperity and an apparent
global Pax Americana. In Armageddon, a group of oil-well drillers, led by two white
characters, is recruited to save humanity from a giant asteroid on a collision
course with the earth, by drilling a hole in it and planting a nuclear bomb that
splits it along an internal fault line. The film exhibits many conventional elements
of the action genre, but it nonetheless expresses a political viewpoint that estab-
lishes through the melodramatic mode a hierarchy of political legitimacy among
its racialized, classed, and gendered characters.
Armageddon’s politics follow most overtly the tendency to represent class as a
matter of lifestyle, behavior, and attitude, and to repress considerations of either
privilege or deprivation.25 The film’s hero, oilman Harry Stamper (Bruce Willis),
is introduced by a shot of the frayed hem of his khaki work pants. The camera
pulls back to show that Stamper is hitting golf balls from an offshore oil rig at a
boat full of Greenpeace activists. Irritating these environmentalists, portrayed as
elitist dilettantes despite their Spartan lifestyles and spotty hygiene, reinforces
Stamper’s blue-collar status even though the audience soon learns that he is not
merely a worker on the oil rig, but its owner, with “eight million dollars of [his]
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own money under contract” on a drilling site in the South China Sea. Other mem-
bers of Stamper’s crew are similarly identified as blue-collar by their loves of wes-
tern-style horseback riding, strippers, tattoos, and Harley-Davidson motorcycles,
passions which offset their possession of capital and advanced degrees in engi-
neering and geology. These are simply blue-collar guys with money and educa-
tion.26 In another reference to class identity, totally detached from any taint of
radicalism, the crew decline direct compensation and insist only on being exempt
from taxation for life as a reward for their service. The shunning of payment
distinguishes the crew from mere mercenaries; their sacrificing spirit is con-
firmed by their volunteering for a community of duty.
As the crew progresses through recruitment, training, and mission planning,
the film’s investment in masculinity becomes evident. Stamper finds an ally in
NASA administrator Dan Truman (Billy Bob Thornton), who shares his apprecia-
tion of the kind of spirit required to complete the mission. Masculinity is overtly
depicted as the glue holding this cross-class alliance together, as the film sug-
gests that the blue-collar “drillers” possess a virility and manliness that the effete,
over-educated scientists and government bureaucrats lack. Truman, the exception
to the rule, has only become a NASA scientist because physical disabilities pre-
vented him from becoming an astronaut. The sexual connotations of “drilling,”
needless to say, are intentional and repeatedly invoked.
I argue that, while the masculinism of Armageddon is all too obviously reflected
in its characterizations and dialogue, this community of duty and spirit is also
fundamentally a community of whiteness, a fact central to the thin plot of the
film. On an overt level, the crew’s demand to be exempted from taxation firmly
attaches the men to the order of whiteness established by the likes of Rush Lim-
baugh, evoking the resentments of “hardworking” whites forced to subsidize lazy
non-whites through taxes and social welfare programs. More subtly, narrative
crises largely hinge on the question of leadership and control over the completion
of the mission, and the film, like others, defines the capacity for leadership and
control in racial terms. Dyer has argued that “spirit” in Euro-American film can
only be expressed through a masculinity that is strong in both body and mind, in
which the mind disciplines emotion and the body, separating the white male
hero, who alone possesses this discipline, from both gendered and racialized
others.27
White heroism begins its progress when Stamper convinces Truman to send a
crew of oil drillers instead of astronauts into space, arguing that only his men can
possibly complete the mission. Stamper’s argument hinges on a mystification of
the nature of the oil driller’s work as not merely a set of skills or knowledge, but
the possession of an intuitive capability. As Stamper tells Truman, “You know,
drilling is a science, it’s an art. Third-generation driller, doing it all my life, and I
still haven’t gotten it all figured out.” This mystification of skill as hereditary
property is similar to the intergenerational march of Irish New Yorkers into the
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FDNY. Ethnic dominance is seldom discussed as a product of organization and
privilege, but most often portrayed (most potently by the ubiquitous bagpipes
played at firefighters’ funerals) as a cultural inheritance. Drilling successfully re-
quires a spirit, and that spirit, in the universe of action movies, is necessarily
white. Truman, sharing in the white spirit, intuitively understands this, and
agrees to send Stamper’s crew instead of his own into space.
This puts Truman into conflict with his formal superior, the African-American
General Kimsey (Keith David). The film promotes an understanding of the actual
relationship of Truman and Kimsey through its use of lighting, as well as the
dynamics of plot, which reveal that Truman knows more than the general. In
scenes where Truman and Kimsey argue, direct lighting reflects from Truman’s
face, while Kimsey’s features are obscured. This repeated representational prac-
tice begins with their first meetings to discuss how to defeat the asteroid. Truman
forces Kimsey to defer to another white scientist, also brightly lit, warning Kimsey
as a parent might scold a child, that “you might want to listen to him.”
Notwithstanding Kimsey’s low opinion of the crew, the combined moral
authority of Truman’s whiteness relative to Kimsey and Stamper’s innate intuition
about the demands of the work inscribe the boundaries of heroism along racial
lines. As the plot progresses, Truman fights a constant battle against the rule-
bound Kimsey to allow Stamper’s men freedom to carry out their mission guided
not by official standards of performance or the technical limitations of their ma-
chinery but by their innate knowledge of their craft. The final and decisive conflict
between Truman and Kimsey occurs when NASA realizes that it will soon lose
radio contact with the crew on the asteroid. Kimsey fears that the crew will fail to
drill deep enough into the asteroid to destroy it, and moves to carry out “second-
ary protocol” – detonating the crew’s nuclear bomb remotely. Truman, guided by
the intuitive spirit he shares with Stamper, knows both that the crew will succeed
if left to their task and that Kimsey’s plan will fail to destroy the asteroid. He wins
the struggle after screaming at the obdurate Kimsey, “This is one order you
shouldn’t follow, and you fucking know it!” The spirit of whiteness triumphs,
reinforcing the film’s implicit message: that the alliance of white masculine mus-
cle, brains, and spirit is the only force capable of protecting the planet.
The hypermasculinist pretensions of the action genre do not exempt films like
Armageddon from consideration as melodrama; the concept of sacrificing heroism
works in this film and in the action genre to assign political legitimacy to racial-
ized white subjects.28 The crew finally succeeds in drilling deep enough into the
asteroid to destroy it, but they are unable to detonate the nuclear bomb remotely.
A final sacrifice is needed – Stamper volunteers to stay behind on the asteroid and
detonate the bomb while the others return to Earth. In his final radio transmis-
sion to NASA, Stamper explains why he has decided to sacrifice himself. Instead
of declaring his love for humanity, or for the United States, Stamper says that he
is sacrificing his own life to protect his daughter. The surviving members of the
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crew return to Earth as heroes. In contrast to an early scene in which their work
on an offshore rig leaves them blackened by crude oil, they are spotless. Their
spacesuits, uniforms of duty and sacrifice, have kept them white.
Re-Articulating the White Hero to Military Crisis: From New York to
Kabul and Baghdad
Though fantastic, the threat to American security displayed in Armageddon pre-
served the continuity of narratives of crisis and heroism between the end of the
Cold War and the beginning of the War on Terror. Potentially potent narratives
about the type of raced, classed, and gendered citizens needed to respond to mo-
ments of crisis were rehearsed in pre-9/11 films like this one, and could thus be
easily revived as the events of 9/11 refocused the project of cultural hegemony.29
Assessing the film’s depiction of courage as an inherent and essential quality,
rather than as a phenomenon of behavior, helps to explain how easily the moral
legitimacy attached to the protective courage of Armageddon’s drillers or New
York’s firefighters could be attached to the aggressive courage required by the
military.30 The patterns established by cinematic representations of white hero-
ism are crucial to sustaining the justification for war. If heroic action is inherently
white, many advocates of war have asserted a corollary proposition that action by
whites is inherently heroic. Nancy Ehrenreich has argued that the implicit white-
ness of American nationalism enables masculine violence to become an expres-
sion of principle, an embodiment of a noble spirit. Recognizing the racial nature
of this claim to principle “helps to explain why ‘our’ violence in response to the
September 11 attacks tends to be seen as brave, rational, principled, justified, and
noble, while ‘their’ violence – the violence of the hijackers – is seen as cowardly,
irrational, unprincipled, unjustified, and unadulteratedly evil.”31 Whiteness en-
ables the imagining of an American “us” that provides clarity of purpose by di-
recting anger toward “them” – while obscuring the divisions that plague “us”.
This was an essential context of the hostility toward efforts to diversify the im-
age of heroism after 9/11. Columnist John Leo betrayed some of what was at stake
in connecting the memorial flap to his fears of a militant multiculturalism “bris-
tling with hostility to whites and white ‘hegemony.’”32 More pointedly, African-
American conservative Shelby Steele has argued that multiculturalists are respon-
sible for undermining the US war against Iraq by attaching “white guilt” to all
American foreign intervention, preventing the easy assumption of moral legiti-
macy that enables the military and individual servicepeople to operate at full capa-
city. This guilt is not based, in Steele’s opinion, on judgments of the moral char-
acter of the current war, but on an unwarranted association of it with the
admitted past sins of racism and imperialism committed by whites. Due to the
carping of multiculturalists, “There is now a cloud over white skin where there
once was unquestioned authority.”33 While Steele stops short of lamenting the
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eclipse of white supremacy as a dominant ideology, he does both deny its contin-
ued influence over American policy and claims that by raising the specter of racism
(again an entirely separate phenomenon from its presence), multiculturalists force
the United States to fight “two wars, one against an insurgency and another
against the past.”34 The energy required to answer challenges to the war’s legiti-
macy is energy not spent killing Iraqi insurgents. The legitimacy of war depends
upon the acceptance of the premise that its participants are heroic, an assessment
that itself depends upon the war being interpreted through cultural filters shaped
by hegemonic whiteness. Thus, its unwarranted claims about the historical elim-
ination of racism notwithstanding, Steele’s lament suggests that critical multicul-
turalism strikes at the heart of the fictions that legitimate war as an instrument of
policy.
The threat to war posed by multiculturalism is accordingly reflected in the pre-
dominance of white faces among those used to sell the War on Terror in its var-
ious geographic incarnations. The most prominent face of heroism used to sell
the broader war on terror belonged to the late NFL star Pat Tillman, who left the
Arizona Cardinals to enlist as an Army Ranger after 9/11. Tillman first served in
the invasion of Iraq before redeploying to Afghanistan, where he was killed by
friendly fire in an event which the Pentagon first attempted to represent as an
ambush by Taliban loyalists.35 Conservative provocateur and columnist Ann Coul-
ter gushed that Tillman was “virtuous, pure, and masculine like only an American
male can be,” while President Bush, demonstrating a solid grasp of the relative
solemnity of events, declared Tillman “an inspiration on and off the football field,
as with all who made the ultimate sacrifice in the war on terror.”36 The Pentagon
had followed Tillman’s recruitment and service with interest, though he refused
to take a special role as a recruitment symbol outside of his regular duty, and his
death came at the politically dangerous moment when the Bush Administration
realized that the release of photographs depicting torture in Abu Ghraib Prison
was imminent. Tillman’s family has accordingly charged that the Pentagon en-
gaged in a cover-up of the circumstances surrounding his death (his uniform and
body armor were both burned in the field by US servicepersons) in order to hold
on to Tillman as a symbol of righteous sacrifice that could continue to defend by
association the righteousness of the War on Terror.
In deploying Tillman’s image of sacrifice for duty to the nation, the Bush ad-
ministration succeeded in obscuring the costs of its policies of war by focusing on
prominent but unrepresentative sacrifices of the privileged. Tillman’s image was
deployed to convince white working- and middle-class families to continue sup-
porting the policies of the Republican Party and its Democratic allies, and to ap-
prove of the violent deaths of Iraqis and Afghans. On the other hand, the dis-
course of heroic sacrifice denies the all too real sacrifices of welfare, property,
and life made by poor American communities of color, as unaccounted billions
of dollars are funneled to the cycle of destruction and reconstruction in Iraq.
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Hurricane Katrina’s devastation of New Orleans while National Guard troops,
trucks, and logistical expertise were tied down in Iraq is only the most dramatic
example. Media coverage aroused sympathy for the black poor of New Orleans,
but not any suggestion that their suffering be viewed as a sacrifice for war. Like-
wise, the disproportionate casualty rate for African-American and Latino soldiers
goes largely unremarked in heroic discourse, most glaringly as politicians who
gladly allow immigrant Latino soldiers to fight seek to militarize the US border
with Mexico. The discourse of heroic sacrifice hides the fact that war, while a raw
deal for the white middle class, is a catastrophe for the poor of color. Mounting
any challenge to this kind of assault from the right requires changing the prevail-
ing cultural politics, providing heroic representations that encourage cross-racial,
cross-gendered, and collective action.
The symbolic vocabulary of heroism militates against such cultural work,
though the people used as symbols of heroism frequently assert their humanity
at inconvenient times. Firefighters across the country have protested the public
sector disinvestment that has followed the Administration’s war policies. For his
part, Pat Tillman not only declined to serve as a poster-boy for military recruit-
ment, but is reported to have told a fellow Ranger during the invasion of Iraq that
US actions were “so fucking illegal.” Posthumously, Tillman provoked a nearly
explosive bout of cognitive dissonance on September 27, 2005, on Fox News
“Hannity and Colmes” show, when Coulter and Sean Hannity learned of Till-
man’s expressed admiration for and plans to meet personally with Noam Chom-
sky to discuss American imperialism.37 These breaks in the right-wing discourse
of heroism are not in themselves politically progressive, but they do demonstrate
how the hegemonic discourse of white heroism works better when those heroes
are symbols than when they are thinking, acting subjects.
Further, in the same way that I have argued that 9/11 altered or refocused exist-
ing cultural currents more than it created new ones, advocates of multiculturalism
as a meaningful critique of policies of war, imperialism, and racism can take
some encouragement from the knowledge that, despite the oft-repeated claim
that 9/11 “changed everything,” much in that struggle remains the same.
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“America under Attack”: Unity and
Division after 9/11
Mathilde Roza
The calculated, meticulously planned and precisely executed attacks on the Twin
Towers of the World Trade Center were horrific. Creating vast damage and deadly
destruction through a heretofore unimaginable application of rationality, technol-
ogy, and science, the attacks constituted a terrifying display of hubris, power, and
control. The fact that the pilots had received their facilitatory training on Ameri-
can soil and had used American planes as their chosen weapons of mass destruc-
tion only exacerbated Americans’ feeling of profound humiliation. The shared
feelings of deep vulnerability, rage, and grief which the events aroused could not
help but unite the people affected by this monumental act of violence.
Understandably, the terrorist act was immediately identified as an attack on the
nation as a whole. “America is under attack,” Andrew Card, then White House
Chief of Staff, famously whispered in President Bush’s ear after the second tower
of the World Trade Center had been hit. The phrase was immediately picked up
and used by CNN as their “breaking news” headline.1 The constant replaying of
the attacks on television, to the accompaniment of the ominous headline, helped
transform them into a highly symbolic public performance in which some 3,000
Americans had been cruelly forced to participate through their deaths. As a result,
it was possible for every American to think of him- or herself as a potential victim,
as well as a survivor.
One of the immediate ways in which this sense of American unity was ex-
pressed, in addition to acts of symbolic patriotism such as flag-waving and the
manufacture of billboards, T-shirts, bumper stickers, and other items bearing the
slogan “United We Stand,” was the spontaneous production of an unprecedented
number of poems. These were left behind on public buildings, in shop windows,
and at bus stops across the boroughs of New York City and on the Internet,
which, in the words of Karen Alkalay-Gut, “became an extension of Ground
Zero.”2 In her article “The Poetry of September 11: The Testimonial Imperative,”
Alkalay-Gut notes how “almost every literary journal on the Web called for sub-
missions to special issues devoted to September 11,” and did so in a “spirit of
democratic inclusion.” The resulting body of 9/11 poetry which appeared sug-
gested, in Alkalay-Gut’s words, that “everyone and anyone [was] equally ‘privi-
105
leged’ to express emotion.”3 No one, then, was silenced, it would appear, and
everyone was granted the authority to speak of the event.
Nevertheless, Alkalay-Gut continues, “it was clear that a certain kind of censor-
ship prevailed.” Poems avoided the inclusion of gruesome and horrific details and
refrained from political or moral analysis. Also, there was an absence of “aes-
thetic” responses, which were deemed “inappropriate” and unsuitable to the
deeply felt need to express grief and raw emotion directly. As a result, treatment
of the subject tended to be conventional as well as “‘positive’ – patriotic, elegiac,
heroic.”4
This essay looks at one early post-9/11 poem clearly violating all of these de-
mands: Amiri Baraka’s highly controversial “Somebody Blew Up America”
(2001). The examination of this poem and its public reception seeks to contribute
to the discussion of the nature and definition of the “America” referred to in the
phrase “America is under attack.” To further contextualize my reading, Baraka’s
poem will be linked to another controversial cultural production – the 9/11 mem-
orial sculpture proposed by the Fire Department of New York–which likewise pro-
jected an image of “America” that could not be brought into connection with the
dominant cultural reading and preferred collective memory of 9/11.
Somebody Blew Up America
Baraka wrote “Somebody Blew Up America” a few weeks after the terrorist at-
tacks of September 2001. Despite the immediacy of the poet’s response, the
poem expressed no emotion about the actual attacks. In further violation of the
general expectations regarding 9/11 poetry, the poem paid no tribute or even at-
tention to the tragic deaths of those who perished in the attacks, and provided no
room for patriotism. What Baraka offered was an aesthetically complex poem in
free verse whose content was intensely political. As Pjotr Gwiazda describes it in
an article for Contemporary Literature,
“Somebody Blew Up America” is neither a lament for the nearly three thou-
sand people who lost their lives on that day nor an uplifting tribute to the
wounded American spirit, nor, indeed, a call for speedy revenge. Instead, the
poem offers an arresting diatribe against the evils of imperialism and the at-
tendant evils of racism as the main forces of injustice.5
Baraka, who has adopted a position outside the cultural mainstream throughout
his career, and who considers poetry a revolutionary weapon, a battle fought with
words, sees every reason to approach 9/11 from a deeply critical poetic angle. In
an explanatory and self-defensive article for CounterPunch, written in response to
the hostile reception of the poem by various groups, especially the Anti-Defama-
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tion League (ADL), he explained the poem’s dissenting view and the absence of
patriotic sentiment as follows:
[T]he poem’s underlying theme focuses on how Black Americans have suf-
fered from domestic terrorism since being kidnapped into US chattel slavery,
e.g. by Slave Owners, US & State Laws, Klan, Skin Heads, Domestic Nazis,
Lynching, denial of rights, national oppression, racism, character assassina-
tion, historically, and at this very minute throughout the US. The relevance of
this to Bush’s call for a “War on Terrorism” is that Black people feel we have
always been victims of terror, governmental and general, so we cannot get as
frenzied and hysterical as the people who ask us to dismiss our history and
contemporary reality to join them, in the name of a shallow “patriotism,” in
attacking the majority of people in the world, especially people of color and in
the third world.6
Although of interest as an aberrant 9/11 poem – of which more examples might
be given, such as Lorna Dee Cervantes’s “Palestine” and Ani DiFranco’s “Self
Evident” – the controversy the poem generated in October 2002 offers an illumi-
nating and disturbing example of how the shockwaves produced by 9/11 reverber-
ated and affected all realms of American culture and society, including those of
art and art management. Identifying the poem as crucially concerned with issues
of knowledge and power, with authority and silence, the discussion of “Some-
body Blew Up America” is especially relevant for the processes of inclusion and
exclusion that have marked America’s post-9/11 cultural and political climate.
Discussing this climate in her presidential address to the American Studies
Association (ASA) in 2003, Amy Kaplan takes her cue from the new vocabulary
that emerged in the wake of 9/11 – in particular, the concepts of “empire,”
“homeland,” and the “War on Terror.”7 These words, she contends, have ushered
in a “dramatic” reconceptualization of the United States. The notion of empire,
Kaplan writes, “recuperates a consensus vision of America as a unitary whole,
threatened only by the terrorists, but no longer contested and constituted by divi-
sions of race, ethnicity, gender or sexuality.”8 This pull toward consensus and
national unity is further cemented by the application of the metaphor of “home-
land” to the United States. Kaplan’s persuasive reading of this concept through an
analysis of the word’s various connotations leads to an understanding of the no-
tion of “homeland” as radically at odds with earlier metaphors of the New World
– for example, the melting pot, manifest destiny, the frontier – all of which em-
phasized mobility instead of the “rootedness” the word homeland connotes. Of
further interest to the topic of this essay is her assertion that the application of
this metaphor to the United States has an exclusionary and racially divisive effect:
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[The notion of the homeland] polices the boundaries between the domestic
and the foreign not simply by stopping aliens at the borders, but by continually
redrawing those boundaries everywhere throughout the nation, between
Americans who can somehow claim the United States as their native land,
their birthright, and immigrants and those who look to homelands elsewhere,
who can be rendered inexorably foreign. This distinction takes on a decidedly
racialized cast through the identification of homeland with a sense of racial
purity and ethnic homogeneity that even naturalization and citizenship cannot
erase.9
It is this renewed creation of divisions, as well as the attempt to render these
divisions invisible and inconsequential by the nostalgic drive to recover a lost
America of unity, that prompted Baraka to respond to 9/11 the way he did in
“Somebody Blew up America.” The way in which America responded to 9/11,
rather than the attacks themselves, provided the impetus and urgent need for
Baraka to compose his poem.
In her analysis of “the war on terror,” Kaplan comes even closer to what lies at
the heart of the contested poem. She is particularly disturbed by the apparent ease
with which the terrorist, or even the suspected terrorist, is excluded from the
category of the human. As President of the ASA, she urges scholars to take note
of the disturbing historical parallels, writing: “As scholars of American studies,
we should bring to the present crisis our knowledge from juridical, literary, and
visual representations about the way such exclusions from personhood and
humanity have been made throughout history, from the treatment of Indians and
slaves to the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II.”10 It is this
project of historical contextualization – the need to remember the radical exclu-
sions made in that past and which continue to be made in the present – that
Baraka also embarked upon in his poem.
Baraka provided a clear indication of the poem’s direction in the opening lines.
There, in parenthetical mode, Baraka announces the poem’s rationale and the-
matic orientation as follows: “(All thinking people / oppose terrorism both do-
mestic / & international… / But one should not / be used / To cover the other).”11
With this cautionary and self-legitimating opening in mind, it stands to reason
that the poem zooms in on 9/11 only briefly. In fact, the sparseness of the poet’s
treatment of this subject, along with the text’s main thematic considerations, al-
lows us to read the title “Somebody Blew Up America” rather differently than as a
mere reference to the recent attacks. In accordance with the poem’s opening
lines, Baraka shifts the focus away from the nation’s concern with the identity of
those responsible for the attack on “America” on September 11, 2001, to the de-
struction of “America” – understood as a historical project and radical experiment
to create a new and utopian nation built upon the promises of liberty and justice
for all. The poem may thus be read as a series of speculations about the identity of
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those who “blew up America” time and again, as well as an inquiry into the con-
tinuing influence and power of the forces that they unleashed – physical, social,
political and ideological – to shape America in their image.
Baraka is unambiguous and far from subtle in his analysis; what really “blew
up” America was the overwhelming presence of a violently suppressive white ca-
pitalist ideology, which stood at the basis of America’s foundational decades and
continues to wield its dark power (“Who say they God and still be the Devil?”) in
the United States and throughout the world. The poem relentlessly indicts the
white perpetrators of the crimes, murders, and violence committed in America’s
past: “Who got fat from plantations / Who genocided Indians / Tried to waste the
Black nation … Who cut your nuts off / Who rape your ma / Who lynched your pa
/ Who got the tar, who got the feathers / Who had the match, who set the fires /
Who killed and hired / Who say they God & still be the Devil.” Similarly, the poem
moves closer to the present and scrutinizes American foreign policy, for instance:
“Who got rich from Algeria, Libya, Haiti, / Iran, Iraq, Saudi, Kuwait, Lebanon, /
Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Palestine.” Throughout, there is an emphasis on both the
political and the cultural power of those who “own” (whether or not through the
acquisition of “funny money,” as Baraka suggests in the line below through his
rhyming technique) and those who do not. For example: “Who own them build-
ings / Who got the money / Who think you funny / Who locked you up / Who own
the papers / Who owned the slave ship.” The power of those who “own” to pro-
duce information and define the areas of knowledge (as expressed, for instance,
in “Who own the papers / Who own television / Who own radio”) is identified as
a crucial element in the processes of exclusion and silencing Baraka draws atten-
tion to. The need to become aware of the ideological power of those who speak is
most directly expressed in the crucial line: “They say (who say? Who do the saying
…).”
The effect of Baraka’s unremitting interrogation is much intensified by the con-
stant repetition of the word “who,” which appears in the poem some two hun-
dred times. Not only does the word itself consciously draw attention to the cen-
trality of the subject position in the circulation of knowledge and power, but the
accumulative aural effect is considerable. The sound increasingly comes to recre-
ate the pain and suffering inflicted by “America” throughout its history, through
genocide, slavery, violence, and the overall abuse of white power, as well as
through the continuation of these practices through imperialism and aggressive
foreign policy. The effect is heightened further by the transformation of the word
“who” from an angry demand for information into a wild and hooting lament. An
angry lament, we might argue, not just at the damage “America” has caused, but
also at the nation’s failure to fulfill its many promises – at the dream not deferred
but actually already destroyed. The poem thus climaxes in its final lines as fol-
lows: “Who and Who and WHO who who / Whoooo and
Whooooooooooooooooooooo!”
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In addition to expressing anger and grief, the sound of the word “who” also
serves to arouse in the listener a strong sense of fear, even panic. In this way, as a
response to 9/11, the poem may well be said to echo the dominant psychological
mood immediately following the attacks. To determine whether fear is in fact a
genuine emotion of the poem itself, it is helpful to note that the syllable “hoo”
has been brought into connection with white fears of African Voodoo. In her
essay “‘HOO, HOO, HOO’: Some Episodes in the Construction of Modern White-
ness,” Rachel Blau DuPlessis writes: “[H]oo is a scare word when used by a white
person, a word alluding to African American and African Caribbean ritual prac-
tices that have undertones of witchcraft, sorcery and power.”12 DuPlessis analyzes
the significance of “Hoo” in three modernist poems (by Vachel Lindsay, Wallace
Stevens, and T.S. Eliot), and concludes that it is “meant in these works to stand
simultaneously for some vibrant, aggressive threat and a promise which thrills
and jolts.”13 Following DuPlessis’s remarks, Baraka’s bombardment of multiple
“whos” may in fact serve to summon up the specter of the “Black Boogeyman”
spooking white America with its sinister yet titillating evil. Read in this way, the
poem suggests that, in addition to the ideology of white supremacy, “America”
was destroyed by irrational fear and paranoia, and continues to allow itself to be
spooked – even by a poem, one might add, judging by the public outrage at
“Somebody Blew Up America”. To the extent that Baraka actually personifies the
“boogeyman” when he delivers close to two hundred “hoo”-sounds in the perfor-
mance of his poem, the poet may at the very least be accused of having played on
white America’s fear of blackness quite deliberately to drive his point home.
Contested Readings
Baraka recited the poem in various places in Africa, Europe, and the United
States, and had the poem circulated on the Internet in the months following its
completion. It was only in September 2002, however, that the poem acquired
notoriety. What triggered the uproar was Baraka’s recital of the poem at the Ger-
aldine R. Dodge Poetry Festival in Stanhope, New Jersey, where Baraka made his
appearance (in the company of poets Robert Bly, Grace Paley, Robert Pinsky, Rita
Dove, Li-Young Lee, and others) as the newly elected Poet Laureate of the state of
New Jersey – an honorary position created in October 1999. The position had first
been held for two years by New Jersey poet Gerald Stern, who was succeeded by
Amiri Baraka in August 2002. This contextual framing of the poet and the poem
at the Poetry Festival proved lethal when the poem was denounced as anti-Semitic
by The Jewish Standard, a New Jersey newspaper, and the Anti-Defamation League
(ADL), which immediately wrote to the governor of New Jersey, James E. McGree-
vey, requesting Baraka’s removal from the post of poet laureate.14 “It may be that
as a poet, Mr. Baraka may say what he chooses, no matter how ugly, irresponsible
or deceptive,” the ADL wrote. “However, we don’t believe that the residents of
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New Jersey, nor their representatives, should have such venom spewed in their
name.”15
Under the pressure of a growing national scandal, which was covered by the
major newspapers and television channels, Governor McGreevey saw no alterna-
tive but to demand that Baraka resign as poet laureate. When Baraka refused, and
the governor found himself unable to legally fire the poet, new legislation was
drafted to eliminate the position altogether. The new bill was introduced to the
New Jersey Senate in October 2002, passed, and became effective on July 2,
2003.16
Specifically, “Somebody Blew Up America” was denounced for spreading what
became known as the “Big Lie,” the theory that posited Israeli foreknowledge of
the 9/11 attacks. The charge was based on only a few lines, which occurred in the
following parts of the poem (italics added):
Who know why the terrorists
Learned to fly in Florida, San Diego
Who know why Five Israelis was filming the explosion
And cracking they sides at the notion
…
Who set the Reichstag Fire
Who knew the World Trade Center was gonna get bombed
Who told 4000 Israeli workers at the Twin Towers
To stay home that day
Why did Sharon stay away?
…
Who, Who, Who
In his lengthy defense against what he called the “dishonest, consciously dis-
torted and insulting non-interpretation of [the poem] by the ‘Anti-Defamation’
League,” Baraka explained how, in writing the lines, he had done no more than
repeat “information” that already circulated in the public domain.17 Drawing on
readily available material in such newspapers as The Star Ledger and The New York
Times, as well as Israeli newspapers and the Internet, Baraka reproduced the many
uncertainties, questions, “facts” and rumors that were launched into a cultural
climate dominated by fear, suspicion, anger, and conspiracy theories, which
arose as part of the frantic attempt to identify the “somebody” who “blew up
America.” As Piotr Gwiazda points out: “Baraka’s speculations about September
11 are certainly difficult to defend, but they take only a little further some of the
thoughts many Americans struggled with in the days and weeks after the perpe-
trators of the terrorist attacks had been identified.”18 Reading the contested lines
in this fashion is wholly in step with the poem’s overall scrutiny of responses to
and reporting on 9/11, and what this might suggest about America.
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Of particular interest in the context of this essay, however, is not so much the
accusations against Baraka’s poem as the way in which art, or the language of art,
was interpreted to fit the demands of the particular political and cultural climate
that emerged. What characterizes the attack on the poem is the detractors’ insis-
tence that “Somebody Blew Up America” – its opening lines notwithstanding – is
unambiguously a poem about the attacks of 9/11. In a political climate intolerant
of ambiguity and consequently placing strong restraints on language use, poetry,
too, is robbed of its particular freedoms. In demanding that the poem tell “the
truth” about 9/11, the poem was reduced to a factual statement, on a par with the
news (this despite the fact – irony of ironies! – that Governor McGreevey actually
cited William Carlos Williams’s line “it is difficult to get the news from poems” in
the proclamation that named Baraka as poet laureate19). The repressive action
against Baraka’s poem, then, does not just threaten freedom of expression as
guaranteed by the First Amendment, but even more so the freedom of artistic
expression and aesthetic form. As if to underscore the very accuracy of Baraka’s
inquiry into the privilege of those who “do the saying,” Baraka’s detractors en-
sured that the poem would be treated as a 9/11 document, by reproducing only
those lines that actually referred to the terrorist acts. With the removal of the
poem’s overall aesthetic framework – dependent, in this case, on African-Ameri-
can formal techniques such as signifying, participatory oratory, and rhythmical
performance in which the poetic effect and meaning slowly but inexorably take
shape – “Somebody Blew Up America” was effectively disarmed.
This stripping down of the poem, as if to its bare essentials, gave rise to some
terrible ironies. The ADL, for instance, in focussing entirely upon how the poem
might affect the public understanding of 9/11, ignored the poem’s many refer-
ences to America’s racist treatment of American Indians, African-Americans, and
other minorities as well as its indictment of white supremacists like David Duke
and the Ku Klux Klan. They further dismissed the poem in their letter to Governor
McGreevey as “anti-American”, and as an expression of support for the terrorists
responsible for 9/11: “We know that you as Governor of the State of New Jersey do
not agree nor support the anti-American hostility, tied to the terrorist attack on
America, expressed in the poem.”20
The dismissal of “Somebody Blew up America” as “anti-American” and, conse-
quently, in support of terrorist activity, is a pertinent example of the immense
snowballing effect of the terrorist attacks as political America transformed itself
into an increasingly Manichean state. As Gwiazda bitterly observes:
As a result of what the Bush administration calls “the War on Terrorism,” we
currently live in a country in which voicing intelligent criticism of our leaders
can be seen as a subversive activity. With the United States supposedly en-
gaged in the primal struggle between Good and Evil, even questioning that
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convenient, self-serving binary puts one at risk of being viewed an enemy to
“the American way of life.”21
Speaking of America’s post-9/11 cultural climate, Deborah Jacobs, executive direc-
tor of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of New Jersey, warned that the
trauma inflicted by the terrorist attacks of 2001 had exactly this blinding effect:
“We can’t continue to use our pain and fear to justify our disregard for freedom,
justice and equality. When we allow for the disintegration of our core democratic
beliefs, then we’re really giving in to the terrorists.”22 Outraged at what the ACLU
considered a violation of Baraka’s First Amendment rights, Jacobs demanded, in
near-Barakian spirit: “Who are our government officials to decide which ideas we
will or won’t hear? Who are they to deprive New Jerseyans of opportunities for
dialogue and growth?”23
Divisions in Unity: “Raising the Flag at Ground Zero”
Another post-9/11 controversy lays bare a similar pull toward the removal of “min-
ority” presence and perspective in the construction of the crucial American ex-
perience of 9/11. This controversy, which took place in January 2002, concerned
the memorial statue that was proposed by the Fire Department of New York
(FDNY) as a tribute to the 343 firefighters who died during the attacks on the
World Trade Center. The bronze statue was to be based on the famous photo-
graph “Raising the Flag at Ground Zero” by photojournalist Thomas Franklin.
Franklin’s photograph resonated strongly with the Joe Rosenthal photograph
which inspired the much-praised Iwo Jima memorial, and instantly acquired
iconic status. “Raising the flag at Ground Zero” shows three FDNY firefighters
attempting to raise the American Flag while standing on a heap of World Trade
Center rubble. Unlike Rosenthal, Franklin did not have his subjects pose for the
photograph. He recalled the moment as follows:
I would say I was 150 yards away when I saw the firefighters raising the flag.
They were standing on a structure about 20 feet above the ground. This was a
long lens picture: there was about 100 yards between the foreground and back-
ground, and the long lens would capture the enormity of the rubble behind
them. … As soon as I shot it, I realized the similarity to the famous image of
the Marines raising the flag at Iwo Jima. This was an important shot. It told
more than just death and destruction. It said something to me about the
strength of the American people and of these firemen having to battle the un-
imaginable.24
Franklin’s photograph was reproduced tens of thousands of times and also ap-
peared on the “Heroes 2001” stamp that was issued by the US Postal Service as
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part of the six-month commemoration of 9/11 in March 2002.25 While the use of
the Franklin photograph as the basis for a memorial sculpture was applauded
because of the historical parallel to the Iwo Jima memorial, the actual design of
the proposed sculpture caused an uproar. The controversy was aroused by the
three Caucasian firefighters depicted in the photograph having been replaced by
one white, one black, and one Hispanic figure. Instantly, the statue was dismissed
by many as “political correctness run amok” and “an attempt to rewrite his-
tory.”26 Under pressure of the spreading controversy, the project was abandoned,
and the prototype of the sculpture was destroyed.27
While the charges of political correctness and revisionism may have been coun-
tered by the argument that, after all, 2.7 percent of the NYFD workforce were
indeed black and 3.2 Hispanic,28 this argument would not just be too slight but
also largely beside the point. At stake here is less the representation of the NYFD
than the representation of American society as a whole. Bridging the gap between
the literal and local reading of the photograph on the one hand, and the meta-
phorical and ideological purpose of a memorial on the other, however, proved a
bridge too far. The vision of unity out of diversity that the statue attempted to
project was lost on many. Sticking to a literalist reading, many were in fact of-
fended by what they saw as the removal of two of the three firefighters, by popu-
lar analogy, it would seem, to the argument that affirmative action effectively
takes away jobs, houses, and opportunities from whites. As one respondent wrote
in protest:
Where have we come as a nation that this quest for political correctness has
led us to believe that it is unacceptable for three white firemen to be shown as
white? Where have we come that we will put reality under the knife lest the
simple conveyance of that innocuous reality offend some? And those who
would be offended by reality, how can they not see that a large segment of
society is greatly insulted and offended by the removal of the two white fire-
fighters? Is it not permissible to ask them to practice a little sensitivity and
acceptance of their own?29
Particularity, however, was exactly what the statue had tried to avoid. Fire Depart-
ment spokesman Frank Gribbon explained the proposed alteration of the photo-
graph as follows: “Given that those who died were of all races and all ethnicities,
and that the statue was to be symbolic of those sacrifices, ultimately a decision
was made to honor no one in particular, but everyone who made the supreme
sacrifice.”30 Expectedly, this statement was countered with many sarcastic rejoin-
ders, such as the following: “Having one black, one white and one Hispanic man
is a good start, but not enough. I know FDNY obeys the Americans With Disabil-
ities Act, so the statue should include persons in wheelchairs from each ethnic
group.”31
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The rejection of the memorial sculpture as “political correctness run amok”
resonates with the suggestion made by Amy Kaplan and others that “the war on
terror, some would like to believe, has supplanted the so-called culture wars.”32
Indeed, on the numerous websites that discuss the controversy, statements such
as the following can easily be found: “Sadly, when it comes to the raging priority
of advancing the multiculturalist agenda, nothing is sacred – not even a hallowed
memorial to our national heroes and victims. At a time when we ought to be
thinking of our unity and common cause as Americans, we are forced to focus on
our differences.”33 The insignificance of race to the unity of America is evoked in
a large number of responses. Many, in denouncing the statue, explicitly state that
America should be moving toward a “color-blind society”34 and urge America to
adopt a radical postethnic perspective, in which the significance and social rele-
vance of race are completely annulled – this to prevent what Arthur M. Schle-
singer, Jr. has popularly termed the “disuniting of America.” The following is a
telling example of such a response: “There are no African Americans. There are
no Irish Americans. There are no Asian Americans. We are Americans, period.
ONE NATION, ONE LANGUAGE, ONE FLAG. That is what America is about,
not catering to each little diverse group, for it breeds resentment and division.”35
In their discussion of multiculturalism in the 1990s, in a chapter aptly entitled
“Multiculturalism’s Unfinished Business,” Christopher Newfield and Avery F.
Gordon analyze the backlash against affirmative action (and with that, political
correctness, which is typically attacked for largely the same reasons). They posi-
tion the backlash in relation to the antiessentialism advanced by theorists of mul-
ticulturalism in recent decades, and especially the idea that “race” is not a fixed
category, but a complex social and historical construct, and hence a variable. The
theory itself is promising. As Newfield and Gordon point out: “Some have argued
that once we understand the multiple and sometimes contradictory and indeter-
minate sources of racial identity, we can no longer use race as an index of disad-
vantage.”36 This argument, however, is vulnerable to misinterpretation and abuse
and may result in “premature claim[s] of the declining significance of race.” The
authors believe, therefore, that affirmative action will prove to be the “crucial test
of antiessentialist race consciousness.”37 The successes of affirmative action will
depend on the “renewed explanation” of the seemingly paradoxical relationship
between antiessentialism and the social and political reality of racially based iden-
tities. If properly understood, Newfield and Gordon argue, antiessentialist per-
ceptions of racial identity “make it easier to show that white-majority institutions
are white rather than neutral.”38 The Franklin monument illustrates the need for
such explanations: the arguments that rendered race consciousness irrelevant and
meaningless to the situation at hand – even though this involved the creation of
an American monument to an American experience – hinged on the assumption
that the white presence in the experience of 9/11 was neutral.
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Both “Somebody Blew up America” and the contested firefighters’ memorial –
each in their own way – reveal that the notion of “America,” too, was immedi-
ately reconstructed as people sought to respond to the horrific and overwhelming
attacks. It is now becoming increasingly apparent that the proclamations of
American unity in fact only masked, or even repressed, America’s diversity and
dividedness. With new insights into the processes of exclusion and inclusion,
both historical and contemporary, and the role of race, ethnicity, and religion as
well as gender and sexuality, America may move beyond the vast trauma inflicted
by the terrorist acts of 9/11 – not just upon the individuals directly involved in the
attacks, but upon the very definition of the nation itself.
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“This Godless Democracy”: Terrorism,
Multiculturalism, and American Self-
Criticism in John Updike
John-Paul Colgan
Even though I knew the view [from the top of the Empire State Building] was
incredibly beautiful, my brain started misbehaving, and the whole time I was
imagining a plane coming at the building, just below us. I didn’t want to, but I
couldn’t stop. I imagined the last second, when I would see the pilot’s face,
who would be a terrorist. I imagined us looking each other in the eyes when
the nose of the plane was one millimeter from the building.
I hate you, my eyes would tell him.
I hate you, his eyes would tell me.
– Jonathan Safran Foer, Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close
The description of America as “this godless democracy” comes from John Up-
dike’s short story, “Varieties of Religious Experience,” first published in The Atlan-
tic in November 2002. One of the first works of fiction by an established American
writer to attempt a representation of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the story takes the
form of a series of brief episodes, each providing different perspectives on 9/11. It
features, for example, a section focusing on an office worker trapped in one of
the World Trade Center towers, one describing the crisis of faith experienced by
another man who watches from a rooftop in Brooklyn as the towers collapse, and
one depicting an elderly woman caught up in the hijacking and passenger mutiny
on board United Airlines Flight 93.
Multicultural Encounters
Most interestingly, Updike devotes a long section of the story to an account of a
meeting between Mohamed Atta, the Egyptian engineer believed to have been the
ringleader of the 9/11 hijackers, and Nawaf al-Hazmi, one of the young Saudi men
involved in the plot. This meeting takes place in a Florida strip club a week before
the attacks. Typical of Updike’s work, his account of the meeting makes extensive
and highly instructive use of free indirect discourse in which the characters’ senti-
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ments – in this case those of Mohamed Atta – are blended with those of a more
conventional third-person narrator. The strip club is described as “a dim, unholy
place” whose staff and patrons are redolent of “soured American opportunities”
and which serves food that resembles “garbage not fit for a street dog.”1 Because
he has been living in America for only a short period, the food, we are told, tastes
particularly “poisonous” to Atta’s young companion. Nevertheless, Atta is clear
about how their presence at such a venue relates to their mission. He thinks:
“Their instructions were to blend in, and getting drunk was surely a way of merg-
ing with America, this unclean society disfigured by an appalling laxity of laws
and an electronic delirium of supposed opportunities and pleasures.” Later,
when the time comes to pay the bill, Atta examines the presidential portraits that
adorn the currency in his wallet and thinks that he is gazing upon “the dead
heroes of this godless democracy.”
An Egyptian man, reflecting on issues of cultural assimilation in contemporary
America, as he drinks Scotch and later boasts to the bartender of being a pilot for
American Airlines; Updike’s imagining of an American multicultural encounter
that is “pre-9/11” – definitively so to the extent that it actively enables the events
of 9/11 – is arresting to say the least. In this version of multiculturalism, Mo-
hamed Atta and the other hijackers achieve their goal of superficial assimilation
into America by imitating what they regard as the very worst characteristics of
their host society. Their indulgence in drunkenness, unclean food and an ulti-
mately joyless pursuit of pleasure grants them ostensible entry to a particularly
squalid version of the American melting pot, and this – aided by what they identi-
fy as an inherent weakness in America’s laws – allows them to blend and plot and
eventually to strike at the heart of this same society. In other words, the idea of a
terrorist “sleeper cell” here becomes a dystopian product of multicultural contact
at its most extreme. Atta’s resolve is strengthened by his exposure to the deca-
dence of the strip club, as he idly compares one of the dancers to a figure in an
Egyptian wall painting, reflects on his contempt for the “imitation Western
goods” accumulated by his parents in Cairo, and ponders the significance of sev-
eral key verses from the Qu’ran – at the same time as it works to destroy the
promise of multicultural harmony.
What is even more surprising about this depiction of Muslim rage and disgust
on the eve of 9/11 is that it comes from a writer not normally noted either for his
treatment of multicultural issues in contemporary America or for giving voice to
violently anti-American views. A critical monograph from 2000 describes Updike
as an author who “mainly stayed home, thinking it his primary task to give us
reports … on American manners,” and this focus on a largely white, middle-class
milieu is conventionally regarded as Updike’s hallmark.2 In his 1989 memoir, Self-
Consciousness, he stated that, “[i]n politics … my instinct [has] been merely to stay
out of harm’s way.”3 There appears, however, to be very little of this caution in
evidence in his decision to depict the events leading up to 9/11 by imagining Mo-
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hamed Atta’s reaction to American excess. In fact, Updike’s decision to grant a
voice to Atta represents a significant departure from the reciprocal “I hate you”
imagined by Jonathan Safran Foer’s young protagonist, Oskar Schell, in Extremely
Loud and Incredibly Close (2005). In its failure to move beyond a deadlock of mute
enmity, Oskar’s articulation of terrorist fury is actually an acknowledgement of
inarticulation – of an inability or unwillingness to voice the thoughts of the sui-
cide pilot – whereas Updike’s narrative of 9/11 presumes an ability to grant ex-
pression to the fury of Mohamed Atta and the other hijackers. In this way, Updike
pre-empts Don DeLillo’s Falling Man (2007), which includes three short passages
imagining Atta’s emotional and religious journey from Hamburg to the moment
of impact of American Airlines Flight 11 as a quest “to fight against the need to be
normal,” and also Martin Amis’s short story, “The Last Days of Muhammad Atta”
(2006), whose protagonist is driven by an indiscriminate and obsessive hatred –
referred to as “the pan-anathema” – and seeks relief in his foreknowledge of “the
war-cycles that would flow” from his actions.4
Attempting, in 1999, to account for the frequency with which he is asked to
write and speak on national issues, Updike suggested, “It may be that among
living American authors, I take an anomalously positive or at least hopeful view
of our Republic’s progress.”5 He elsewhere describes this attitude toward Amer-
ica as “unduly patriotic” – an instructive phrase that proclaims loyalty whilst si-
multaneously appearing to cast doubt on the object of that loyalty.6 More recently,
when pressed by Ian McEwan, during a 2004 interview, for a response to the
photographs of prisoner abuse which had just emerged from Baghdad’s Abu
Ghraib prison, Updike sidestepped the issue by once again referring to his san-
guine attitude toward America as a curious anomaly. “I have,” he noted, “an in-
appropriate streak of defending the US.”7
How this habitual defense of America comes to coexist in Updike’s writing
with the articulation of strains of anti-American anger – as typified by the
thoughts of Mohamed Atta as he sits “among the infidels” – is one of the issues
this essay will explore. More specifically, it will examine how Updike’s depiction
of anti-American thought – often, but not always, accompanied by terrorism or
the threat of terrorism – relates to his construction of a self-critical national iden-
tity, and how both of these issues relate to the question of multiculturalism in
contemporary America. In particular, what follows will gesture toward some of
the ways in which multiculturalism frequently acts in Updike’s work as a lens,
through which he is able to examine America and its position in a wider global
context. Rather than preoccupying himself with issues of cultural identity politics
or exploring alternative models of assimilation – the fictional terrain of, for exam-
ple, Philip Roth, Amy Tan and Sandra Cisneros – it will be argued that Updike’s
primary interest in multiculturalism is in its ability to offer him a perspective of
critique, a “fresh pair of eyes” through which to examine present-day America,
and in particular the question of whether America has succeeded in living up to
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the ideals that lured those of other cultures to its shores in the first place. After
outlining Updike’s view on the role of national self-criticism in American writing,
the development of this strand in his own fiction will be traced, demonstrating
how characters from outside mainstream American culture begin to act in Up-
dike’s work as America’s most vociferous critics. The focus will then shift to his
2006 novel Terrorist, analyzing how its depiction of a young Arab-American drawn
into a terrorist plot relates to issues of multiculturalism and American self-criti-
cism.
The Declension of Patriotism
In a 1990 interview, Updike recalled the distress he had felt in the late 1960s at
what he perceived to be the “American self-hatred” at the heart of the domestic
anti-Vietnam War movement. He accounts for this distress in Self-Consciousness,
where he states, “I, whose stock in trade as an American author included an in-
tuition into the mass consciousness and an identification with our national for-
tunes, thought it sad that our patriotic myth of invincible virtue was crashing, and
shocking that so many Americans were gleeful at the crash.”8 Somewhat cu-
riously, this reference in the interview to how out-of-step and alarmed Updike
felt during what is now regarded as the quintessential era of American protest
was followed by a brief digression on American self-criticism and its role in fic-
tion among American writers. Updike noted that:
We were founded as a Utopia, and it’s always in our minds that we’re falling
short of being a Utopia. This is one of the things that makes American self-
criticism so savage and so relentless. It controls the tone of American fiction to
a degree. We’re extra hard on ourselves, but this feeling that we should be
better gives a kind of point and bite to American fiction.9
In the context of Updike’s substantial oeuvre – the result of what is now over half a
century of prolific literary production – this idea of a “savage and relentless” cri-
tique of America having a salutary effect on the nation’s literary efforts grabs the
attention largely because it seems, on the surface at least, to be at odds with the
tone of much of Updike’s own writing. This tone, as has been demonstrated,
Updike himself regards as “optimistic,” “hopeful,” and “unduly patriotic.” In
fact, in a fiercely critical review of Updike’s 1996 family saga, In the Beauty of the
Lilies, Gore Vidal lampooned this patriotic reflex, stating that “[i]n the presence of
authority, Updike is like a bobby-soxer at New York’s Paramount Theater when
the young Frank Sinatra was on view.”10 Even if this caricature is toned down –
and it is worth noting that Updike once stated that he never looks at a blue mail-
box “without a spark of warmth and wonder and gratitude that this intricate …
service is maintained for my benefit” – it is clear that an instinct to maintain faith
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in a nation beset by criticism from within and without recurs throughout Up-
dike’s writing.11 He summed this up most clearly in lines from “Minority Report,”
a poem from the late 1960s, which read: “Don’t read your reviews / A*M*E*R*I*-
C*A: / You are the only land” – a passage that once again gestures toward the
concept of “undue patriotism.”12
Interestingly, however, Updike’s own writing from the late 1960s onward in-
creasingly becomes a vehicle for these negative reviews, as the inherently nostal-
gic idea of America as a nation in irreversible decline from the prosperity and
vigor of the 1950s to an enervated and second-rate present begins to recur. As D.
Quentin Miller points out, Updike’s fiction becomes the site for a constant nego-
tiation between what America was once hoped to be and what America actually
is.13 Perhaps most famously, this declensionist trajectory is explored in Updike’s
celebrated quartet of Rabbit novels, where American decline is represented synec-
dochically by the dwindling of Harry “Rabbit” Angstrom from acclaimed high
school athlete to a life mired in compromise – and, in fact, predicated on national
diminution – as a salesman of Japanese cars.
Increasingly, throughout this period, what we might call a type of home-grown
American self-criticism – for example, Rabbit’s belief that America is “running
out of gas,” as he thinks at the start of Rabbit is Rich (1981), and “falling apart,” as
he thinks at the start of Rabbit at Rest (1990) – is joined in Updike’s writing by a
negative evaluation of present-day America, by characters from different national
and cultural backgrounds; characters whose outsiders’ perspectives appear to give
them greater critical purchase on America.14 We see this first in Rabbit Redux
(1971), which begins with Rabbit’s uneasy acknowledgement of America’s in-
creasingly visible ethnic diversity, as the extroverted behavior of black teenagers
with whom he shares a bus journey causes him to think, “It’s as if … seeds of
some tropical plant sneaked in by the birds were taking over the garden. His
garden.”15 The novel later introduces a character named Skeeter who, influenced
by the Black Power movement, reads aloud to Rabbit from Frederick Douglass
and W.E.B. Du Bois and refers to Rabbit’s beloved nation as the “Benighted States
of Amurri-ka,” as well as a Greek-American character named Charlie Stavros,
with whom Rabbit’s wife has an affair, who calls Rabbit “paleface” and for
whom the American flag sticker on Rabbit’s car means “screw the blacks and
send the CIA into Greece.”16 In other words, if – as was famously stated in a short
story from 1972 – “America is a vast conspiracy to make you happy,” it is as
though Updike senses that characters from outside mainstream white American
culture are in a better position to see through this conspiracy to its flaws and
contradictions.17
For example, The Coup (1978) depicts Hakim Felix Ellelloû, the Islamic-Marxist
demagogue and leader of the fictional African state of Kush, a character whose
anti-American polemic is partially based on the experience gained during his col-
lege education in the US. Along with attacking America on religious grounds,
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Ellelloû also expresses disgust at its broader culture, referring to the land of his
education as “that fountainhead of obscenity and glut.”18 Later in the novel, he
rails against the decadence and superabundance enjoyed by the “capitalist infi-
del” thanks to its access to and plundering of what Ellelloû refers to as “the price-
less black blood of Kush.”19 Interestingly – for Updike is not normally regarded
as a culturally or politically prescient novelist in the mould of Thomas Pynchon or
Don DeLillo – The Coup also suggests that radical Islam represents a power and a
threat capable of supplanting the rigid binary structures of the Cold War. “The
prophet’s vivid paradise,” Ellelloû states, “is our atomic bomb.”20
The role of oil in a new global paradigm, in which America is not only increas-
ingly dependent on events and nations beyond its borders but also increasingly
subject to violent critique from these very nations, is further explored in Rabbit is
Rich, the action of which begins with the oil shortage of 1979 and ends with
America embroiled in the Iran Hostage Crisis. When, in response to a reference
to the newly acquired wealth of Arab states, one of Rabbit’s country club friends
exclaims, “Jesus, those Arabs…. Wouldn’t it be bliss just to nuke ’em all?”, he is
not only betraying a sense of impotent annoyance at his nation’s precarious de-
pendence, but is also revealing the shortcomings of America’s continued reliance
on a no-longer-tenable Cold War-style adversarial framework.21 Later in the no-
vel, the extent to which a newly assertive and violent critique of America is begin-
ning to seep unbidden into the national consciousness is suggested by the follow-
ing description of Rabbit’s exposure to the dispiriting news from Tehran:
Ma Springer’s television set, when he listens, is still on – a rumbling, woofing,
surging noise less like human voices than a noise Nature would make in the
trees or along the ocean shore. She has become a fan of the ABC eleven-thirty
special report on the hostages and every morning tells them the latest version
of nothing happened. Khomeini and Carter both trapped by a pack of kids
who need a shave and don’t know shit. … A muffled sound of chanting comes
through the papered wall, Iranians outside the Embassy demonstrating for the
benefit of the TV cameras. Rabbit’s throat constricts in frustration.22
As the chanting from Tehran surges at the shores of Rabbit’s consciousness and
undermines his confidence in America’s physical and ideological invulnerability,
he is self-defensively forced to hear these dissenting voices as inhuman, ambient
noise or at the very least to deny the protesters any legitimacy of thought or ex-
pression. Nevertheless, the constriction in Rabbit’s throat – denying him a voice
with which to counteract or respond to the protesters – illustrates the increasing
impact of this opposing force.
By the time of Rabbit at Rest ten years later, this force has become central and
irrefutable, violently breaching America’s sense of itself as unassailable in the
form of the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, an event which acts as
124 american multiculturalism after 9/11
a controlling metaphor in the novel. The enemies, it would seem, are now firmly
within the gates – a point that is made clear following the description of some
mild vandalism at the condo complex in Florida where Rabbit and his wife now
spend the winter months: “[They’re] out there, the criminals, watching and wait-
ing for the security guards to nod, so the fortress of sleeping retirees can be
stormed.”23
This sense of an enervated and vulnerable America also manifests itself in the
form of a harsh lesson in late-Cold War economic realities at the hands of a visit-
ing Japanese executive, who lectures Rabbit on American indiscipline and decline
before removing from his family’s car lot the Toyota franchise that has under-
pinned Rabbit’s wealth. Prior to the depiction of Mohamed Atta’s anti-American
revulsion in “Varieties of Religious Experience,” this passage in Rabbit at Rest rep-
resented the most concerted critique of contemporary America in Updike’s writ-
ing since Ellelloû in The Coup and is, therefore, worth quoting at some length. The
caricaturing of the Japanese accent in this passage can perhaps be attributed to
Rabbit’s clinging to World War II-era stereotypes of the Japanese as his frustra-
tion mounts. Mr. Shimada tells him:
Arways we in Japan admire America. As boy during Occupation, rooked way
up to big GI soldiers, their happy easy-go ways. … But in recent times big
brother act rike rittle brother, always cry and comprain. … Riving now five
years in Carifornia, it disappoints me, the rack of disciprine in people of Amer-
ica. … In United States, is fascinating for me, struggle between order and free-
dom. Everybody mention freedom, much rove and talk of freedom. … In Car-
ifornia, dog shit much surprise me. Everywhere, dog shit, dogs must have
important freedom to shit everywhere. Dog freedom more important than
crean grass and cement pavement.24
As with the positing of Mohamed Atta’s fanatical distaste at “an unclean society
disfigured by … appalling laxity,” this portrayal of America as disordered and
oversold on freedom chimes with Rabbit’s assertion earlier in the novel that
America is “going down the tubes,” as well as with Updike’s observations, in an
article from 1992, that “a once-sinewy nation, exultant in the resourcefulness that
freedom brings, now seems bloated and zombified, pillaged and crumbling, all
around us.”25 In other words, Updike is primarily interested in the perspective
available to these characters as a result of their being rooted in another culture,
whilst simultaneously being alert to the gap between American ideals and Amer-
ican reality. As a result, the criticism of America voiced by Atta and Shimada rep-
resents, to some extent at least, a sort of ventriloquism on the part of the author.
Updike’s reflections on American decline and lassitude are voiced by characters
who, having arrived from the geographical “East” and having lived for a time in
the United States, are a testament to American multiculturalism at the same time
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as they recoil from American excess and profit – albeit in vastly different ways –
from American indiscipline.
Scrutinizing Post-9/11 America
Speaking in 2004 of his plans to continue the analysis begun in 2002 with “Vari-
eties of Religious Experience” by writing a full-length novel about post-9/11
America, Updike stated, “I’m not sure what shape [this] would take, since every-
thing happens so violently and quickly, [but] I think if you’re a writer you try to
make something out of everything that happens.”26 The novel Terrorist (2006) rep-
resents the fruits of this attempt. Its depiction of a young Arab-American from the
ominously named city of “New Prospect” who gets drawn into a plot to detonate a
truckload of explosives under the Lincoln Tunnel, made it one of Updike’s most
talked-about novels in years. Reviewing the novel for The Independent, Justin Cart-
wright asserted, “This is a book that must be read by anyone interested in Amer-
ica, terrorism, and serious literature.” Even Christopher Hitchens’s excoriation of
the novel in The Atlantic acknowledged Updike’s attempts at keeping abreast of
current events by turning his attention to radical Islam.27
In a short piece written in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks,
Updike wrote of his amazement that “[d]etermined men who have transposed
their own lives to a martyr’s afterlife can still inflict an amount of destruction that
defies belief.”28 This solemnity of interest, of course, stands in stark contrast to
Rabbit’s dismissal of the student protesters in Iran as “a pack of kids who need a
shave and don’t know shit.” In fact, Updike’s fascination with the power of ter-
rorism underpinned by fanatical religious conviction means that of the full-length
fictional responses to 9/11 written since the attacks – among them by Jay McIner-
ney, Jonathan Safran Foer, Ian McEwan, Paul Auster, and Don DeLillo – his is the
only one that attempts a sustained presentation of the perspective of a terrorist.
As has previously been mentioned, both Martin Amis and Don DeLillo followed
Updike in composing relatively brief portraits of 9/11 ringleader Mohamed Atta.
In Terrorist, however, Updike’s use of the novel form, as well as his creation of a
protagonist who has himself lived through the events of 9/11, allows him to es-
cape the confines of 9/11 as historical event and to examine the issue of terrorist
motivation in greater depth.
Given Updike’s uncertainty as to how to tackle the subject of post-9/11 America,
it is perhaps no surprise – but is certainly highly instructive – that the novel once
again sees him engaged in a ventriloquisation of American self-criticism, through
characters granted a critical perspective on the nation by their immersion in mul-
ticulturalism. In the process, Terrorist comes very close to imagining al-Qaeda-
style terrorism as a type of severe critique of an America that has lost its way.
This also made it Updike’s most controversial novel for many years, with several
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reviewers commending him for writing an “emotionally daring” and “risky” novel
with well-intentioned ambitions to “shock readers.”29
From the novel’s opening paragraph, we see that for Ahmad Mulloy Ashmawy
– the titular terrorist – the clamor, indiscipline, and materialism of contemporary
America represents a threat to the self-denial at the heart of his Muslim faith:
Devils, Ahmad thinks. These devils seek to take away my God. All day long, at Cen-
tral High School, girls sway and sneer and expose their soft bodies and allur-
ing hair. Their bare bellies, adorned with shining navel studs and low-down
purple tattoos, ask, What else is there to see? Boys strut and loaf along and look
dead-eyed, indicating with their edgy killer gestures and careless scornful
laughs that this world is all there is – a noisy varnished hall lined with metal
lockers and having at its end a blank wall desecrated by graffiti and roller-
painted over so often it feels to be coming closer by millimeters. (T 3)30
Ahmad fears becoming trapped within this debased world and feels betrayed by
what he regards as “an imperialist economic system rigged in favor of rich Chris-
tian infidels” (T 80). “The world is difficult,” he thinks, “because devils are busy
in it, confusing things and making the straight crooked” (T 11). Ahmad also at-
tacks what he regards as the false promises of American consumer culture, telling
his high school guidance counsellor Jack Levy that the nation “has no God [and]
is obsessed with sex and luxury goods” (T 38), and reflecting elsewhere that “all
America wants of its citizens … is for us to buy – to spend money for foolish
luxuries and thus to propel the economy forward” (T 72). The “us” here is crucial,
particularly in terms of the portrayal of multiculturalism in the novel. The product
of an Irish-American mother and an absent Egyptian father, Ahmad is repeatedly
identified throughout the novel as an American. He is described as walking “with
a native trace of the American lope” (T 281) and tells Levy that, despite his sense
of not belonging, he is “not a foreigner” and has never been abroad (T 35).
Nevertheless, despite Levy’s attempts to make Ahmad appreciate his position as
a member of a “diverse and tolerant society” (T 38), Ahmad himself regards any
celebration of multiculturalism as evidence of a disabling lack of conviction on
America’s part. He repeats the view of his local Yemeni imam that “a relativistic
approach trivializes religion, implying that it doesn’t matter much. You believe
this, I believe that, we all get along – that’s the American way” (T 38). Under the
guidance of this imam – who, we are told, helped to “make him anew” at the
local mosque (T 99) – Ahmad also scorns the idea of high school as a route to
college, opting instead to train as a truck driver so as to avoid being exposed to
the “corrupting influences” of American secularism (T 37). This decision leads to
his becoming embroiled in the terrorist plot that drives the novel’s action. Toward
the end of the novel, prior to departing on his abortive suicide mission, Ahmad
states that he is volunteering for martyrdom for two main reasons: firstly, out of
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the “fullness of [his] faith” and secondly, “out of hatred for those who mock and
ignore God” (T 270) – a combination of religious zeal and cultural distaste that
echoes the Mohamed Atta of “Varieties” and The Coup’s Hakim Ellelloû.
Interestingly, the novel’s other main character, high school guidance counselor
Jack Levy, also echoes many of the main points of Ahmad’s critique of America,
with Robert Stone noting in his New York Times review that their views appear to
converge at several points.31 As a non-observant Jew, having an affair with Ah-
mad’s mother, and married to a mercilessly depicted overweight gentile whose
sister works for the Department of Homeland Security, Levy’s character is made
to carry an extraordinary amount of weight in the novel. Updike positions him in
the novel as something of a multipurpose mouthpiece, on account of his first-
hand experience of everything from post-9/11 security issues and the promise of
multicultural harmony in America, to the emblematic nature of obesity and the
uncertainties faced by high school students. For example, he regards America as
“a coast-to-coast tarbaby where we are all stuck” in which “even our vaunted free-
dom is nothing much to be proud of, with the Commies out of the running”
(T 27). He almost echoes Ahmad to the word in his diagnosis that in contempo-
rary America, “everything is so relative, and all the economic forces are pushing
pleasure and consumption and credit card debt” (T 205). In conversation with his
wife, he even suggests a reason behind Ahmad’s attraction to radical Islam, a
reason that once again centers on the idea of American decline. He says:
[Kids] like Ahmad need to have something they don’t get from society any
more. Society doesn’t let them be innocent any more. The crazy Arabs are right
– hedonism, nihilism, that’s all we offer. … We don’t know what to do, we
don’t have the answers we used to; we just futz along, trying not to think. No-
body accepts responsibility, so the kids, some of the kids, take it on. (T 205-
206)
For Levy, an America in which, at one point, “guidance was everywhere” (T 33)
has betrayed its earlier promise of opportunity and protection for all – he thinks,
“Too many losers, and the winners winning too big” (T 136) – and has left young
people like Ahmad foundering in relativism and yearning for the certainty pro-
vided by fundamentalist religion.
Multiculturalism and American Self-Criticism
In a 2006 interview, Updike stated that the cultural and theological idea that lies
at the heart of Terrorist – a religious young man who sees contemporary America
as “a devil trying to take away his faith” – was initially intended to form the basis
of a story about a young Christian seminarian. He decided to change the protago-
nist’s religion and turned his attention to post-9/11 America because, he said, “I
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thought I had something to say from the standpoint of a terrorist.” Updike goes
on: “I think I felt that I could understand the animosity and hatred which an
Islamic believer would have for our system. Nobody’s trying to see it from that
point of view. I guess I have stuck my neck out in a number of ways, but that’s
what writers are for, maybe.”32 This, once again, is an extraordinarily arresting
statement for an author such as John Updike to make, not only given his self-
proclaimed inclination to defend America, but also given the political and cultural
climate of post-9/11 America. As Judith Butler has written, “There is no relevant
prehistory to the events of September 11, since to begin to tell the story a different
way, to ask how things came to this, is already to complicate the question of
agency which … leads to a fear of moral equivocation.”33 Updike’s undertaking
in Terrorist, to imagine the “prehistory” of a planned sequel to 9/11, is in clear
contravention of this unspoken prohibition. His exploration of the layers of ani-
mosity behind the unspoken “I hate you” of the suicide bomber is even more
daring, when this figure is himself an American citizen and the product of a mul-
ticultural union. In fact, despite Jack Levy invoking a utopian version of the melt-
ing pot ideal as he attempts to dissuade Ahmed from carrying out his plan –
“Hey, come on, we’re all Americans here. That’s the idea…. Irish-Americans,
African-Americans, Jewish-Americans; there are even Arab-Americans” (T 301) –
Updike’s use of perspectives produced by multiculturalism as a means of imagin-
ing a terrorist critique of America gestures, perhaps inadvertently, toward the
views of American critics of multiculturalism, such as Samuel Huntington and
Lawrence Auster, who see it as a fundamentally anti-Western ideology.
This is not to suggest that Updike is himself hostile to multiculturalism. It is,
however, apparent that, by constructing viewpoints that develop as a result of
multicultural contact, Updike is able to comment critically on the nature of Amer-
ican progress to a degree that would not otherwise be possible. In his 1995 intro-
duction to the collected Everyman edition of the Rabbit quartet, he describes the
way in which the four novels began to function for him as “a kind of running
report” on the changing face of America. He writes: “My impression is that the
character of Harry ‘Rabbit’ Angstrom was for me a way in – a ticket to the Amer-
ica all around me. What I saw through Rabbit’s eyes was more worth telling than
what I saw through my own…. He kept alive my native sense of wonder and haz-
ard.”34 In Terrorist, as in “Varieties of Religious Experience,” the final three Rabbit
novels, and The Coup, Updike’s “native sense of hazard” – in reality a combination
of patriotism and nostalgia, expressed as a self-critical belief in America as a place
of decline and unfulfilled potential – is further honed and explored through the
lens of multiculturalism. With Ahmad’s warning to Jack Levy that “the American
way is the way of infidels. It is headed for a terrible doom” (T 39), Terrorist can also
be regarded as another of Updike’s “running reports” on the state of his nation. It
is one of the more remarkable features of Updike’s writing in the second half of
his career that he has opted to expand considerably upon the scrutinizing premise
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of the Rabbit novels, and has frequently chosen to examine America through the
eyes of characters that are implacably ranged in opposition to its values, charac-
ters for whom it represents little more than a “godless democracy.” This makes
Terrorist more than simply Updike’s contribution to the ever-increasing list of
post-9/11 novels, but rather part of an ongoing project of scrutiny and critique.
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Multiculturalism in American History
Textbooks before and after 9/11
Rachel Hutchins-Viroux
History textbooks for public schools construct and transmit an official version of
a nation’s past. In the United States, in the absence of a national system of educa-
tion, these books act as a sort of de facto national curriculum. Owing to the power
they wield, both real and symbolic, they are highly contested terrain, with many
pressure groups from both the right and left trying to influence their content. The
teaching of history in the public schools was a primary battleground in the initial
rounds of the “culture wars” in the 1980s and 1990s, and it remains at the center
of a great many debates to define national identity, debates which have been
further intensified in the wake of September 11, 2001. Textbooks embody a com-
promise. In order to sell, they must be acceptable to parents, teachers, adminis-
trators, and, in general, citizens of divergent political leanings. As such, they pro-
vide a meaningful representation of a consensual vision of American national
identity.
This essay examines the textbooks that were adopted for use in primary educa-
tion by the state of Texas in 1997 and 2003.1 Texas constitutes a significant case
study, as it exerts unequaled influence over the content of the books it purchases,
which are then sold nationwide. The textbooks selected in 1997 were not only the
last to be chosen in Texas before the events of September 11, 2001, they were also
the first to be published after the conservative backlash against progressive multi-
culturalism and the initial rounds of the culture wars. These conflicts led to a new
vision of American identity and the way in which American history, in both its
academic and more popular forms, is written.
In the 1997 books, a conservative form of what we might call “civic multicultur-
alism” – or what David Hollinger has called “postethnic” national identity –
dominated Texas-approved textbooks.2 That is, the United States is presented as
a multiethnic nation, with a core culture composed of shared values and ideals –
the political ideals upon which the United States was founded. In these textbooks,
the face of America had, indeed, become more diverse. That diversity was pre-
sented as a defining trait of American national identity, one of which students
should be proud. Reflecting the widespread scholarly shift toward commitment
to a more plural vision of the nation, certain elements of recent multiculturalist
133
historiography, as promoted by such mainstream academic bodies as the Organi-
zation of American Historians and the American Historical Association, had in-
fluenced the textbooks. This new approach led to the inclusion of previously ig-
nored or neglected subjects, as we shall see, such as the suffering endured by
African-American slaves or the internment of Japanese-Americans during World
War II. However, these progressive tendencies were attenuated, as textbooks
avoided the most difficult, polemical questions – those which raise doubts as to
the equality of American society today, and those which tarnish the image of na-
tional heroes and myths. The books seemed to cater further to right-wing interest
groups by emphasizing the traditional patriotic symbols of the nation.
In spite of these practices, the conservative Christian Right3 groups which in-
tervene in the processes of textbook production and selection, both in Texas and
nationwide, felt at the time that textbooks put too much emphasis on discrimina-
tion and oppression of minority groups and women in American history, and they
continued to protest. In the late 1990s, the already influential right gained an even
greater foothold in the Texas political circles that determine what children learn.
Throughout the decade, they had gained seats on the Texas State Board of Educa-
tion, and in 2000, nine individual organizations of the conservative Christian
Right banded together to pool their considerable financial and human resources
to influence even further the choice and content of Texas textbooks. In addition,
publishers continued to practise self-censorship in accordance with the wishes of
the Right, with whom they increasingly collaborated behind closed doors in the
early stages of textbook development.4
Since 9/11, the debate over the representation of American national identity has
once again become increasingly urgent and strident. On paper, commentators
and activists of different political persuasions seem to agree that children should
learn about the rest of the world. However, in both rhetoric and practice they
disagree as to what this learning should entail. Progressive multiculturalists, who
generally advocate the teaching of multiple points of view, argue that children
should be able to understand the attacks in the context of American foreign pol-
icy, thereby shedding light on why significant numbers of people oppose and
revile the United States.5 Many conservatives have attacked this position, equating
understanding other viewpoints with agreement, indicating that those on the left
justify terrorism. Likewise, progressive multiculturalist educators have stressed
the need to establish the distinction between fundamentalist terrorists and peace-
ful Muslim Americans.6 A number of prominent conservatives consider this ap-
proach largely irrelevant, believing that history should be presented in a way that
emphasizes patriotism, unity, and the heroes of the more distant past, as well as
those of 9/11.7 More than ever, conservatives want textbooks to celebrate the
superiority of American values and society. The only explanation they accept for
the attacks of 2001 is that terrorists abhor the ideals of freedom for which Amer-
ica stands. For instance, Chester Finn, who, among other high-profile jobs in the
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world of education, served in the US Department of Education under President
Reagan, advocates “teaching patriotism, American style.” He further explains his
viewpoint thus:
Respect for diversity is a necessary ingredient. But so is love of freedom – and
the fact that it has enemies who loathe it. So is the fragility of a free and
diverse society, and the central obligation of that society to defend itself
against aggressors. So, too, is respect for heroes, including those who froze at
Valley Forge, who stormed the beaches of Normandy, and who perished while
trying to rescue terrorist victims in lower Manhattan. This more martial strand
of patriotism makes some educators nervous. So does the sense of pride in
America that accompanies it. They’d rather emphasize our failings and our
differences.8
The various parties in the debates over history teaching seem to agree that
schools should teach “respect for diversity,” but in practice, this expression can
be interpreted in very different ways. In the view of progressive multiculturalists,
respecting diversity requires legitimating minority viewpoints by incorporating
them into the official national narrative and teaching students that truth is (at
least partially) subjective, and that they should always be aware of other view-
points. For assimilationists, respecting diversity means recognizing that America
is indeed made up of many different ethnic groups, but they prefer not to empha-
size conflict, discrimination, and inequality, fearing that to do so would only
breed antagonism. Therefore, they continue to advocate teaching a version of
American history that omits a great part of minorities’ experiences.
This essay will seek to evaluate how textbook publishers, in their quest for
widespread public approval, negotiate these opposing sets of demands. In addi-
tion, we will examine whether the nature of the patriotism expressed in the books
has changed since 9/11. Namely, does cultural diversity remain a keystone of
American national pride and of the country’s outlook on international affairs, as
more liberal educators have recommended? Does a more militaristic version of
patriotism emerge, with the doctrine of cultural tolerance becoming (even more)
subservient to conservative positions? This essay aims to answer these questions
through an analysis of the image of the American people as it is reflected in the
textbooks’ illustrations; an examination of the presentation of the subjects in
American history which most sharply oppose progressive multiculturalists and
conservatives, as well as a study of the messages and values conveyed by patriotic
iconography and text; and finally, a look at the presentations of the events of
September 11, 2001.
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Overview: The Face of America
Though they are essentially history books, the social studies textbooks examined
here all contain photographs of contemporary Americans, in addition to illustra-
tions showing historical figures. As the charts below show, the percentages of
different ethnic groups changed little between 1997 and 2003.9






































































Average percentage 1997 29.2% 10.8% 5.8% 5.5% 10.8% 31.1% 6.6% 51.5
Average percentage 2003 25.3% 8.7% 10.3% 1.3% 14.7% 25.3% 14.3% 64.3
*Excludes historic events, such as the events of 9/11.
The books clearly remain committed to presenting a multicultural image of Amer-
ica and its history, for which photographs of contemporary Americans are a use-
ful device, as they permit the inclusion of members of ethnic groups that appear
less frequently in historical accounts. However, despite multiculturalists’ sugges-
tions, most books do not depict Muslim Americans. The McGraw-Hill book is the
only one to include such photographs, one of which appears in the context of an
exercise teaching about Muslims in the United States. It is interesting to note that
this textbook had by far the worst sales in Texas.10 While its sensitivity to the
image of Muslim Americans was surely not the only reason for its poor sales,
neither was it much of a selling point. Clearly, the desire of more liberal educa-
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tors to make sure students have a positive view of Muslims by portraying them as
fully fledged members of the nation has not been widely adopted.
Another aspect of the books’ illustrations also indicates the dominance of con-
servatism: the 2003 textbooks feature considerably fewer women. In 1997, 30.4
percent of illustrations of historical events included women and 85.3 percent in-
cluded men. In 2003, only 22.1 percent of such illustrations included women, and
92.4 percent included men. The photographs of contemporary Americans, how-
ever, still reveal a strong desire to include women in the books, as about 72 per-
cent of such images from both groups of books depict women. Thus, the sharp
decrease in historical illustrations showing women appears to be the result not of
a total rejection of multiculturalist aims, but of a return to a more conservative
approach to presenting history. Women appear primarily in scenes featuring
anonymous historical people.
In 1997, illustrations depicting anonymous people made up 50.4 percent of
images of people from the past (an average of 187.5 out of 372.3 per book). In
2003, however, their number drops drastically – in both real and proportional
terms – to account for only 38.7 percent of images of historical people (an aver-
age of 158 out of 408.7 per book). This change reflects the shift away from the
elements of social history (favored by multiculturalist scholars and rejected by
many conservatives) that had been integrated into the 1997 books, and a move
toward a more military and political approach to American history, which conser-
vatives generally prefer. Indeed, within the remaining images of anonymous his-
torical people, a much greater number show battles and legislative bodies, thus
further reducing the visibility of women. These changes represent a clear setback
for multiculturalist ideals and approaches to history.
Controversial Subjects
As is the case with the textbook illustrations, the 2003 books demonstrate a clear
shift toward conservative-approved approaches to delicate subjects, even though
certain multiculturalist gains in the presentation of controversial subjects con-
cerning interethnic relations seem to be definitive.
In accordance with multiculturalism and recent historiography, slavery remains
a prominent subject in the books and is explicitly described as “cruel.” However,
in 2003 textbooks the emphasis shifts subtly away from the more disturbing as-
pects of slavery, focusing instead on slave culture, knowledge and skills, and re-
bellion. This approach is in keeping with multiculturalist historical research since
the 1970s, showing slaves not as helpless victims, but as actors in their own des-
tiny and in that of the United States. This trend had already begun in the 1997
textbooks, but the 2003 books concentrate even more on these aspects. In addi-
tion, the 2003 books expand the already significant coverage of the role of slaves
and former slaves in fighting in the Revolutionary and Civil Wars. The books thus
multiculturalism in american history textbooks before and after 9/11 137
exhibit a multicultural sensitivity to making African-Americans and slavery more
visible in US history. However, in areas where multiculturalism and conservatism
clash, the books adopt the more conservative views. Right-wing protestors in
Texas have fought against what they saw as too much emphasis on oppression of
minorities by whites in the 1997 books, especially concerning slavery, and they
seem to have been successful. While books have not gone so far as to remove all
references to the cruelty of the system of slavery in America, they have removed
nearly all details, first-person accounts, and illustrations which made these obser-
vations more comprehensible and touching, and less abstract for their readers. In
addition, despite multiculturalists’ wishes for textbooks to clearly show the extent
of slavery’s reach in the United States,11 textbook editors continue to omit the fact
that the “Founding Fathers” owned slaves. This omission would seem to be a
direct concession to conservatives, who wish to present a mythical, unblemished
image of traditional national heroes.12
Multiculturalists have had somewhat more success concerning the topic of dis-
crimination in general. It is now possible to discuss discrimination against
blacks, Chinese, and Mexicans in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Amer-
ica openly and still receive the approval of conservative groups. However, the two
top-selling (and conservative-approved) books of 2003 suggest that discrimina-
tion is a thing of the past. Government actions and the Civil Rights Movement of
the 1950s and 1960s are presented as having been successful in eradicating it.
McGraw-Hill, on the other hand, ends its chapter on the Civil Rights Movement
with this statement: “Discrimination still exists, but our country has come closer
to the ideal of ‘liberty and justice for all.’ Leaders such as Jesse Jackson and Cor-
etta Scott King, Martin Luther King’s widow, have carried the legacy of the move-
ment into the new millennium” (583).
This portrayal of the past would seem to represent the viewpoint of progressive
proponents of civic multiculturalism, placing the ongoing fight against discrimi-
nation in the context of continual progress toward the nation’s civic ideals. An
assignment on Martin Luther King, Jr., however, is more closely aligned with the
more radical approach of transformative pedagogy: “Think of a situation in our
nation today that seems unfair. Write a paragraph that tells what Dr. King might
have done to address the situation” (582). This question, with its emphatic use of
the word “unfair” and general goal of making students aware of injustice and
methods for fighting it, is the only example in all three 2003 books of an attempt
to impart a sense of social justice, which is at the heart of progressive multicultur-
alism.
Conservatives have also beaten back multiculturalist gains regarding the intern-
ment of Japanese-Americans during World War II. While the main ideas of how
to present the internment have not changed greatly, the details have been altered
in subtle, but significant, ways. The books continue to show the internment as an
error, based on the mistaken fears that Japanese-Americans might help Japan
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against the US. The textbooks make it clear that these American citizens were
loyal to America, a fact which they stress by mentioning the heroism of the Japa-
nese-American 442nd Regimental Combat Team. Inclusion of the internment
represents a victory for multiculturalists, as books in the 1970s and early 1980s
did not necessarily discuss this event. However, the 2003 books present the topic
in a way that is less likely to satisfy multiculturalists. The majority of these text-
books do not mention the US government’s 1988 apology, and none mentions the
reparations (symbolic as they were) paid to victims’ families. This omission de-
tracts from the seriousness of the injustice done to Japanese-Americans.
Similarly, the 1997 books stress the loss of civil liberties and property, as well
as the unpleasant living conditions victims had to endure. The 2003 books
omitted details stressing the injustice of the internment, including primary-source
accounts of living conditions in the camps and families’ emotional suffering. For
instance, the 1997 McGraw-Hill textbook explains: “In 1942, the government
made more than 100,000 Japanese-Americans leave their homes on the West
Coast. Many of their rights were taken away, including freedom of speech and
the right to vote. These Americans were also deprived of their homes, businesses,
and property …” (601). The 1997 Harcourt textbook states that the camps were
“like prisons. Barbed wire fenced people in. Soldiers with guns guarded the
camps to keep people from leaving” (555-556). No such descriptions appear,
however, in the more recent textbooks. Students are therefore less likely to identi-
fy with the victims, to see the internment as a breach of legal rights and American
ideals of freedom and equality, and are more likely to see it as an honest mistake
made in a time of war.
This change is particularly significant, as many educators suggested drawing
parallels between the internment of Japanese-Americans after the bombing of
Pearl Harbor and the suspicions directed at Arab-Americans after the attacks of
September 11, 2001.13 Furthermore, the textbooks ignore completely multicultur-
alist demands that the internment be shown not only as the result of fears con-
cerning national security, but as the continuation of years of discriminatory poli-
cies and attitudes toward Asian Americans. Only one book in 1997 made this
connection clear, and none of the 2003 books makes any mention of discrimina-
tion. Once again, this approach represents a significant setback for multicultural-
ists, but not a complete reversal of earlier progress.
Similarly, the 2003 textbooks appear to incorporate a multiculturalist approach
by occasionally drawing parallels between events in the United States and those
abroad, which the 1997 books did not do. For instance, in their discussions of the
American Revolution, all the 2003 books feature a mention of the French Revolu-
tion and an illustration depicting France. Likewise, the more recent books quote
foreign leaders on topics with universal implications, such as the right to free
speech. These additions – to textbooks whose mission is to teach American his-
tory – are significant, and clearly reflect a desire to help students conceptualize
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history beyond national boundaries. However, the 2003 textbooks are less sensi-
tive than their 1997 counterparts to foreign points of view regarding US foreign
policy. Notably, certain 1997 books introduced the term “imperialism” to describe
American expansionism at the end of the nineteenth century, showing students
that these policies were sharply criticized by some American citizens, and dis-
cussing Hawaiian opposition to annexation by the United States. In the 2003
books, opposing viewpoints are silenced. Only Hawaii’s last monarch, Queen Li-
liuokalani, is still mentioned as opposing annexation, but she now appears to
have acted alone – one might suppose in order to maintain her power – rather
than as the head of a legitimate protest movement.
Patriotic Iconography and National Values
As we have now seen, textbooks have adopted more conservative approaches to
their telling of American history in general, largely moving away from the ele-
ments of social history which had gained a foothold in the 1997 textbooks, and
shying away from emphasizing details which reflect negatively on the behavior of
European Americans toward minorities. Not surprisingly, patriotic images and
messages regarding national values in the textbooks also reflect a shift toward a
more conservative stance.
Compared to older books, the 1997 textbooks contain many more patriotic
symbols, notably US flags and the Statue of Liberty. This increase was the result
of several factors, including improved publication quality. However, the augmen-
tation seems, more significantly, to be the result of the culture wars. Conserva-
tives protested that greater attention paid to conflict and discrimination in the
United States’ past was a sign of the editors’ lack of patriotism, and would have a
negative impact on students’ feelings toward their country. They had legal
grounds for these complaints, as the Texas Education Code (like many other
such pieces of legislation in the United States) requires schools to teach patriot-
ism.14 It is hardly surprising that textbook editors responded by multiplying the
number of patriotic images in their books. These symbols often appear alone, as
simple demonstrations of patriotism, or serving to acquaint students with the
object in question. They can also be associated with other events, objects, or peo-
ple, thereby conferring upon them a patriotic significance. The flag, in particular,
often appears alongside important moments in the nation’s history. Notably, the
American Revolution, events that led to advances in civil rights and liberties, and
the expansion of the national borders and growing power abroad are all marked
in this manner as examples of progress in the United States (whether military or
toward civic ideals).
These traditional uses of the American flag already appeared in older text-
books, but there are many more examples of them in the books published in
1997. These recent books, however, were innovative in associating patriotic sym-
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bols with images and texts celebrating American diversity, which is thereby pres-
ented as a characteristic trait of American culture and as a source of national
pride. For instance, the Houghton Mifflin book, entitled Build Our Nation, features
on its front cover a photograph of a multiethnic group of children set against the
background of an American flag, and the book contains other similar images.
The McGraw-Hill book also includes an abundance of images showing ethnically
diverse groups of Americans associated with the US flag or the Statue of Liberty
and a text proclaiming something along these lines: “Our country’s people come
from all over the world, yet we are united in our belief in freedom and equality for
all” (6).
While all the 2003 books still feature specific sections highlighting American
diversity, this subject no longer holds quite as prominent a role as in 1997. The
1997 books contained at least three illustrations celebrating diversity by associat-
ing it with a patriotic symbol. The 2003 books contain on average only one such
image. More importantly, whereas these images constituted a plurality of illustra-
tions featuring the American flag or the Statue of Liberty in 1997 books, in 2003
they are greatly overshadowed by the much more abundant images associating
patriotic symbols with military exploits. Indeed, whereas the 1997 books contain
on average eleven illustrations in which patriotic symbols play a key role, this
number climbs to 27.7 in the 2003 books. The flag continues to be associated
with defining moments in American history (including such multiculturalist land-
marks as the Civil Rights movement or the Emancipation Proclamation, thus re-
asserting the notion that these events helped move the United States toward its
egalitarian ideals), but a great many more of these moments are now military in
nature. This is not to say that they would not meet with approval from multicul-
turalists.
Significantly, several of these illustrations feature African-American soldiers
brandishing the American flag in different wars, thus reinforcing the image of
African-Americans as patriots and full contributors to American history. How-
ever, the definition of patriotism seems to have changed. If in 1997 it was enough
to embrace the American ideals of equality and tolerance, in 2003 military defense
of the nation has become a significant part of what defines a good citizen. “Loy-
alty” has replaced “justice” and even “liberty” as the catchphrase for American
unity. Scott Foresman ends its chapter on the diversity of the American people
with the text of the Pledge of Allegiance and an explanation of how it reinforces
unity. Similarly, Harcourt includes two photographs of multiethnic groups of
children against the background of an American flag with their hands over their
hearts, saying the Pledge of Allegiance, which is printed beside the photo. (Har-
court includes the text of the Pledge not once, but three times, each time accom-
panied by an American flag.) An excerpt from McGraw-Hill’s 2003 edition is typi-
cal of the change. In a chapter entitled “The American People,” this textbook
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features a two-page spread of the Statue of Liberty juxtaposed with photos of
diverse American families, and includes this text:
The United States has been described as a nation of immigrants. In fact, most
Americans have someone in their family background who was an immigrant.
Over the years, immigrants from all over the world have made contributions to
the United States. Their differences have brought a great deal of cultural diver-
sity to our country. Diversity is variety.
This diversity can be seen in the many religions, languages, values, and tradi-
tions that are found in our nation. Values are the beliefs that guide the way
people live. One important value is patriotism, or love for and loyal support of
one’s country. (18)
These themes of patriotism and loyalty are further tied together in the textbooks’
presentations of the events of September 11, 2001.
The Rightward Shift after 9/11
Two of the three 2003 books adhere perfectly to conservatives’ wishes regarding
the representation of the events of 9/11, emphasizing the heroism and patriotism
of the American people, but not discussing the terrorists’ reasons for the attacks
(Harcourt gives no indication whatsoever as to who perpetrated the attacks). Scott
Foresman (the top-selling book by a wide margin) vaguely presents the attacks as
being “on the basic democratic values in which we all believe,” which is in line
with conservatives’ view of terrorists as enemies of freedom. Instead of seeking to
explain the attacks, this book focuses on the heroic actions of the New York City
firefighters and completes the chapter with sheet music of the patriotic song
“You’re a Grand Old Flag,” accompanied by a full-page photograph of a very large
flag at the center of a parade. All three books feature the same photograph of
firefighters raising an American flag over the ruins of the World Trade Center.
While multiculturalists would certainly not object to this type of patriotic presen-
tation, they might regret the lack of information explaining the attacks. McGraw-
Hill (again, the most multiculturalist 2003 textbook, the only one to show Muslim
Americans, and by far the poorest selling book in Texas) is the only one to offer a
hint of an explanation of the reasons behind the attacks. The text refers to “a
network of terrorists based in the Middle East who opposed American policies,
culture, and influence” (601).
The fact that the McGraw-Hill textbook was adopted by Texas indicates that its
slightly more multiculturalist tendencies are still within the norm of what the
conservative-dominated State Board of Education is willing to accept. It is, how-
ever, far from radical. This textbook, with its move away from social history, its
reduction of details showing the cruelty toward slaves and the injustice of the
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internment of Japanese-Americans during the Second World War, and its pre-
dominance of militaristic themes in its abundant patriotic images, is more similar
to the other 2003 textbooks, with their decidedly conservative slant, than it is to
the somewhat more liberal 1997 books.
It would be an overstatement to attribute this rightward shift entirely to the
attacks of 9/11, as the Christian Right was mobilizing even before 2000 in ways
that indicated it might gain strength, and publishers were already practising self-
censorship as they sought to gain the approval of influential conservative groups.
Whatever the cause, the 2003 textbooks adhered so closely to conservative wishes
that it is clear that the right was ahead in the culture wars.
Nationalism is often exacerbated when the nation is perceived as being in dan-
ger, and these books are no exception. A perceived threat to national unity led to
the abundance of patriotic symbols and rhetoric in the 1997 textbooks, and a
more imminent threat has now led to a more conservative conception of a nation
still proud of its diverse heritage, but primarily concerned with unity and loyalty.
Nevertheless, while the more liberal goals of multiculturalism have suffered a sig-
nificant setback, the movement has succeeded in changing Americans’ collective
consciousness. The face of America is resolutely multicultural. While the details
may vary, once taboo subjects such as the cruelty of slavery or the unjustified
internment of Japanese-Americans are now assured of their place in the history
books.
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Transatlantic Dialogues

A Kinder, Gentler Europe? Islam,
Christianity, and the Divergent
Multiculturalisms of the New West
Patrick Hyder Patterson
Multiculturalism is a many-splintered thing. With multiple, transitory, and con-
tested meanings, the concept resists straightforward definition. In both its inter-
pretation and its effects, it frustrates even as it seeks to pacify. To complicate
matters, America’s multiculturalism is not Europe’s multiculturalism. The his-
tories are not the same, the origins and intentions are not the same, the present
practices are not the same, and the futures may not be the same, either. Like
certain other great “isms” of the modern period, most notably “liberalism” and
“nationalism,” the concept has had a meaning for Americans very different from
that commonly held by Europeans. Key distinctions have surfaced in the varying
responses to the perceived “problems” that multiculturalism as a deliberate, in-
terventionist, programmatic “ism” is intended to address concerns ranging from
the delivery of more effective social services to the improved integration of immi-
grant and other minorities, to the management of multiple, sometimes compet-
ing identities and the cultivation of a sense of civic cohesion.
All these differences have come into play powerfully and vividly in the encoun-
ter with Islam. After the events of September 11, 2001 – but also, critically, well
before that date – European policymakers, policy advocates, and reformers have
pursued a multiculturalist path that has veered away from the course taken in the
United States.1 The split proves especially noticeable when, as in the discussion
that follows, the primary object of concern is not the often far-reaching visions of
academics, progressive activists, and political theorists, but rather the more con-
ventional conceptions that have won out at the level of official rhetoric, state
practice, and common public discourse. Both Europe and the United States have
seen the emergence of what might fairly be called “mainstream multicultural-
isms” – accommodationist stances that, as middle courses, have frequently man-
aged to frustrate multiple constituencies: insufficiently multiculturalist for the
vanguard, too multiculturalist for many in the society at large. Yet these European
and American mainstreams have led to remarkably different ends, and nowhere
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has the divergence between the two multiculturalist tendencies been more appar-
ent than in the reception of Islam and its followers.
To the extent that multiculturalism is liberally inflected, as the dominant ver-
sions are in varying degrees, certain Muslim interpretations of Islam promise to
violate the express or implied multicultural contract. In turn, advocates of liberal
pluralism find themselves wondering just how great a departure from liberal
ideals their pluralist commitments require them to tolerate. The European and
the American traditions have, in the main, resolved that question very differently.
For Europeans, pressures from American paradigms and the more concrete
demands of US security policy as it confronts Muslims as potential terrorists, are
perhaps inescapable. But given the prevailing assumptions of America’s over-
weening political and cultural influence on Europe (and on practically every other
part of the world), what seems most remarkable is that Europeans have continu-
ally seen themselves as called upon – and able – to articulate their own distinctive
approaches, responses they understand to be decidedly European in both their
functional dynamics and their historical-cultural provenance. Europeans borrow
from the United States, and they often recognize it as a source of the multicultur-
alist impulse. In the main, however, they have thought that the best solutions
come not from America, but rather from Europe’s own traditions. And they con-
tinue to do so.
A careful demarcation of the American experience is therefore in order. This
proves difficult, as the powerful emotional charge of 9/11 threatens to overwhelm
practically any discussion of the meaning of Islam in the contemporary world,
making it seem all of one piece. Yet 9/11 and its aftermath have thus far narrowed
the gap between European and American multiculturalism only slightly. Notwith-
standing a few reconsiderations and retreats, the logic and practice of conven-
tional European multiculturalism remain largely intact.
The discussion that follows seeks to elucidate the fundamental distinctions be-
tween these two prevailing conceptions. There are country-specific variations, to
be sure, and they are important. The purpose here is to offer a comparative, syn-
thetic account, one that will underscore the importance of those basic distinctions
for the elaboration and application of multiculturalist thought in the United States
and Europe, especially as regards Islam. Despite the differences between the two
paradigms, the American experience has been understood, for better or for
worse, as a primary source of European experimentation with multiculturalism,
and critics and supporters alike have doubted that the US model is fully valid for
Europe. Concerning Islam specifically, the internal logic of America’s version of
multiculturalism has resulted in a hands-off approach to domestic Islam, and this
classically American response has persisted even after 9/11. In Europe, however,
the specifically religious dimension of the Muslim encounter has induced multi-
culturalists to be even more hands-on, and the European church-state regimes
have offered policymakers additional reasons and avenues for intervention. Per-
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haps paradoxically, the rough-and-tumble ideological market of American reli-
gion has, notwithstanding the vitriol poured on Islam there, continued to yield
greater inter-confessional peace, at least thus far. It remains unclear which under-
standing of multiculturalism is most likely to create a more fair and decent so-
ciety. But recent developments in the response to Islam may hold the potential to
reconfigure the traditional European relationship between government and reli-
gion, though at present there is little real threat to the extant paradigm.
“Europe Is Not America”: Group Rights, Immigrant Communities,
and the Denial of the Melting Pot
America’s mainstream multiculturalism has been one that celebrates the mainte-
nance and expression of more superficial, “symbolic” indicia of differences that
are, critically, not considered to separate members of minority cultural groups
from the broader American culture.2 For much of what really matters as regards
full inclusion in and acceptance of the fundamental, nation-constituting political
community – and thus, in other words, for much of what really matters as regards
“American-ness” – the prevailing understandings of multiculturalism in the Uni-
ted States presuppose that race, ethnicity, religion, national origin, and even im-
migrant status will not pose obstacles to acceptance, either on the part of minor-
ity groups or on the part of the broader society. The American civic compact spills
over directly into American multiculturalist principles and, as Nathan Glazer puts
it, reaffirms the importance of
one underlying rock-bottom belief, held broadly by Americans, regardless of
their political orientation: it is better to be an American, and anyone who le-
gitimately can should become an American citizen. That “anyone” used to be
limited, in law or consciousness, to whites, or Protestants, or Christians. But it
now does truly include anyone. … Multiculturalism, whatever the degree of its
acceptance in one or another formulation, and it is widely accepted in schools
and colleges, does not mean the new Americans should be different from the
others who preceded them in loyalty, in language, in commitment to the com-
mon Constitution and the laws.3
The mainstream view assumes, as Glazer recognizes, that “there will be no for-
eign enclaves in the United States, if the laws and common opinion can help it.”4
No matter what else it does, multiculturalism should not present any barrier to
membership in the larger American society.
Along these lines, Will Kymlicka has identified “an emerging consensus, or at
least a dominant paradigm” of American thought, one that insists that multicul-
turalism must be consonant with classically American individualism by recogniz-
ing the mutability of groups and group boundaries, with free and voluntary af-
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filiation, and the possibility of overlapping, non-exclusive group identity.5 In
other words, America’s version of multiculturalism proceeds from a basic under-
standing of the way identity works that sees nothing unnatural or contradictory in
the assumption by immigrants of a new “American” identity and the simulta-
neous retention of their prior self-conceptions. This multiculturalism thus allows
American-ness to be chosen, as indeed the American civic compact asserts it can
and should be.
All the above is, admittedly, a crystallized summation of the multiculturalist
principles that have emerged in the context of American ideology and mythic
self-representation. Moreover, it represents an understanding of the American
“nation” that revisionist scholars have argued to be of very recent origin.6 In
practice, of course, things have not been so pretty. Yet they have not been so
messy and ugly that the generalization must be scrapped. Multiculturalism in the
United States is, at its root, about finding ways to offer American-ness to every-
one, or as some critics from the left would say, to impose it.
Europe’s multiculturalism, by contrast, has been reluctant to insist on the as-
similation of newcomers, and often has not offered much real prospect of it.
European concepts and practices of multiculturalism have therefore mainly ad-
vanced the idea that respect for immigrants and their descendants should mean
allowing them to import and maintain, within comparatively insular commu-
nities, their fundamental cultural and ethical norms, whether or not those native
norms can be fully reconciled with those of the broader society. European multi-
culturalists thus tend to believe that justice means extending to immigrant com-
munities the freedom to live alongside their neighbors rather than the opportunity
to join the dominant community. This has perpetuated a relationship of hosts and
guests – some more welcome, some less. Muslims are therefore often conceptua-
lized not as citizens in the fullest sense, but as residents who are entitled in the
name of multiculturalist respect to remain culturally alien, and who are not true
participants in “European-ness”. Much has been made in both academic and pol-
icy circles about the expansion of citizenship as a possible remedy for some of
Europe’s troubles with its immigrants, but even where reforms have eased the
path to citizenship, the resultant legal equality has not guaranteed social integra-
tion. It is far from clear, for example, that those of Turkish descent who obtain
citizenship under Germany’s recently relaxed rules will, in fact, be considered
“Germans.” In Germany and elsewhere, the longstanding distinction between
Volk (nation, especially in an ethnic sense) and Staatsangehörigheit (formal state
citizenship) seems, for the moment at least, quite invulnerable.
In its preference for the recognition and maintenance of bounded social-
cultural groups rather than the universalizing assimilation of citizenship, Euro-
pean multiculturalism adopts a stance that is, as it happens, familiar enough to
Muslims accustomed to the structure of societies organized under Islamic princi-
ples, where historically the basic divisions have tended to be conceptualized as
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religious rather than ethnic or “national.” Philip Jenkins goes so far as to suggest
that Europe’s brand of multiculturalism may, in extreme formulations, verge on
something not unlike the old millet system of administration in the Ottoman Em-
pire, whereby minority religious communities such as the Jews, Armenian Chris-
tians, various Eastern Orthodox populations, and others were allowed substantial
autonomy and legal authority with regard to their own intra-group affairs.7 (The
difference, of course, is that the Ottoman system presupposed a natural and divi-
nely mandated Muslim primacy, whereas both European and American multicul-
turalism shy away from the suggestion of the superiority of any one group.)
The French case poses some special problems. The dominant ideologies of
French governance, and indeed of French identity, display a great discomfort
with any notion of distinct social groups that may be officially recognized and
handled as such. Along these lines, Gérard Wormser argues that America’s multi-
culturalist visions are less universalist and more relativist than the prevailing
ideals of France. From the French perspective, a demand for strict adherence to
the homogenizing public culture associated with laïcité functions as “the founda-
tion of inter-community coexistence” and not as insistence on cultural particular-
ism, as French practice would likely be criticized from the American point of
view. “The difference,” Wormser observes, “is that of the indifference that may be
demanded in the USA in the name of constitutionally-guaranteed personal liber-
ties of the First Amendment, whereas the French Revolutionary past leads the
collectivity to demand ‘signs of belonging’.”8
The record of recent history, however, leads me to conclude that despite these
very real differences between the French and American conceptualizations, when
French institutions have implemented multiculturalism “on the ground” vis-à-vis
Islam and its followers, its forms and methods have looked more like those fol-
lowed in the rest of Europe than the indifferent attitude of the United States. The
concept indeed has been put into practice in a variety of ways, notwithstanding
the theoretical neutrality and group-blindness of the French state.
Elsewhere in Europe, the specifically religious basis for the encounter with Mus-
lim immigrants amplifies the European multiculturalist tendency to respond in
terms of group rights, stable communities, and persistent outsider identities.
Similarly, the existence of a specifically religious dimension moves French society
away from the more strict neutrality, or insensitivity if you will, shown toward
social groups constituted on the basis of race and ethnicity. Religion gives the
French state a familiar target and the prospect of reliable institutional brokers
with whom deals can be made (though, given the diffuse structure of Muslim
practice, that hope may prove illusory). The secularist imperatives of the Revolu-
tionary tradition are, in this case, checked by étatist remnants of the Napoleonic
urge to bureaucratize and control religious institutions. As Frank Peter observes,
a perceived need to quell potential Muslim violence has led to a “drastic reorienta-
tion of French politics since the late 1980s toward a religious policy favoring the
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incorporation of Islam into national structures and the creation of authority struc-
tures.”9 French policy has thus shifted toward a variety of institutional arrange-
ments that evidence what Peter calls a “disregard for the principle of laïcité” so as
to promote integration, build relationships with acceptable Muslim interlocutors,
and bring Islamic groups under more effective surveillance and control.10 At least
as regards the specifically religiousmulticulturalism directed toward Islam, France,
too, proves decidedly European.
It is critical to recognize just how far apart the prevailing European and Amer-
ican conceptions may be. At the beginning of the new millennium, German cul-
tural traditionalists triggered a fierce controversy by advancing the idea that im-
migrants and their children should accept and practice a Leitkultur, a German-
European “leading culture.” In the words of one of its leading proponents, Fried-
rich Merz of the Christian Democratic Union, the Leitkultur embodied “the rules of
coexistence in Germany,” rules rooted, he said, in the “generally applicable stan-
dards of our values” [allgemein gültige Wertmaßstäbe].11 Merz’s original defense of
the concept centered on issues such as women’s equality, constitutionally en-
shrined values such as democracy, human dignity, individual rights and free-
doms, the universal mastery of the German language, and a market economy
tempered by a social-welfare state. The term was widely taken to imply something
more chauvinistic and sinister, and Merz himself warned that “we cannot and
may not tolerate the emergence of parallel societies.”12 In the context of recent
German history, the campaign for Leitkultur proved explosive.
Yet it is much the same sort of assimilationist practice that the American model
has insisted on in the past and chiefly continues to insist on today. Anti-multi-
culturalist forces in the United States certainly have no qualms about doing so,
pressing the case for the superiority of Western civilization and the preservation
of a Western cultural canon. Even the prevailing notions of multiculturalism prac-
tised in the United States presuppose the acceptance of what is really a political-
pluralist Leitkultur: mainstream American multiculturalism still shows a distinct
unease with anything like a Parallelgesellschaft, and the minority cultures that it
celebrates and seeks to preserve among various “hyphenated” citizens (Italian-
Americans, Indian-Americans, Iranian-Americans, etc.) are clearly understood to
remain the basis of only subordinate identities.
Each such culture-of-origin is, at most, expected to serve as what I would term
(if an outsider may be permitted such an intervention into the German lexicon) a
Begleitkultur: a necessarily limited expression of shared values, customs, experi-
ences, and attitudes that will continue to accompany (begleiten) immigrant com-
munities and their descendants as they integrate into, and accept the values of,
the broader majority culture. America thus fairly comfortably and without great
rancor embraces this practice of Leitkultur and Begleitkultur, though over time it has
opted for a civic compact that derives American-ness from shared political values,
and no longer clings to the constrictive Anglo-Protestant specificity that theorists
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like Samuel Huntington and critics like Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., have asserted
as one of the foundations of American culture and identity.13
Although the American understanding of multiculturalism is unusual and dis-
tinctive, it is linked in a causative, genealogical sense with the versions cultivated
in European societies. Many analysts of the cultural and political debates in ques-
tion, and indeed the participants themselves, corroborate this view. Among Euro-
pean skeptics of both the left and right, multiculturalism still carries the decidedly
American taint of “political correctness,” and many detect the origin of the con-
cept in America’s long and reluctant reckoning with the self-imposed demands of
multiethnic and multiconfessional pluralism. British conservative commentator
Melanie Phillips thus has placed a large part of the blame for what she diagnoses
as Europe’s multicultural malaise on specifically American notions of progressive
pluralist politics, arguing that the United States has exported a “multicultural vic-
tim culture” that almost invariably treats the West as abusive and exploitative.14
From a rather different political perspective, Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant
have likewise viewed multiculturalism as an obvious importation, and one with
serious implications well beyond its country of origin:
North American ‘multiculturalism’ [or more specifically, in the French origi-
nal, simply “le ‘multiculturalisme’ américain”] is neither a concept nor a theory,
nor a social or political movement – even though it claims to be all those
things at the same time. It is a screen discourse, whose intellectual status is
the product of a gigantic effect of national and international allodoxia, which
deceives both those who are party to it and those who are not. It is also a North
American [américain] discourse, even though it thinks of itself and presents
itself as a universal discourse.15
The idea of multiculturalism, in this interpretation, seeks to mask characteristi-
cally American failures to ensure real economic and social equality through a
form of what Bourdieu and Wacquant call “neoliberal Newspeak.” Such allega-
tions of American hypocrisy are echoed, albeit to quite different ends, in the com-
plaints of Serbian sociologist Boris Jašović that America “is persisting in its call
for the simulation of multiculturalism in Kosovo,” a stance that Jašović has found
particularly hard to swallow given what he believes to be the dominant role of
“the white, Anglo-Saxon, and Protestant majority” in setting the terms of Amer-
ican multiculturalism.16 European critics thus may fault US society for both a suf-
focating political correctness (often thought to be born of a guilty conscience
from the history of race relations) and, at the same time, for a discreditable and
discrediting mismatch between the vaunted American ideals and the lived Amer-
ican realities.
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It Can’t Happen Here: European Rejection of the American
Multiculturalist Solution
If they are none too happy about the importation of multiculturalism to Europe,
many critics appear just as convinced that it will not work – that the American
experience will not translate to the European context because the fundamental
social dynamics and demographic realities are just too different. It is in this vein,
for example, that Danish author Poul Vinther Jensen, a contributor to the anti-
immigration movement Den Danske Forening (The Danish Association), took issue
with a piece in the prominent Christian newspaper Kristeligt Dagblad that had
seemed to endorse Americans’ welcoming attitudes toward their approximately
1800 religious groups, and had suggested that learning about, and from, other
religions would be essential for understanding and coexistence in a globalizing
world. Jensen would have none of it. Contrasting America’s historical plurality
with the European cultural milieu, he insisted that “Europe is not the USA, by
any means.” From this perspective, the distinctions between the two environ-
ments in which multiculturalism was deployed were so stark as to be decisive:
“Here, until some three decades ago,” Jensen argued, “we have had a firmly an-
chored, unified culture [en forankret enhedskultur] in which Christianity and the secular
constitutions have served as the framework for Europe’s free populations. It
should be that way in the future.” As for the supposed value of diversity and
knowledge of other faiths, Jensen concluded that Islam was a “super-totalitarian
religion” that “cannot teach the West anything whatsoever.”17
Much the same rejection of the American model and the pro-diversity assump-
tions that underlie it appears in the work of Italy’s (in)famous celebrity journalist
Oriana Fallaci, who before her death in 2006 spent several years immersed in a
high-profile cultural war against Muslim immigrants and their religion. Fallaci
saw the culture, history, and values of Europe and her home country as indelibly
stamped by the Christian tradition and the worldview it had produced. A relation-
ship with Christianity, she maintained, therefore proved inescapable even for
zealous atheists and secularists like herself. Even in a remarkably latitudinarian
Italy, in a remarkably secularized Europe, cristianità inevitably remained at the
heart of identità:
You cannot fail to consider the religion called Christianity and the church
called the Catholic Church ... I am telling you that we Italians are not in the same
situation as the Americans, who are a mosaic of ethnic and religious groups, a
hodgepodge of a thousand cultures, simultaneously open to every invasion
and capable of repulsing it. I am telling you that, precisely because it has been
defined by many centuries and is very precise, our cultural identity cannot
withstand a migratory wave of people who, in one way or another, want to
change our manner of living. Our values.18
154 american multiculturalism after 9/11
Fallaci further insisted that because Italian society was so rooted in a specific and
consistent cultural and religious tradition – because it was, in other words, so
unlike fantastically splintered America – it was clear that Muslims and their values
and culture could never fit:
I am telling you that here among us there is no place for the muezzins, for the
minarets, for the fake abstainers, for their fucking Middle Ages [il loro fottuto
Medioevo], for their fucking chador. And if there were, I would not give it to
them. Because it would be the equivalent of throwing into the trash Dante
Alighieri, Leonardo da Vinci, Michelangelo, Raphael, the Renaissance, the Ri-
sorgimento, the freedom that we have, for better or worse, won for ourselves,
our Patria. It would mean giving them Italy as a present. And I will not give
them Italy.19
As the result of her diatribes against Islam, Fallaci faced prosecution under an
Italian statute criminalizing the “vilification” of “a religion admitted by the
state.”20 Here again, the contrast with America is sharp: the existence of such a
penal law, and indeed the codification of the idea that a religion may (or may not)
be “admitted” by the state, underscores one of the dramatic discontinuities be-
tween, on the one hand, the dominant tendencies in the European theory and
practice of church-state relations and, on the other, the more laissez faire privatiza-
tion that characterizes the American resolution of these questions.
To some vocal European critics of American practice, the characteristic open-
ness and tolerance of the United States represent, especially after 9/11, an out-
moded weakness and naïveté bordering on the suicidal. Along these lines, for
example, one of the more extreme Serbian opponents of Islam, political scientist
and publicist Miroljub Jevtić, has opined that American secularists and multicul-
turalists are fooling themselves with the comforting beliefs that “their” Muslim
population is somehow different from those found across Europe, and that the
presently more peaceable relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in the
United States will remain so indefinitely because of the common ground suppos-
edly provided by the separation of church and state and by the American model of
assimilative integration. Islam, in Jevtić’s view, cannot be assimilated even in a
country of immigration that has long stressed assimilation, and it cannot be as-
similated because Muslims refuse to be assimilated. Worse yet, to the extent that
Muslims seem to have assimilated, that appearance is merely a deception. Rather,
Jevtić suggested, the followers of Islam are simply playing a strategy of stealth,
waiting to destroy the American model once they have sufficient numbers to do
so. “It is impossible,” he argued, “to expect that the Muslim community in the
United States will accept as a lasting fact the existence of the US in the way that it
now is.”21 Ultimately, Muslims would demand an Islamic state in America, too.
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That is, mildly put, an attention-getting prediction, and in one version or an-
other something like it has electrified conservative media outlets and websites
across Europe and America, most notably in the form of the increasingly attrac-
tive rhetoric of “Eurabia” and “dhimmitude,” which foretells the coming subjec-
tion of European populations to the imposition of shari’a and Islamic rule, with
the attendant relegation of non-Muslim Europeans to second-class status.22 Yet
while many rightist analysts have faulted the United States as a wellspring of mul-
ticulturalist victimology, others have seen America as better equipped to resist
Islamicization as the result of its enduring Christian religiosity, something that
Europe has largely discarded (lamentably, in the view of the critics). That wide-
spread religious commitment has indeed been another determinative and distinc-
tive factor in the American multiculturalist engagement with Islam.
A Meaner, Tougher America? Religious Politics before and after 9/11
The attacks of September 11 have changed the United States dramatically in many
ways, but they have not altered one fundamental dynamic at work here: although
American governance remains (for the time being at least) remarkably more secu-
larist in comparison to Europe, America continues to relate to Islam differently
because its people are remarkably less secularized. Understanding the significance
of this fact requires attention to how the specifically religious dimensions of inter-
group accommodation have shaped the mainstream multiculturalisms under con-
sideration. For all its military might and all its pressure on its neighbors and
allies, the American state must still be understood in world-historical, compara-
tive terms as a remarkably weak state in two critical respects: the control of ex-
pression, and the regulation, surveillance, and affirmative protection of reli-
gion.23 Unlike European states, the government of the United States is also
greatly constrained by a historical societal preference for individualism, by popu-
lar free-speech traditions, and by the corresponding absence of a strong commu-
nitarian culture favoring social harmony. All this is something distinctively Amer-
ican, and it makes religious politics in the United States, and thus American
multiculturalism, quite unlike their counterparts in Western and Eastern Europe.
Europeans generally, and multiculturalists and practitioners of political Chris-
tianity more specifically, have wanted and expected much more of their states in
terms of the regulation, management, and control of religion and religious ex-
pression in the European public sphere. And historically, European states have
delivered. They show an enduring willingness to supervise religious activity and
to rein in, and even punish criminally, speech that they view as harmful to what
they perceive to be agreed-upon social ends. In contrast, under the First Amend-
ment to the US Constitution, American practice regarding religion is decidedly
hands-off, as is the American approach to free expression. Where the two factors
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coincide and the expression at issue is specifically religious in nature, the Amer-
ican preference for non-intervention has been profound.
The fact that Muslim minorities are religious minorities therefore makes Amer-
ican law and American state practice – but not American society – more distanced.
Conversely, the same fact makes European law and European state practice – but
not European society – more engaged. Under the present regime, as the influential
British theorist and advocate Tariq Modood has noted approvingly, “[t]he key
point is that British and European multiculturalism cannot be indifferent to reli-
gion in the manner of North American multiculturalism.”24 Barring a major re-
configuration of the prevailing European church-state models, this pattern is
likely to persist.
Yet there may be a wide gap between state and society, between governmental-
legal approaches and popular responses. When it comes to the “Muslim ques-
tion,” there are some unsettling paradoxes in the US experience of religious plur-
alism. While non-Muslims’ relations with the Muslim communities in the United
States have been comparatively peaceful, American religious politics is potentially
much more vitriolic in its anti-Islamic rhetoric than its European counterparts.
Examples are legion, but along these lines, witness the comments of Baptist min-
ister Jerry Vines, a former president of the Southern Baptist Convention, who in
June 2002 told that group that Islam is a religion “established by a demon-pos-
sessed pedophile who had 12 wives, and his last one was a nine-year-old girl.”
The remark provoked some controversy, but significantly, nothing even resem-
bling the violent uproar that surrounded the publication of the “Muhammad car-
toons” in Denmark’s Jyllands-Posten newspaper in 2005. Elaborating on his com-
ment that “Allah is not Jehovah,” Vines explained that “Jehovah is not going to
turn you into a terrorist that will bomb people.”25 Lest it appear that this line of
thinking is confined to some lunatic fringe of American religion, it is worth not-
ing that Jack Graham, then the incoming president of the Southern Baptist Con-
vention, the nation’s largest Protestant denomination with approximately 16 mil-
lion members, confirmed that such comments were “accurate,” doing little if
anything to distance himself or his followers from the polemical sentiments Vines
had expressed.26 The prominent conservative evangelical leader Jerry Falwell ex-
pressed his support for these views to a national television audience, on the pop-
ular CNN public affairs show Crossfire, using language that was hardly less inflam-
matory.27
Invective of this sort finds echoes in the messages of other American commen-
tators who are, if not strictly speaking representatives of the Religious Right,
closely allied with it. The same tone surfaces, for example, in the work of the
reliably incendiary journalist Ann Coulter, who just after 9/11 issued a call for the
United States to deal with the Muslim societies that had sheltered terrorists in a
most straightforward way: “We should invade their countries, kill their leaders
and convert them to Christianity.”28 The United States is famously tolerant of
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extreme expression, and it is quite obvious that for these guardians of an America
“under God,” extremism in the defense of Christianity is no vice.
In the Huntingtonian analysis of world history, so popular among traditionalist
critics of multiculturalism in both Europe and America, religion is taken to be the
dividing line between clash-bound civilizations. A closer look at the religious poli-
tics of Europe and the United States suggests that the application of religious
belief to questions of multicultural ideology and practice is, again, quite diver-
gent. If the West does constitute a civilization, as the Huntingtonian line insists,
there is evidence of an important internal rift here. For, generally speaking, Eu-
rope’s explicitly Christian politics offers little to match the potentially much more
fiery and exclusivist language of either American political religion or Europe’s
secular (but not necessarily secularist) xenophobes and populists. Much more
consistently, the rhetoric of important Christian politicians and politically en-
gaged Christian institutions in Europe tends to seek some semblance of religious
comity, either by embracing European notions of multiculturalism or, failing that,
by walking a fine line between tolerance and rejection, multiculture and unicul-
ture, charity and fear. Even the latter approach to Islam is comparatively distanced
and nuanced: it is skeptical and suspicious, certainly, but ultimately hedged and
moderated. In either mode, Europe’s political Christians seek to reconstitute their
faith as vital once more to inter-confessional peace and harmony, and therefore
as central to the new cultural and political order. First, they hold themselves out
as a compassionate buffer against the uglier manifestations of anti-Muslim senti-
ment, and because they are people of faith, as uniquely credible advocates of tol-
erance. Second, they claim to act as indispensable negotiating partners and honest
brokers between Islam and Europe’s secular, secularized, and secularist society,
representing the Christian tradition as the inextricable essence of the “true”
Europe.
A Kinder, Gentler Europe? Questioning the Past and Future of
Multiculturalism
The American and European approaches to multiculturalism function on different
principles and have produced different results. European multiculturalists believe
their version to be more respectful and accommodating of difference, and Eur-
ope’s politically engaged Christian communities, in line with the dominant as-
sumptions of European multiculturalism, have generally offered more muted cri-
ticisms of Islam than their American counterparts, seeking to cultivate moderate,
“acceptable” Muslim partners who might help promote social stability and, not
coincidentally, serve as allies against secularism.
Yet Europe remains divided. The reasons for the difference are still being hotly
debated, but American society, even after 9/11, is less unsettled by the presence of
its own substantial Muslim population, and American Muslims are by most ac-
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counts far less troubled by the conditions of life in the West than their fellow
believers in Europe. The comparative quiescence of America’s Muslims has fast
become the subject of considerable analysis and commentary, and Europe’s great-
er difficulties on this score have most notably been attributed to economic and
class distinctions among the diverse “sending” populations in the Muslim world,
to variations in the religiosity and in the specific Islamic theological roots of the
immigrant groups, and last but not least, to simple differences in the sheer size of
the Muslim communities in the respective locales. Whatever the reasons for the
divergence, it is clear that with regard to Islam, the spectacular variety, conten-
tion, and lack of restraint characterizing American public life have not produced
domestic cleavages and enmities perceived as major challenges to the integrity of
the broader society, as have emerged in Europe. It remains conceivable that Eu-
rope’s Muslim communities might with time be assimilated into French, British,
Dutch, and other national identities, and with that to European-ness, but as Philip
Jenkins observes, “such an ‘American’ outcome seems a distant dream.”29
All good intentions notwithstanding, these problems of social and cultural co-
hesion are compounded by the heavy engagement of the European state in mat-
ters concerning Islam, a result that flows naturally from both the generally heigh-
tened competencies of the European state and from the particular resolution of
church-state questions in most of the countries under consideration. Virtually
every public controversy over religion in Europe has the potential to become a
specifically governmental controversy, a complex and protracted multi-party en-
tanglement in which citizens on all sides of the dispute look to the state for ac-
tion, and stand ready to blame its leaders for failure. This was the fate, for exam-
ple, of the hapless Danish government as the result of its response – or lack of
response – to the notorious Muhammad cartoons. The furor over Salman Rush-
die’s novel The Satanic Verses in 1988-89 elicited many of the same claims on the
British government and judiciary. Faced with a similar situation, American lea-
ders could do little else than try to make good use of the bully pulpit. They lack
the legal power to do much more than talk about religion, and even that can get
them into hot water.
But citizens in European societies can demand that the state do something. In the
Muhammad cartoons case, for example, aggrieved Muslims unsuccessfully urged
the government to prosecute the publishers of the cartoons on the basis of Dan-
ish law, which resembles a number of European statutes that prohibit giving of-
fense or inciting hatred on religious grounds. As regards the regulation of reli-
gion and the regulation of expression, what we see in such responses is a
European legalism par excellence, and a reflex that is still almost entirely unthink-
able in the context of American jurisprudence. (With the proliferation of hate-
speech codes on American campuses and hate-crimes laws in a variety of state
jurisdictions, it has become a bit more thinkable in recent years.)
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The American model of multiculturalism, and in particular its distinctive hand-
ling of religious pluralism in the context of church-state separation, has thus far
not proven especially appealing to Europeans. France permits far less latitude for
the personal expression of religiosity in the public sphere, while the rest of
Europe, and with it even France to a great extent, generally seeks to engage, spon-
sor, and control religion, and to protect religious sensibilities and social order
through a variety of criminal enactments such as blasphemy laws and their latter-
day hate speech analogues.30 For a long time, this system seemed to offer a suita-
ble framework, one in keeping with Europe’s communitarian traditions. Conse-
quently, there has been great resistance in Europe to the idea of an “American-
ization” of religion, which would place all believers on an equal footing and
eliminate the time-honored institutional ties.31
The governing logic of European multiculturalism suggests that this is just how
things should remain. Along these lines, the prospect of any move toward the
American model seems distinctly unappealing to Tariq Modood, one of the lead-
ing proponents of European multiculturalist thought in its characteristic, anti-as-
similationist mode. Suggesting that Muslims have, especially after 9/11, faced the
unfair treatment inherent in a “panicky retreat to a liberal public-private distinc-
tion” that had previously appealed mainly to “radical secularists,” Modood offers
prescriptions that run in precisely the opposite direction: “We should recognise
Muslims as a legitimate social partner and include them in the institutional com-
promises of church and state, religion and politics, that characterise the evolving,
moderate secularism of mainstream Western Europe.”32 Europeans should, he
says, spurn “the wayward, radical example of France” – and with it as well the
American “wall of separation,” which he likewise rejects.33
For the time being at least, the established European pattern seems safe en-
ough. The privatization of religion is far, far off. Yet the very fact that some are
considering the possible benefits of disengaging the state from religion suggests
that the US model may be becoming more attractive than ever before. That Amer-
ican arrangement is the product of a diversity Europe lacked in the past (or did
not recognize it had). Now, however, Europe undeniably exhibits much the same
sort of plurality. Citizens in most European states can no longer tell themselves
that theirs are not “countries of immigration.” (Even East Europeans are facing
that truth, or soon will.) The new religious make-up wrought by Islam takes them
well beyond the old, familiar pattern in which large, recognized churches with
reliable, stable, and formally recognized institutional representation could engage
with the state, accommodating its demands and enjoying its patronage. In a num-
ber of ways, the theological diversity and the diffuse, fragmented structure of
Muslim religious communities bring to Europe something like the religious plur-
ality that has resulted from the wild proliferation of Protestant denominations and
“new religions” in America. Until very recently, the state financing of religion and
the provision of denominational schooling have not usually required Europeans
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to sponsor communities that they find radically alien, or even hostile. Regardless
of what fairness and neutrality might seem to require, Europeans may well prove
reluctant to extend state support to all the varieties of Islam now emerging
around them. Islam has brought changes to the religious landscape that may,
with time, lead to some reconsideration of the prevailing church-state arrange-
ments.
Defending the status quo that had evolved in US constitutional jurisprudence
by the late twentieth century, Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor in
2005 argued that pluralism and freedom are best served by the American model,
which had, she said, “kept religion a matter for the individual conscience, not for
the prosecutor or bureaucrat.” This non-interventionist approach to religion had,
in O’Connor’s view, shielded Americans from the difficulties of sectarian conflict
“[a]t a time when we see around the world the violent consequences of the as-
sumption of religious authority by government.” Skeptical about a retreat from
existing law that would permit new extensions of state sponsorship, she articu-
lated a position that would, she believed, preserve the characteristically American
successes of the past. “Those who would renegotiate the boundaries between
church and state must therefore answer a difficult question,” O’Connor wrote.
“Why would we trade a system that has served us so well for one that has served
others so poorly?”34
Despite some concerns about “panicky retreats” to privatization, the events of
9/11 in the United States and the fear of Islamic terrorism in Europe itself have not
brought about any thoroughgoing rethinking of Europe’s religious multicultural-
ism. Yet there is evidence that new ideas along these lines have begun to bubble
to the surface. Paraphrasing Justice O’Connor’s reservations, at least a few Eu-
ropeans have begun to ask, “Should we trade a system that may serve us poorly
in the future for one that has served others so well?” America’s multiculturalist
principles have managed, in modified form, to bridge the Atlantic, but for a long
time, many Europeans assumed that theirs was a vastly different social and cul-
tural context, that these American “others” were just too unlike them, and that
the US experience could therefore offer only limited lessons. In the realm of con-
temporary religious politics, where Americans have persisted in their more com-
petitive, fractious, often harsher style, Europeans have generally made their way
toward a softer, more moderated, and genuinely communitarian approach. Now,
however, the once-important distinctions may be fading, and the history of Amer-
ican pluralism may be becoming more relevant to a kinder, gentler Europe.
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Slavery, Memory, and Citizenship in
Transatlantic Perspective
Johanna C. Kardux
One point of contention in which debates about multiculturalism have taken
shape in the United States and the Netherlands is the public memory of slavery.
Since the early 1990s, numerous people of African descent in these and other
former slave-holding and slave-trading nations have mobilized around commem-
orations of slavery and the transatlantic slave trade. The two memorial projects I
will discuss in this essay – the African Burial Ground in New York and the Nether-
lands National Slavery Monument in Amsterdam – and the public debates they
have sparked provide insight into the ways in which multiculturalism functions
in these two nations. The call for the remembrance of slavery on both sides of
the Atlantic has not only brought to light painful and shameful national histories,
but has also laid bare some of the complex conflicts connected with the social
and cultural integration of minority groups in these two societies – conflicts
which have only intensified since 9/11.
The two slavery memorial projects I will discuss are part of what French histor-
ian Pierre Nora has critically called a “tidal wave of memory.” According to Nora,
we live in an “era of commemoration”: we indiscriminately “stockpile” traces of
the past in archives, libraries, and museums, and fulfill our self-imposed “duty to
remember” by celebrating anniversaries, building monuments, and organizing
commemorations. Whereas in the past, collectively remembered values bound
diverse groups and competing ideologies together as a nation, we now feel com-
pelled self-consciously and artificially to construct lieux de mémoire to buttress
group identities no longer securely grounded in the idea of the nation.1 It is no
coincidence, however, that Nora’s collaborative, multivolume history of French
national memory, Les Lieux de Mémoire (1984-1992), was itself conceived and pro-
duced in a time in which traditional constructions of national unity, history, and
identity were increasingly challenged by mass migration and globalization. In
fact, as the metaphorical title of his 2001 essay suggests, Nora sees a causative
link between the “tidal wave of memory” and the massive influx of immigrants in
Western Europe that threatened to render national borders and traditional defini-
tions of the nation-state obsolete in the last two decades of the twentieth century.
Postcolonial migrants, Nora suggests, formed the vanguard of the modern cul-
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ture of commemoration, followed by other newly emancipated minorities. Be-
cause they never had access to public memory and were marginalized in tradi-
tional historical discourse, ethnic and other minorities stake their right to recog-
nition and inclusion, and their collective identities, in a “rehabilitati[on] of the
past.”2
While Nora is critical of what he calls the “explosion of minority memories” in
the past few decades, I will suggest a more positive and constructive way of look-
ing at the modern memorial culture Nora laments.3 On the one hand, the public
debates surrounding slavery memorials show that the public memory of slavery is
one of the most contentious issues in the integration and multiculturalism de-
bates in both the United States and the Netherlands. I will argue, however, that
the call for slavery memorials in these two nations also represents vital, if neces-
sarily conflicted and contested, attempts to renegotiate national and cultural iden-
tities, and to redefine citizenship in a postcolonial and globalizing age. Seeking
recognition and redress for centuries of willful amnesia, the slavery memorial
projects in the United States and the Netherlands attempt to re-imagine national,
transnational, and multicultural communities that are more responsive to the
needs of citizens in our multi-ethnic societies today.
The African Burial Ground Project in New York
That slavery was not just the US South’s “peculiar institution” but an integral part
of the entire nation’s history, painfully entered the public consciousness in 1991
when, during the excavations for a new federal building near Foley Square in low-
er Manhattan, an eighteenth-century African burial ground was discovered. Pre-
liminary archeological investigations had indicated the presence of a “Negros
Burial Ground,” as the site was marked on historic maps, but the discovery of
human remains was completely unexpected. Covering about 6.6 acres, the burial
ground was originally located in a desolate area outside the city’s boundaries be-
cause people of African descent were not allowed to bury their dead in the church
graveyards. Used from about 1710 on, the cemetery had to make way for city ex-
pansion in the 1790s. When excavation of the construction site started in the fall
of 1991, it was assumed that any human remains would have been scattered or
destroyed during two centuries of urban construction and development.4 The
presence of the burial ground, which may have held the remains of an estimated
10,000-20,000 people of African descent, testified to the fact that by 1750, New
York City had the second largest free black and slave population after Charleston,
South Carolina; the first Africans arrived in New Amsterdam in 1626, only one
year after the founding of the Dutch colony.5
The discovery of the human remains initially seemed to be only of archaeologi-
cal and cultural interest. Although part of the burial ground had also served as a
potter’s field and as a graveyard for Americans during the Revolutionary War,
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David N. Dinkins, New York City’s first African-American mayor, was one of the
first to point out its special significance for the city’s black population. “Two
centuries ago,” Dinkins told reporter David W. Dunlap, “not only could African-
Americans not hope to govern New York City, they could not even hope to be
buried within its boundaries.”6 On a surface level, Dinkins, whose own career
testified to the gains made by the Civil Rights Movement, seems to interpret the
site’s symbolic meaning here as a narrative of progression from segregation to
integration. Significantly, however, the triple negatives in his statement also call
attention to African-Americans’ history of exclusion. The multi-layered meaning
of the black mayor’s early statement about the ancient burial ground showed him,
at this point in his career at least, to be a master of multicultural politics, being
able to appeal to the various ethnic groups in his constituency. Partly as a result of
Dinkins’ astute publicizing efforts, the historic find could initially count on broad
and multi-ethnic community interest.
Soon, however, the burial ground became a site of contestation and identity
politics. The General Services Administration (GSA), the federal agency in charge
of the construction, repeatedly assured community groups that the remains
would be treated with “the utmost respect and dignity.”7 Therefore, when a few
months after the discovery it became known that construction workers had dis-
turbed a number of graves, African-American citizens and officials were out-
raged. Community activists protested against disrespectful treatment and storage
of the remains, complaining that the discrimination these people had suffered
during their lives continued after their death.8 Petitions were written and vigils
held. Sensitive to his black constituency’s complaints about continuing racial in-
justice, Mayor Dinkins called for a suspension of the excavations, insisting that
GSA come up with a proper research plan for the exhumed remains.
It was only after a public hearing before a US Congressional subcommittee,
convened by African-American Congressman Gus Savage in the summer of 1992,
during which Mayor Dinkins and members of the Black Caucus gave testimony,
that GSA finally gave in and agreed to seek an appropriate solution for the site.9
Congress allocated three million dollars for the scientific study of the excavated
human remains and artifacts, and for the construction of a memorial and inter-
pretive center at the site. While the construction of a thirty-four-storey federal
building was to go forward as planned, building plans for the adjacent lot were
abandoned. This space was preserved for a future memorial. In response to de-
mands from the black community for more African-American involvement in the
research project, the more than four hundred human remains that had by then
been excavated were transported to Howard University, the leading African-Amer-
ican research university in Washington, DC, to be studied by a research team led
by Dr. Michael Blakey, an African-American biological anthropologist.10 Early in
1993, the burial site was officially designated a national historic landmark. Moved
to tears by the event, Councilwoman Mary Pinkett of Brooklyn said to the New York
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Times that the “efforts to preserve and commemorate the burial ground amounted
to a declaration by the city’s black residents[:]‘This is enough. … You can’t walk
over the bodies of our ancestors anymore.’”11
Although the African Burial Ground’s designation as a national historic land-
mark helped increase federal funding to almost twenty-five million dollars, the
memorial project continued to be contested terrain. The federal building on 290
Broadway was completed in 1994, and a space was created in the hallway for a
small exhibit and artworks that memorialized the African Burial Ground. The
adjacent lot remained empty for almost a decade, however, as community groups,
scientists, and government institutions wrangled about control and funding of
the research project and the memorial site. Growing impatient about the disputes
and delays, by 2001 black community advocates began to increase pressure on
government agencies to finally reinter the human remains and artifacts, though
the Howard scientists claimed that they needed more time and money to study
them.
The dispute about the re-interment scheme revealed the underlying ideological
conflicts. One community group, the Committee of Descendants of the Afrikan
Ancestral Burial Ground, apparently unilaterally set August 17, 2001, as the date
for the reburial ceremony. Both the unorthodox spelling of its name, and the
choice of the anniversary of back-to-Africa activist Marcus Garvey’s birth date for
the ceremony, indicate this advocacy group’s black-nationalist agenda. When
asked by a local reporter why the re-interment had not taken place, the GSA
spokesperson claimed that it was scheduled for the end of 2001, adding that the
ceremony would be “for the larger New York and world community, not any par-
ticular group” and ridiculing the group’s “special claim to the ‘descendant’ la-
bel.” While to African-American advocacy groups the ceremony obviously was
intended to undergird a collective black identity, the government spokesperson
insisted that the re-interment was to be a multi-ethnic and even international
event.12
Less than three weeks later, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, gave an
unexpected twist to the controversy over the memorial project. Among the casual-
ties of 9/11 were the African Burial Ground Project’s library and New York labora-
tory, which were housed in the basement of 6 World Trade Center. Black commu-
nity activists were quick to blame GSA for the deemed loss of the artifacts from
the burial ground that had been stored there: “All those artifacts and the remains
would have been buried by now,” a spokesperson of the descendant group said,
referring to GSA’s putative failure to keep to the August 17 re-interment date.13
Although most of the artifacts, documents, and other materials of the African
Burial Ground Project were eventually recovered from the rubble, the dispute
about the re-interment only intensified after 9/11, turning more and more on the
politics of race. Comparing the African Burial Ground somewhat illogically to
Ground Zero, the radical black civil rights activist Al Sharpton accused the gov-
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ernment of “doing to us what they did to my ancestors”; by stalling plans for the
reburial, “[t]hey’re trying to make us invisible in lower Manhattan.”14 To Howard
scientist Blakey and the team of researchers studying the human remains, it was
also clear that race was the real issue behind all the delays and quarrels. Com-
plaining that GSA officials sabotaged the research project by deliberately under-
funding it, Blakey accused the federal agency of providing only “what is often
called in black college circles ‘a colored grant.’” Moreover, he argued that his
research team was put on an unrealistic time schedule. “What GSA is insisting
on is for us to fail,” Blakey told the Washington Post in August 2002. “I think ra-
cism plays a special part, as well as arrogance. GSA has demonstrated from the
beginning a pattern of disrespect and disregard for the expertise of black peo-
ple.”15
GSA and the scientists eventually negotiated a compromise in the fall of 2002
and on October 4, 2003, the 419 human remains that had been salvaged from the
burial ground were finally returned to New York City from the Cobb laboratory at
Howard, where they had been studied for a decade. After being placed in small
mahogany coffins hand-crafted in Ghana, the human remains were ceremonially
re-interred in the African Burial Ground.16 The re-interment site was subse-
quently covered by grass and landscaped in the shape of seven mounds that re-
semble waves, symbolizing the enslaved Africans’ ocean crossing to America.
The New York Times’ prediction that the reburial would bring “a symbolic close
to an especially tumultuous chapter in the city’s racial history” was not fulfilled,
however.17 During the re-interment ceremony, several speakers called for repara-
tions for slavery. Painfully recalling the US government’s failure to give the for-
mer slaves “forty acres and a mule” in compensation for slavery in the post-Civil
War era, the demand for reparations became a major public issue around the turn
of the twenty-first century, culminating early in 2002 with the filing of a class-
action suit against a number of major private corporations, whose predecessor
companies had profited from slavery.18 In the wake of 9/11, the revitalized issue
of reparations began to take a prominent place in the rhetoric surrounding the
African Burial Ground controversy. “They owe us,” one of the presiding clergy-
men said to a cheering crowd during the re-interment ceremony. “It's time to pay
up.” “You want to honor us?” Councilman Charles Barron asked, “Pay us our
reparations.”19
The memorial project continued to cause controversy as a segment of the Afri-
can-American community mobilized against plans to construct a monument on
the site, next to the re-interment grove. When the memorial design winner was
announced in April 2005, protesters denounced the design that had won the com-
petition as being “too big and intrusive.” Rather than the design itself, what
seems to have been at stake was the politics of ownership and identity. As one
opponent put it, “They disrespected our ancestors when they excavated our bones,
they disrespected us when they took them out of the ground, and now they're
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disrespecting us by turning our grave site into some kind of a museum” (my ita-
lics).20 The chair of the Committee of Descendants told a reporter from a local
black weekly: “[E]ven if we have to lay down in front of bulldozers to stop this,
that’s exactly what we are going to do.”21
On February 27, 2006, the more than a decade-long struggle for a proper mem-
orial entered a new phase when President George W. Bush proclaimed the Afri-
can Burial Ground a national monument. It was surely no coincidence that the
presidential memorandum that preceded the proclamation was issued in October
2005, barely a month after media images of the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina
had shown the world that the face of poverty in the United States is predomi-
nantly black. Though it is difficult to prove, the designation of the African Burial
Ground as a national monument may well have been part of the White House’s
strategy to counter accusations of racism, as the Bush administration came under
serious attack for its hopelessly inadequate response to the disaster in New Or-
leans.
The proclamation of the site as a national monument enabled the allocation of
federal funds for the memorial, designed by African-American architect Rodney
Leon, and an educational visitor’s center under the authority of the National Park
Service. On October 4, 2007, the African Burial Ground National Monument was
finally dedicated. It was the nation’s first official national monument to enslaved
and free Africans and their descendants.22 The African Burial Ground memorial
consists of two black granite walls that enclose an “ancestral chamber” and lead
the visitor to a sunken circular “Libation court.” Architect Leon describes the
function of the court as a gathering place for slave descendants and others to
commemorate and reflect upon the lives and experiences of enslaved Africans.23
In fact, the African Burial Ground memorial project itself has served as a gath-
ering place despite – or, rather, because of – its history of contention. Opposition
against the federal agency in charge of the excavations and subsequent manage-
ment of the site, as well as a new black self-consciousness, empowered many
African-American New Yorkers to identify themselves as a community held to-
gether by a common ancestral past. Their protests voiced a legitimate concern
about community involvement in the memorial project, and African-American
participation in the study and interpretation of the site’s history. Often-heard
claims that the project “belongs … to people of African descent” are not simply
about ownership; they also articulate a sense of belonging, a stake in the commu-
nity, its history as well as its future.24
The National Slavery Monument Project in the Netherlands
Americans are not the only ones who have had to confront a history of slavery and
racial injustice in recent years. The Dutch have disavowed their nation’s slavery
past perhaps even more radically. Traditionally, Dutch national identity is largely
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based on the collective memory of the Netherlands’ freedom struggle and rise to
imperial greatness in the seventeenth century. This inflated public memory of this
small nation’s greatness could be maintained only by a collective forgetfulness of
a history of slave-trading and colonial exploitation. As the nineteenth-century
French historian Ernest Renan observed, “The essence of a nation is that its peo-
ple have much in common but also that they have forgotten a lot of things.”25
What has long been erased from public memory is that Dutch slave traders trans-
ported more than half a million Africans to the Americas, constituting about five
per cent of the total international slave trade. Three hundred thousand of these
enslaved Africans were taken to the Dutch Caribbean colonies in the Antilles and
Suriname.26 Dutch history textbooks rarely dwelled on this chapter of the nation’s
history, but the immigration to the Netherlands since the mid-1970s of almost
half a million people from the former colonies in the Dutch West Indies, includ-
ing 300,000 descendants of slaves, made it increasingly difficult to uphold the
national myths and silence the past.27
The anger over the selective amnesia regarding slavery that had been smolder-
ing in the Afro-Dutch community for many years was translated into organized
protest in 1993, as people of African descent were making preparations for the
commemoration of the 130th anniversary of emancipation in the Dutch West In-
dies. Centennials and other anniversaries are important occasions for national
and other communities to consolidate or redefine collective identities and con-
struct collective memories. For descendants of slaves, these occasions carry spe-
cial importance, because exclusion from official history and public memory was a
central feature of their ancestors’ state of bondage. Slavery, Orlando Patterson has
famously said, was a form of “social death.” Unlike other human beings, slaves
“were not allowed freely to integrate the experience of their ancestors into their
lives, to inform their understanding of social reality with the inherited meanings
of their natural forebears, or to anchor the living present in any conscious com-
munity of memory.”28 The dispossession of a social and cultural ancestral heri-
tage continues to have a profound impact on slave descendants, constituting per-
haps a collective or cultural trauma.29 Both the African Burial Ground Project and
the call for the commemoration of the Netherlands’ “forgotten” history of slavery
can be seen in the context of a transatlantic, grassroots movement among slave
descendants, seeking to build diasporic communities of memory.
In the spring of 1993, a group of Afro-Surinamese people in Amsterdam
founded the Nationaal 30 juni/1 juli Comité (National June 30/July 1 Committee) to
raise public awareness of the slavery past. The committee proclaimed June 30 as
an annual day of reflection and July 1 as Emancipation Day, the “Day of Broken
Chains,” as it is called in Suriname, where July 1 is a national holiday. The name
of the committee was a barely veiled reference to the Nationaal Comité 4 en 5 Mei
(National Committee May 4 and 5), which organizes the annual national com-
memoration of Jewish and other Dutch World War II victims on May 4, and the
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celebration of the nation’s liberation from Nazi occupation on May 5. The Afro-
Dutch organization’s message was clear: slavery is as much part of Dutch history
as is World War II. There was another, more provocative message implied as well,
however: slavery was also a holocaust, one in which the Dutch were not victims,
but perpetrators. As one slave descendant later put it, “[o]ur holocaust lasted 350
years.”30
From the annual gatherings the National June30/July 1 Committee organized in
Amsterdam from 1993 on, gradually a plan emerged for a national monument to
commemorate the Dutch slavery past. The idea of a national monument entered
Dutch public discourse in the spring of 1998, while preparations were underway
to celebrate the 135th anniversary of the abolition of slavery in the Dutch West
Indies. By that time, it had become clear that what began in Amsterdam as a local,
grassroots effort to call attention to a history of slavery was actually part of a
much larger international, even transnational movement. In April 1998, President
Bill Clinton, during a tour of Africa, declared that America’s profiting from slav-
ery had been wrong, though he stopped short of issuing an apology.31 In Decem-
ber of the same year, Christiane Taubira, a black Representative from French Gui-
ana, introduced a bill in the French legislature to declare the slave trade and
slavery a crime against humanity, which was later passed.32 In July 1998, a group
of Afro-Dutch women offered a petition to the Dutch parliament, requesting the
government’s acknowledgment of the slavery past and active involvement in ef-
forts to commemorate it. Their initiative could not have been better timed. By late
1998, postcolonial immigrants of African descent had succeeded in putting public
recognition of the historical injustice of slavery and its legacies on the national
political agenda in both France and the Netherlands.
In June 1999, the proposal for a Dutch national slavery monument was officially
endorsed by the newly appointed Minister of Urban and Integration Policy, Roger
van Boxtel. Van Boxtel’s endorsement speech, delivered in the presence of the
queen’s husband, Prince Claus, had great symbolic significance. For the first
time, the Dutch government publicly acknowledged responsibility for the nation’s
history of slave-trading and slave-holding. To realize the plans for a national slav-
ery monument, the government started negotiations with a newly founded um-
brella organization of slave descendants, named the National Platform for the
Remembrance of the Netherlands Slavery Past, in which various Afro-Dutch
groups were represented. The Dutch government’s support nationalized and poli-
ticized the slavery memorial movement. The National Platform’s decision to ac-
cept the government’s funding of the monument meant that the descendant com-
munity was no longer fully in control of the project, and to some extent became
dependent on the government. Although governmental participation in the proj-
ect gave it momentum and prestige, it also became the source of contention,
sparking a heated public debate about the symbolic meaning, the design, and the
location of the slavery monument. Intended to commemorate a common past in
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the spirit of reconciliation, the Dutch national slavery memorial project, like the
African Burial Ground project in New York, became an arena for the politics of
memory and identity.
Initially, the government’s main aim in supporting the memorial project was to
acknowledge moral responsibility for and call public attention to the nation’s for-
gotten slavery history. The purpose of a slavery monument, Minister Van Boxtel
said in his endorsement speech, is “to restore slavery to its rightful place in Dutch
history.”33 Van Boxtel’s support of the project became increasingly linked to his
integration policies. As a result, the memorial project became enmeshed in an
intense public debate about multiculturalism. That Van Boxtel’s multicultural vi-
sion was as much about national identity as about integration policy is symbo-
lized by the memorial project’s official motto: verbonden door vrijheid – “bound by
freedom.” The motto expanded the monument’s meaning by including ethnic
minorities who do not share the Netherlands’ slavery history, most notably the
Muslim immigrant population, who were the main target of the government’s
integration policy and the focus of the multiculturalism debate, particularly after
9/11. The motto was controversial among members of the National Platform of
slave descendants because it was felt to deflect attention away from the monu-
ment’s commemorative function. Protesting against the government’s “takeover,”
the National June 30/July 1 Committee demanded reparation payments for slavery
as well as an apology from the Dutch queen.34
The multiculturalism debate came to a climax in the fall of 2001, in the im-
mediate aftermath of 9/11, with the meteoric rise of the populist political leader
Pim Fortuyn. Fortuyn started his own political party on an anti-immigration plat-
form, which forced other political parties to make immigration, coupled with
security, the main issue in the national election campaign of 2002. With his flam-
boyant personality and his strategic appeal to nativist sentiment and social grie-
vances, Fortuyn gained enormous popularity with a large segment of the Dutch
population. Though his post-9/11 anti-immigration policy was directed mainly
against Islamic immigrants, in his campaign book Fortuyn specifically targeted
the issue of slavery monuments, which he saw as the multiculturalists’ pet proj-
ect. Ridiculing the idea of reparations, he wrote that “those who still suffer from
their ancestors’ enslavement” should seek psychiatric treatment rather than fi-
nancial compensation.35 Fortuyn’s assassination by a radical environmentalist in
May 2002 prompted a massive outpouring of grief and anger among his fol-
lowers, and led to a landslide victory of his party in the national elections that
took place less than two weeks after the murder. The three political parties in the
incumbent center-left government coalition, including Van Boxtel’s social-liberal
party D66, lost dramatically during the 2002 elections, while Fortuyn’s three-
month-old party (LPF) became the second-largest party in the country, receiving
seventeen percent of the vote.
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The multiculturalism debate and the political ascendancy and subsequent mur-
der of Fortuyn are crucial contexts for the Dutch national slavery monument proj-
ect. It was during the political crisis following Fortuyn’s assassination and the
national elections that the unveiling of the national slavery monument took place,
in Amsterdam’s Oosterpark on July 1, 2002. The chosen site of the monument
was highly controversial in the Afro-Dutch community. Most people favored a
more prestigious and central location, preferably Dam Square, where the National
World War II Monument is located. Because of the highly volatile political climate
and the presence of the queen, the incumbent prime minister, and international
dignitaries, security surrounding the unveiling ceremony was tight. Fences cov-
ered with black plastic prevented access to the memorial site itself and kept it
from view. Though the security measures were not unreasonable under the cir-
cumstances, the general public had not been informed, and most came expecting
to witness the proceedings directly. Therefore, to many it came as an unpleasant
surprise that they would have to watch the ceremony on a large video screen in a
different part of the park. While Minister Van Boxtel offered a formal apology for
the Dutch slavery past, a riot broke out as a small group of people assembled at
the guarded entrance to the memorial site, expressing their outrage and demand-
ing admission to the ceremony. The outburst of anger that these security meas-
ures triggered within the crowd was a painful illustration of the explosiveness of
the memory of slavery among Dutch slave descendants. Intended as a symbolic
gesture of inclusion, the inauguration of the national slavery monument came to
symbolize to many people in the Afro-Dutch community their continued exclu-
sion from Dutch society.
When, immediately after the unveiling of the monument and the departure of
the invited guests, the public were allowed to enter the memorial site, the event
took the form of a re-appropriation ritual. During a quiet dedication ritual six
weeks after the unveiling, a group of Afro-Surinamese women symbolically took
repossession of the monument, a large figurative statue representing the journey
from bondage to freedom. A year later, on July 1, 2003, the National Institute for
the Study of Dutch Slavery and its Legacy (NinSee) was inaugurated. Conceived of
as the “dynamic” part of the national slavery memorial and located in the near
vicinity of the monument, the institute’s aim is to help shape a nuanced and rea-
listic view of the Netherlands’ slavery past in order to remember, commemorate,
and work through this history and its legacies for the benefit of future genera-
tions.36
Since 2001, the slavery memorial movement has dramatically increased public
awareness of the Netherlands’ slavery past. History textbooks used in schools
have been revised to incorporate this long-neglected chapter in the nation’s his-
tory. Slavery even literally received canonical status when it was included in the
so-called Canon of Dutch Cultural History: it is one of the fifty themes that a
national committee of scholars and teachers, appointed by the Minister of Educa-
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tion, has deemed central to an understanding of Dutch national history.37 That
slavery is still a sensitive issue, however, is suggested by the fact that of all the
fifty themes, it received the largest number of reactions on the Canon’s internet
forum. Moreover, it remains potentially divisive. On various occasions since the
monument’s unveiling in 2002, the annual national commemoration of slavery
has been disrupted by demonstrations, most notably in 2005, when the conserva-
tive Minister of Immigration Rita Verdonk was delegated to represent the govern-
ment at the commemoration. Verdonk was prevented from giving her speech by a
multi-ethnic group of demonstrators who loudly protested against her restrictive
immigration policy. Seen by her followers as a successor to Pim Fortuyn, Verdonk
started her own political movement, tellingly named “Proud of the Netherlands,”
in the spring of 2008 with an inaugural speech in which she denounced her op-
ponents as people who want to place slavery monuments all over the Netherlands
“to make us look bad.”38
Verdonk’s “us-versus-them” rhetoric reflects the neo-nationalist turn Dutch
politics has taken since the murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh by an Islamic
fundamentalist in November 2004.39 The political rise of the far-right parliamen-
tarian Geert Wilders, whose extremist anti-Islam and anti-immigration agenda is
supported by an alarmingly large segment of the Dutch electorate, has put at
severe risk the tradition of tolerance that has long been a source of national pride
and identity. As a key symbol of multiculturalism, to both advocates and oppo-
nents of the idea that the Netherlands is a multicultural nation, the national slav-
ery monument was at the center of a Dutch cartoon controversy in 2008. Among a
series of anti-immigrant and racist cartoons published on the internet by a far-
right Dutch cartoonist was one that depicted a racialized, overgrown baby bur-
dening the back of a native-born working-class man. The text on the cartoon
read: “What we need now is a slavery monument for the white Dutch-born tax-
payer.”40 The cartoonist’s message is obvious: white taxpayers are the true slaves,
bearing the financial burden of unemployed immigrants. The unnamed cartoon-
ist’s arrest on suspicion of racism and his subsequent release on the grounds of
freedom of speech received wide publicity in the Dutch media. Both his arrest and
his release led to public protests, exposing the ideological fault lines in Dutch
society. That six years after its unveiling the slavery monument played a central
role in this Dutch cartoon incident indicates that multiculturalism continues to be
highly controversial in the Netherlands, but also that it is a force the political
right still needs to contend with.
Collecting Memories
Both in the United States and in the Netherlands, the confrontation with the na-
tional history of slavery has led to controversy and contention. Precisely because it
has led to broad public debates, however, the slavery past has become living his-
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tory. That the public debates about the monuments often turn on the politics of
racial and national identity and memory is perhaps an inevitable stage in the pro-
cess of reconciliation with, and atonement for, a painful and shameful past too
long repressed. In fact, the public debates have themselves been a form of mod-
ern memorial activism. What James Young has said about Holocaust memorials
also applies to the slavery memorial projects: “The never-to-be-resolved debate
over which kind of memory to preserve, how to do it, in whose name, and to
what end” is itself a memorial to slavery. Breaking down the concept of collective
memory, in which Pierre Nora grounds a sense of national unity and identity, this
dialectical model for modern memory-work proposes the alternative concept of
what Young appropriately calls “collected memory.”41
The African Burial Ground National Monument in New York and the Nether-
lands National Slavery Monument in Amsterdam are places where members of
diverse communities can gather to “collect” memories. An example of such a
gathering was the 1995 visit by a delegation of Ghanese leaders to the African
Burial Ground in New York, to publicly take responsibility and ceremonially ask
forgiveness for their ancestors’ participation in the slave trade.42 The concept of
“collected” memory accommodates the diversity of today’s multi-ethnic societies
without relinquishing the ideal of social integration, based on racial and ethnic
equality, which is the black Civil Rights Movement’s enduring legacy. For the
many groups, individuals, and even government officials active in the two mem-
orial projects, participation in the memorialization of a history of enslavement,
exploitation, and racial injustice constituted a new form of historically conscious
and socially engaged democratic citizenship. Moreover, the public debates and
the annual commemorations at the two national monuments have created a
forum in which, as citizens of national and transnational communities, we too
are challenged to address – and redress – slavery’s continuing legacies.
Although the public debates surrounding the two memorials became increas-
ingly contentious after 9/11, the African-American and Afro-Dutch communities’
long but eventually successful struggle for a national slavery memorial shows that
multiculturalism continues to be a vital, if often vehemently contested ideology
and social and cultural practice in the post-9/11 era. The projects may have caused
bitter divisions and exposed racial fissures in the social fabric of the multi-ethnic
and multicultural societies of both the United States and the Netherlands, but
controversy also created a public sphere and space in which coalitions had to be
formed and power shared. Again and again, during the long and difficult process
of realizing the two national slavery monuments, grassroots initiatives were ac-
companied and reinforced by political action, while conversely political interven-
tions were legitimated by community involvement. By claiming control and public
recognition of their past, African-American and Afro-Dutch community activists
built diasporic communities of memory. Together with the other groups and in-
dividuals involved in the two memorial projects, they fostered a multicultural con-
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sciousness and produced new forms of historically informed civic and political
engagement.
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Are We All Americans? 9/11 and
Discourses of Multiculturalism in the
Netherlands
Jaap Kooijman
The “multicultural drama” has become the catchphrase in the Dutch political dis-
course on multiculturalism and the alleged failure of ethnic integration policy.
The term was coined by the Dutch leftwing publicist Paul Scheffer in an influen-
tial essay of the same name, published in January 2000.1 Scheffer argues that the
Dutch policy of multiculturalism has resulted in ethnic segregation and the exclu-
sion of ethnic minorities from a collective Dutch history and identity. Although
written before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the events of 9/11 rein-
forced the essay’s political urgency. Moreover, the assassinations of the popular
rightwing politician Pim Fortuyn in 2002 and the controversial filmmaker Theo
van Gogh in 2004 emphasized the seriousness of the multicultural drama. For-
tuyn, running on an anti-Islam platform, was murdered by a white Dutch animal
rights activist just nine days before the national elections; Van Gogh was mur-
dered by the Moroccan-Dutch Muslim extremist Mohammed Bouyeri. Together,
the two murders seemed horrifying symptoms of Dutch multiculturalism in crisis,
prompting conspiracy theorists to point out that Van Gogh was murdered exactly
911 days after Fortuyn. Scheffer also made an explicit connection between 9/11,
the two assassinations, and the multicultural drama. “Once you accept that multi-
cultural argument against teaching them our history, you are excluding them from
collective memory, from an enormous chance for renewal,” Scheffer stated in a
2006 interview, adding that “September 11th gave many of them their narrative.”2
By making a rigid distinction between “us” (the Dutch national collective) and
“them” (the Muslim ethnic minorities), Scheffer implies that “our” culture can be
reduced to an identity predominantly formed by a collective national history.
Moreover, his statement ignores the fact that 9/11 and the assassinations of For-
tuyn and Van Gogh not only gave “many of them their narrative” but also “us” a
range of narratives, including some that polarize the debate, as well as others that
instead challenge the rigid “us” versus “them” dichotomy. In my book Fabricating
the Absolute Fake, I have analyzed the way 9/11 and the assassinations of Fortuyn
and Van Gogh have been used in popular culture as part of a larger political dis-
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course, ranging from pop songs and commercial rap songs to magazines and
commercial “feel good” cinema, specifically addressing questions of national
identity and multiculturalism in Dutch society.3 In this essay, I will focus on art
rather than popular culture, discussing how 9/11 has provided Dutch artists with a
narrative to reflect upon a changing world. I do so not to make a rigid distinction
between art and popular culture, but rather to show how art, politics, and popular
culture are often intertwined. As in Dutch pop-cultural objects, 9/11 has func-
tioned in Dutch art as a political reference point and a cultural symbol for “Amer-
ica.” American popular culture is omnipresent in Dutch society, which is reflected
in the realms of both art and popular culture.
First, I will address how 9/11 and the murders of Fortuyn and Van Gogh have
been used in a larger discourse about national identity and multiculturalism. I will
pay specific attention to the identification with “America,” both politically as well
as culturally. Subsequently, I will discuss two Dutch art films that explicitly refer
to 9/11: The American I Never Was (2004) by Chris Keulemans, and New York is Eating
Me & The Cactus Dance (2005) by Jeroen Kooijmans. Both films illustrate how 9/11
gave Dutch artists (rather than potentially radical Muslim youth) their narrative,
each questioning in their own way notions of belonging to a particular cultural or
national identity in relation to America.
We Are All Americans
As Dana Heller has pointed out in the introduction to The Selling of 9/11, in the
United States the term “9/11” attained “the cultural function of a trademark, one
that symbolizes a new kind of national identification – or national branding
awareness.”4 Although Heller speaks explicitly about the United States, 9/11
might have functioned in a similar way in other countries, namely as a marker in
discussions about national identity and multiculturalism. In the Netherlands, pol-
iticians as well as journalists and political commentators have interpreted 9/11,
together with the assassinations of Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh, as marking
a drastic change in the political climate, shifting from the celebrated principle of
multicultural tolerance toward a renewed patriotism and a more restrictive view
on Dutch national identity. As in the post-9/11 debates in the United States, both
rightwing and leftwing politicians have called for a return to the history of the
nation-state as the foundation of a collective national identity, in line with the
multicultural drama argument that Scheffer introduced. However, as the Dutch
political scientist Maarten Vink suggests, the paradigmatic shift ascribed to 9/11
and the murders of Fortuyn and Van Gogh is in fact the result of a longer histor-
ical process, as “Fortuyn and others did not so much start a new debate in the
wake of September 11th, but rather radicalized a discourse of ‘new realism’ that
had been developing for over a decade.”5 In other words, 9/11 merely functioned
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as a rhetorically powerful symbol, adding a sense of political urgency to an al-
ready evolving political debate.
This perspective is confirmed by other recent writings on the Dutch political
situation after the murders of Fortuyn and Van Gogh. Although recognizing that
“the world had indeed changed since 9/11, and that world had caught up with
Amsterdam,” the Anglo-Dutch publicist and academic Ian Buruma hardly men-
tions September 11 in his book about Van Gogh’s assassination. As Buruma sug-
gests, even if the motive of Van Gogh’s murderer Mohammed B. “might also have
been affected by 9/11, … this event appears to have confused him more than any-
thing else.”6 In his article “Pim Fortuyn, Theo van Gogh, and the Politics of Tol-
erance in the Netherlands,” Peter van der Veer mentions 9/11 only once and, like
Vink, he emphasizes how the event helped to reinforce existing political senti-
ments rather than prompting them: “The attacks on the United States on Septem-
ber 11, 2001, seemed further to confirm Fortuyn’s message that the world had
changed and that fearsome Muslim terrorists were ready to attack Western civili-
zation. To respond to these new challenges, one needed new leaders, and Fortuyn
seemed to fit the bill.”7 Moreover, Van der Veer argues that the political debate
says more about a changing Dutch culture than about Islam, even if most discus-
sions are limited to the issues of terrorism and Muslim fundamentalism. The
assassinations of Fortuyn and Van Gogh, more than 9/11, made evident that pre-
existing notions of Dutchness – and its politics of tolerance in particular – were
being challenged.
Does this mean then that 9/11 plays no significant role in the discussions on
Dutch national identity, other than providing a rhetorical backdrop? In the United
States, 9/11 has been used as a critical point in time to rethink American identity,
not only in the political debate but also within academia and the art world. Essay
collections such as Dissent from the Homeland, The Selling of 9/11, and Terror, Culture,
Politics: 9/11 Reconsidered are telling examples of how, in American academic cir-
cles, 9/11 has been perceived as a crucial juncture of renewed national identifica-
tion, politically as well as culturally and ethically.8 In similar fashion, American
artists as well as museums and galleries have taken 9/11 as a point of reference for
reflecting upon American identity, with exhibitions such as Here is New York: A
Democracy of Photographs (MoMA) in 2002, The American Effect (Whitney Museum of
American Art) in 2003, and The Art of 9/11 (apexart) in 2005. Although these exam-
ples do not share one “American” perspective – quite the contrary, each tries to
broaden the views on 9/11, thereby often critically challenging the unequivocal
patriotism of the Bush administration – they all can be perceived as American
attempts at a renewed self identification, as a self-reflective questioning of what
it means to be American. Even when European intellectuals (most notably Jean
Baudrillard, Jürgen Habermas, and Slavoj Žižek) entered the debate immediately
after 9/11, the emphasis tended to concentrate on redefining American self-
identity.9
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The question of how 9/11 has played a role in renewed discussions about na-
tional identity and multiculturalism in the Netherlands (and other Western coun-
tries outside of the United States) is complicated by the “us” versus “them” divide
that seems to dominate the post-9/11 political discourse. When after 9/11 the
French newspaper Le Monde famously declared, “We are all Americans,” this dec-
laration of transatlantic solidarity could immediately be incorporated into a politi-
cal discourse framed by Samuel Huntington’s thesis of a clash of civilizations.
“Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists,” President Bush declared
nine days after 9/11.10 If “we” in the Western world are indeed “all” supposed to
be “Americans,” how does that place “us” within the discourses of both a re-
newed self-identification as well as international politics? On the political level,
this transatlantic solidarity between Europe and the United States seemed short-
lived, as soon it was challenged by the unilateral stance of the American Bush
administration – its War on Terror and the subsequent war in Iraq – resulting in
a revival of European anti-Americanism. As Le Monde’s editor-in-chief Jean-Marie
Colombani wrote in May 2004: “In the wake of September 11, we all felt ourselves
to be Americans. [Bush’s Secretary of Defense] Donald Rumsfeld would make us
all un-American.”11 On a political level, then, the notion that “we are all Ameri-
cans” was easily challenged; on a cultural level, however, this proves to be much
more difficult.
This difficulty is apparent in the first Dutch academic essay collection on 9/11,
Stof en as (“Dust and Ashes”), edited by Liedeke Plate and Anneke Smelik, which
was published in 2006. Stof en as contains essays by Dutch and Belgian academics
discussing the role of 9/11 in art and popular culture. As the editors explain in the
introduction, 9/11 is not only a political but also a cultural event, one that helps to
shape collective memory. Both highbrow art and lowbrow pop culture are instru-
mental in how “we”make sense of the tragedy. Plate and Smelik perceive 9/11 as a
form of trauma that needs a process of collective healing, for Americans as well
as for Europeans. “Even though it happened on the other side of the ocean, 9/11
was also a traumatic event for us in Europe.”12 From such a perspective, “we” in
Europe are indeed “Americans,” becoming part of a therapeutic reshaping of
“our” collective cultural identity through American culture. This American dom-
inance is reinforced by the art and pop-cultural objects that form the case studies
of the collection. With the exception of an essay about 9/11 in French literature,
the contributions focus predominantly on how 9/11 has been addressed in Amer-
ican art and popular culture. In other words, the editors suggest that these objects
not only shape an American collective memory, but a European one as well. Thus,
even if the notion that “we are all Americans” no longer holds up when transat-
lantic solidarity is challenged by the political actions of the American nation-state,
culturally “our” identification with “America” remains strong, helping to shape
“our” collective memory.
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That, particularly after 9/11, such a personal investment in American culture
can clash with a more critical view on the political actions of the American na-
tion-state has been addressed by art exhibitions in the Netherlands. On Septem-
ber 11, 2005, the Stedelijk Museum of Amsterdam organized the video viewing
After 9/11, featuring work by contemporary Dutch artists. In the six-minute short
film Afterhours (2005) by Marc Bijl, the camera roams through the empty streets of
Manhattan at night, presenting New York City as a ghost town rather than as the
busy metropolis we know from the cinema screen. Herman Helle recreates the
9/11 event with the four-minute animation film History of the World: Part Eleven
(2004), using orange-juice and chocolate-milk cartons as the city’s skyline and
David Bowie’s “Heroes” as soundtrack. In the 37-minute short film New York Is
Eating Me & The Cactus Dance (2005), which I will discuss more extensively later on
in the essay, Jeroen Kooijmans takes 9/11 as a traumatic event to reflect upon his
self-image, suggesting that not only the world, but also he has drastically chan-
ged.13 All these artworks use elements of American popular culture to reflect
upon – and at times criticize – the way in which politics and popular culture are
intertwined.
In 2006, the Centraal Museum Utrecht organized the art exhibition This is Amer-
ica: Visions on the American Dream. The exhibition took as its starting point that “we
all carry the American dream within us, yet, similar to this dreamed America, we
also cannot break loose from the America that we despise.”14 Both After 9/11 and
This is America brought to the foreground the ambivalent position the claim “we
are all Americans” produces, suggesting that a distinction needs to be made be-
tween the United States as a nation-state operating in the arena of global politics,
and an imagined “America” made up of the images provided by pop culture
through Hollywood film, television, pop music, and advertising. This ambivalent
position is effectively captured by the concept of “The American I Never Was,”
coined by Chris Keulemans. Unlike the collective memory as suggested by Plate
and Smelik, which is based on the idea that the European experience is directly
shaped by American art and popular culture, the concept by Keulemans leaves
room for more ambiguity. Dutch people have grown up with American culture,
incorporating “America” within their everyday lives, histories, and memories,
with the result that the boundaries between what is considered American and
what is considered Dutch have become blurred.15 As will be discussed below,
both the project by Keulemans and the short film by Kooijmans show how 9/11
brings this ambiguous transatlantic composition of national identity to the fore-
ground, suggesting that the Dutch indeed can be perceived as the Americans they
never were.
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Americans We Never Were
The American I Never Was (2004) is a multi-media project by Chris Keulemans, con-
sisting of a website, a novel, a radio documentary, and a “road movie in still
images” released on DVD.16 The project can be seen as an autobiographical ar-
chive of images, memories, and stories about how American culture has shaped
the life of someone living outside of the United States. Although born in the
Netherlands, Keulemans grew up in different countries, including Tunisia, Iraq,
and Indonesia, and most importantly, attended international American elemen-
tary schools where he was taught to be “a little American patriot, ready for junior
high.” However, instead of “returning” to New Jersey, the American state which
had become his imagined home (based on his favorite comic book; he never actu-
ally had been there), Keulemans returned to the Netherlands where, eventually,
he became more critical of the United States: “I was raised with the stereotypical,
unabashed, happy and heroic image that the US could export of itself with impu-
nity until 1968. After that I learned, like my whole generation, the darker sides of
America: from Irangate to the Gulf War, from the permanent segregation to the
omnipresent commercialization. Still, I never completely lost touch with that little
boy’s paradise.”17 The ambiguity that Keulemans describes is similar to the main
premise of the This is America exhibition, which explored the same tension of
being caught between a critical stance toward the politics of the American na-
tion-state and a personal investment in American culture.
The film follows Keulemans on his trip “home” to New Jersey, which proves to
be an ambivalent experience. Consisting of still images photographed by Rob
Smits, the film features a voiceover by Keulemans, both in Dutch and English.18
9/11 plays a significant role early on in the film, when Keulemans attends a 9/11
memorial service at the Frank Sinatra Park in Hoboken, New Jersey. Providing a
clear view of the Manhattan skyline, the place is significant, connoting the Amer-
ican dream, as the young Sinatra used to stand at that exact spot dreaming about
making it in New York City. Moreover, as Keulemans explains, the Twin Towers,
erected in the early 1970s, were clearly visible from that spot in the park. “There
was no need to dream any higher than the Twin Towers. And then, they smashed
the planes into them. Suddenly the skyline was no longer a dream but a night-
mare.”
The film shows us how now, after 9/11, the Frank Sinatra Park is no longer a
place of dreams but one of remembrance, filled with mourning people dressed in
patriotic T-shirts and holding American flags, while the names of the fifty-seven
dead Hoboken citizens are read out loud. One picture shows Keulemans, stand-
ing in the middle of the crowd, wearing the headphones of his audio-recording
device, and facing in a different direction than the mourners, including one wear-
ing a T-shirt reading: “Lest we forget our Fallen Brothers.” Keulemans clearly
does not fit in; he is an outsider. As his voiceover states: “What do I feel when
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they raise the American flag, when I hear ‘The Star-Spangled Banner,’ the only
national anthem I ever recognized as mine? I walk away.... Of this patriotism I’m
no part. My sympathy remains that of the visitor. I’m only a patriot of my own
comic book past.” Here the ambivalence of his position becomes apparent. On
the one hand, Keulemans recognizes “home” from all the pop-cultural images
embedded in his memory, yet, on the other, the confrontation with the 9/11
patriotism of the “real” New Jersey makes him realize he is not an American after
all.
Comparing Keulemans’ The American I Never Was to New York Is Eating Me & The
Cactus Dance by the Dutch artist Jeroen Kooijmans produces a fascinating contrast.
In 2001, Kooijmans was living in New York City, shooting a documentary about
moustaches. Although not explicitly visible in the documentary, its promotional
material reveals that Kooijmans watched the attacks on the Twin Towers from his
New York apartment, an experience which the documentary claimed to explore:
“The disaster had a profound personal impact on Kooijmans – his American
dream suddenly became a nightmare.” Just like in The American I Never Was, the
metaphor of the dream turning into a nightmare is used. However, whereas Keu-
lemans observes the “nightmare” of the patriotic Americans in Hoboken, Kooij-
mans’ nightmare is more personal; it is “his American dream” which abruptly
comes to an end with the event of 9/11.
In spite of the omnipresence of 9/11 throughout the film (at times implicit
while at others explicit), New York Is Eating Me & The Cactus Dance is still a documen-
tary about moustaches. Kooijmans, sporting an impressive moustache himself,
interviews a wide range of men from different cultural backgrounds who talk
about their moustaches, while the camera zooms in on their mouths and facial
hair. Early on in the film, Kooijmans himself is interviewed. He too can be per-
ceived as the American he never was, as he explains that he knows the American
culture of New York from the movies, revealing that American culture has always
been a presence in his life. “You know everything even if you have never been here
before,” he says in Dutch. “Sometimes I even have the feeling that I play a part in
a very absurd movie when I’m here.”19 Then 9/11 happens, although the event is
not directly shown from his apartment window but through the “breaking news”
television images of CNN. Not all the scenes that follow, however, were shot after
9/11. The moustache documentary continues, focusing on both the machismo
and the homoeroticism of facial hair, often connected to the masculine uniforms
of the New York police and the New York fire department. The documentary is
edited in an anachronistic manner, alternating between scenes shot before and
after 9/11, which chronology often is left unclear. Moreover, the interviews con-
tinuously shift from the triviality of moustaches to the seriousness of 9/11, and
back again, suggesting that the topics overlap. At one moment, Kooijmans is
shown standing on a ferry, dressed in a police uniform, with the New York sky-
line – including the Twin Towers – in the background. Although the scene ob-
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viously is shot before 9/11, the connotation with the terrorist attacks is clear. Not
only are the Twin Towers a strong visible marker, reminding the viewer they are
no longer there, but also the police uniform recalls the rhetoric of hero worship
and courage that the policemen and firefighters came to embody in post-9/11
American culture. That Kooijmans is wearing the uniform of the New York police
now suggests a personal identification with both the victims and the heroes of
9/11, emphasizing the event’s emotional impact on the Dutch filmmaker.
As a documentary about shooting a documentary about moustaches, New York is
Eating Me & The Cactus Dance is a film dealing with finding one’s identity within a
hectic multicultural city, a search for identity not only by the subjects interviewed,
but also by the filmmaker himself. The events of 9/11 both confirm as well as inter-
rupt this search for identity; 9/11 is clearly presented as a traumatic life-changing
event, yet simultaneously, the search for identity is continued rather than termin-
ally interrupted by 9/11, a notion which is reinforced by the film’s anachronism, as
the scenes shot before and after 9/11 alternate. This ambiguous function of 9/11 is
visualized in one scene of the film, which has also been released separately under
the title “Cargo.”20 A cargo boat is moving from the left side of the screen to the
right, with as a backdrop the Manhattan skyline, including the Twin Towers.
Once the boat has reached the right side of the screen, after blocking the view of
the towers momentarily, the Twin Towers suddenly disappear. The scene’s seren-
ity presents a strong contrast with the violent images of the 9/11 terrorist attacks
as endlessly repeated on television. Presented this way, 9/11 is stripped of its tele-
visual sensationalism, while its suddenness remains emphasized.
A close look at The American I Never Was and New York is Eating Me & The Cactus
Dance shows that both Dutch filmmakers can be seen as “Americans they never
were” whose cultural identities (including their national ones) are questioned by
the impact and the aftermath of 9/11. However, whereas Keulemans distances
himself from the American patriotism that permeates post-9/11 American culture,
Kooijmans identifies with the personal impact that 9/11 had on American citizens
(and those of New York in particular). In this way, the films exemplify the two
sides of the ambiguous position of a critical stance on the politics of the Ameri-
can nation-state, combined with a personal investment in American culture.
Connecting 9/11 to Dutch Multiculturalism
The films I have discussed by Chris Keulemans and Jeroen Kooijmans are ob-
viously just two examples of a wider range of Dutch artworks that have used 9/11
to comment on issues of cultural identity in a post-9/11 world. Unlike The American
I Never Was and New York Is Eating Me & The Cactus Dance, some of these other works
explicitly connect 9/11 to discussions of Dutch multiculturalism. For example, the
solo exhibitionWe the Dutch First Party (Galerie Fons Welters, 2005) by Sara van der
Heide includes the painting On & On, which shows the serene interior of a New
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York apartment, with flowers on the wallpaper and two birds pictured on the tele-
vision. Looming over this peaceful scenery is the reflection of the burning North
Tower, with the second plane about to crash into the World Trade Center. As its
promotional material suggests, the exhibition “alludes to the tensions that have
slowly but surely come to dominate our society over the past few years. The reli-
gious and social polarization that followed in the wake of the murder of Theo van
Gogh was one of [Van der Heide’s] main points of departure for the series.”21 On
& On is the exhibition’s only painting that explicitly refers to 9/11, as the others are
inspired by the Amsterdam multiethnic neighborhood Bos & Lommer. As the in-
clusion of the painting suggests, here 9/11 functions as just one of the images and
events – albeit a prominent one – that have shaped the contemporary discourse
on Dutch multiculturalism.
Even though The American I Never Was and New York Is Eating Me & The Cactus Dance
do not explicitly comment on Dutch multiculturalism, they do so implicitly by
challenging the Dutch “us” identity in the rigid “us” versus “them” divide that is
implied by the multicultural drama argument. They show that 9/11 provides a
narrative not only to “them” (the potentially radical Muslim youth, as identified
by Paul Scheffer), but also to “us” (the Dutch national collective), thereby reveal-
ing that the Dutch “us” identity is not clear-cut but ambiguous, and cannot be
easily captured in a discourse of a collective national history. The films also show
the ambiguity of the assertion that “we are all Americans,” thereby adding com-
plexity to the claim by Liedeke Plate and Anneke Smelik that the responses to 9/11
in American art and popular culture shape “our” European collective memory in
the same fashion as they do the American one. 9/11 has provided these two Dutch
filmmakers with a narrative, enabling each of them to present different perspec-
tives on the notion of a Dutch national identity, including our position as the
Americans we never were.
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“How could this have happened in
Holland?”American Perceptions of
Dutch Multiculturalism after 9/11
Jaap Verheul
“Something sad and terrible is happening to the Netherlands, long one of Eu-
rope’s most tolerant, decent and multicultural societies.” With these ominous
words, the editorial of the New York Times started its analysis of the “deadly ha-
treds” that had seemingly engulfed the Netherlands after two political assassina-
tions in 2002 and 2004.1 What had happened in the Netherlands was, without a
doubt, dramatic enough to justify an epic narrative. On May 6, 2002, Pim Fortuyn,
the leader of a Dutch anti-immigrant party, was fatally shot just days before a
national election in which he was predicted to score a massive victory. Fortuyn
had become a controversial populist by attacking the established political consen-
sus, and had especially targeted multicultural relativism toward Muslim immi-
grants. Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh, who, like Fortuyn, enjoyed being provo-
cative and in the limelight, had similarly caused controversy by deriding political
correctness and radical Islam in his films and newspaper columns. He was mur-
dered in 2004 by a Dutch radical Muslim enraged by the short video Van Gogh
had made for the ex-refugee Member of Parliament Ayaan Hirsi Ali, one of the
most outspoken critics of Islam in the Netherlands. Her short video, entitled
“Submission, Part One,” in which she criticized the oppression of women under
Islam, was severely criticized within the Islamic community. Both political assas-
sinations and the ensuing political turmoil radically ended the utopian tone that
had marked the Dutch debate about integration for so many years.2
It was no surprise that these disruptive political murders drew international
attention to the Dutch debate about integration. Yet the almost elegiac wording
of the New York Times article is remarkable. The newspaper was not just reporting
on tragic events in a small, far-away country. It was giving meaning to fundamen-
tal developments considered highly significant for its American readers. The dra-
matic narrative American commentators offered to describe and analyze the as-
tounding developments in the Netherlands offers valuable insight into the
transatlantic perspective on multiculturalism after 9/11.
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Framing Fortuyn
It is easy to understand why Pim Fortuyn both puzzled and intrigued American
observers. With his shaved head, dandyish way of dress, and openly gay lifestyle,
he was flamboyant, somewhat volatile and highly unconventional. At the same
time, he was socially conservative, and ostentatiously displayed his wealth, with
his butler and his trademark chauffeur-driven Bentley. His political views were
just as complicated. He began his career as a professor in Marxist sociology, pub-
lishing thorough studies on social-economic policy. In the 1990s, however, he
began writing popular books and newspaper columns in which he attacked the
technocrat “Purple” government coalition of the “red” Dutch Labor party and the
“blue” right-wing free-market liberals. He became one of the most vocal critics of
the failings of the Dutch government’s approach to health care, education, social
security, and law and order, suggesting a series of radical reforms, some along an
American model. Most conspicuously, Fortuyn had strongly warned since the late
1990s that cultural relativism within a multicultural society would inevitably lead
to the “Islamicization” of Dutch culture. He accused the political elite of failing to
defend essential modern values, such as personal freedom and individual respon-
sibility, against the imperialist claims of Islamic fundamentalism.3
In the summer of 2001, a few months before 9/11, Fortuyn decided to enter
politics. At first he became party leader of Leefbaar Nederland (Livable Nether-
lands), a national party which had evolved out of a number of local grass-roots
parties in large cities that protested the aloofness, arrogance, and elitist mentality
of local governments. When this party ousted him because he had openly called
Islam a “backward culture,” declared that Holland was “full up” and suggested to
remove the ban on discrimination from the Dutch constitution, he started his
own Lijst Pim Fortuyn party (LPF), taking most of the voters with him. Fortuyn
managed a stunning victory in early March at the local elections in Rotterdam,
where he pocketed thirty-five percent of the vote, leaving all the traditional parties
far behind. As a colorful outsider, he suddenly dominated the national media and
publicly embarrassed the leaders of the traditional parties with the joyfully aggres-
sive and picaresque way he raised issues about integration; issues they politely
preferred to keep under the table.
Until his murder, Fortuyn attracted only marginal and largely hostile attention
from the American media. Leading newspapers routinely described him as yet
another example of a turn to the right throughout Europe and, much to his cha-
grin, associated him with more familiar extreme right-wing politicians such as
Jorg Haider in Austria, Philip de Winter in Belgium, and Jean-Marie le Pen in
France.4 Although Fortuyn might very well be said to have shared some character-
istics of the American populist tradition, American media framed him against the
growing transatlantic divide. Internet magazine Slate sarcastically argued that the
Dutch populist demonstrated how 9/11 had not so much led to the xenophobia
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and nativism of ugly Americans that many had predicted, but had rather created
an “Ugly Europeanism” of prejudice and separatism. British historian Tony Judt
of NYU similarly argued in the New York Times that the Fortuyn phenomenon
grimly illustrated how Europeans were formulating answers to their obsessions
of “crime, immigration and the loss of ‘national identity’” that seriously threat-
ened transatlantic cooperation, because they intentionally diverged from the
American model. If nothing else, Fortuyn was seen as a symptom of growing
anti-Americanism in Europe.5
Fortuyn’s dramatic assassination on May 6, 2002, changed this view instantly.
Most major US newspapers reported on the slaying of what was now called a “Key
Dutch Rigthist.” One of the dominant themes in their reporting was that of a
paradise lost. This was a compelling storyline, which exploited the pastoral and
pre-modern image of a Holland with windmills, tulips, and wooden shoes so
thoroughly embedded in American popular culture.6 Readers were persistently
reminded that the Netherlands traditionally had been one of the most civil and
tolerant countries in the world. It was, as one commentator found, “[a] bourgeois
and orderly country that prides itself on tolerance.”7 Because it had mostly wel-
comed and accommodated foreigners, Holland had been a case study of utopian
multiculturalism. As American readers now learned, however, dark forces had
been lurking in this paradise. The sudden success of Fortuyn’s party had shown
that even this “Dutch tradition of tolerance” had already reached its limits. In fact,
for many years, the integration of immigrants had led to problems that had been
largely ignored by the political elites, both right and left. It was Pim Fortuyn who
challenged this political consensus by addressing these manifest but ignored
problems in the multicultural society.8 He opened European eyes to those prob-
lems Americans had already been forced to acknowledge as consequence of the
attacks of 9/11.
Two of Fortuyn’s ideological positions in particular enthralled the American
conservative commentators: his stance against multiculturalism, and his open at-
tack on the European elites. Fortuyn was celebrated by neoconservatives as a
monoculturalist, a liberal nationalist, a patriotic modernist, and a libertarian pop-
ulist who attacked what he called “Europe’s multicultural establishment.” The
National Review, the archetypal conservative magazine founded by William F.
Buckley, in particular embraced Fortuyn as “a martyr in the war on political cor-
rectness.” Rod Dreher of the National Review portrayed him as “an unapologetic
libertine who stood firmly behind Dutch beliefs in a liberal, tolerant society” and
who had dared to attack the collectivism supported by the ruling elite. Dreher
especially applauded Fortuyn’s attacks on “an increasingly ossified statist govern-
ment overseen by [an] elitist political class which … a growing number of voters
see as unresponsive to its desires.”9
It is ironic that the American neoconservative commentators suddenly em-
braced an openly gay politician who supported abortion rights, euthanasia, and a
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modern lifestyle.10 The neoconservative political magazine The Weekly Standard was
slightly bemused by this paradox, and called the fact that Fortuyn was both a
nationalist and a libertarian “the great contradiction of enlightened opinion.” For
Fortuyn, after all, to be tolerant meant stopping multiculturalism and stemming
the tide of orthodox Islamic immigrants. This, according to The Weekly Standard,
explains the silence in the liberal media, who could not see anyone else but “a far-
right bogeyman.”11
The Dutch Multicultural Debate
The sudden introduction to the paradoxical ambitions of Pim Fortuyn offered
American readers a first glimpse into the growing debate surrounding multicul-
turalism in the Netherlands. This may have come as a surprise, since most Amer-
ican publications hardly associated the country of Hans Brinker with the prob-
lems of diversity and integration. When in 1995 Samuel Barber published his
influential book about the global battle between Jihad and McWorld, for example,
he added a nostalgic footnote, in which he explained that the Netherlands was
one of the few countries left that were truly homogenous.12 Barber’s assessment
utterly missed the reality that about seventeen percent of the Dutch population
was either foreign-born or had one or two foreign-born parents. Although these
numbers were comparable to those of the United States, the Netherlands was
never recognized as a pluralist nation, because it lacked a national narrative that
incorporated immigration as part of its self-image, mythology, and popular cul-
ture.13
Moreover, Americans may have failed to notice the multicultural realities of the
Netherlands because the official “minority policy” of the Dutch government was a
far cry from American-style multiculturalism. If the formal governmental position
suggested a “cultural relativism” of mutual acceptance, policymakers left no
doubt about the dominance of Dutch cultural values. In spite of the multicultural
tone in terminology, their model of Dutch plurality foremost recalled the well-
established principles of “pillarization,” the system of segregation along religious
and social fault lines that had dominated Dutch society until the 1960s. Ironically,
it was as if the Dutch government had revived that largely obsolete arrangement
of cultural segregation by placing immigrant minorities in a “pillar,” assuming
they would be able to emancipate themselves from their own station, just as other
minorities had done in the past century.14
A new discourse about Dutch identity and the multicultural society promoting
national core values and the need for assimilation had emerged rather suddenly,
however, at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The most prominent indica-
tion of a paradigm shift was the now-famous 2000 newspaper article by Labor
Party member and sociologist Paul Scheffer. By defining the Dutch immigrant
experience as “A Multicultural Tragedy,” Scheffer sparked a heated national dis-
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cussion which led to the demise of the ideal of Dutch multiculturalism. He com-
pared the failed integration of immigrants into Dutch society unfavorably to the
successful social emancipation of the working classes at the end of the nineteenth
century. He also argued that the Dutch elites, who had energetically invested in
that earlier social emancipation, had failed to recognize the urgency of the immi-
grant question because they were blinded by a “lazy multiculturalism.” The re-
sulting levels of unemployment, poverty, crime, and truancy among immigrant
groups had effectively created an ethnic underclass, Scheffer warned, which
formed the single most dangerous threat to civil order in the Netherlands.
When Scheffer tried to formulate a solution for the impending ethnic crisis, he
firmly rejected multiculturalism as a meaningful way to deal with the Dutch im-
migrant experience, but instead cited Norman Podhoretz, the neoconservative
commentator and former editor of the conservative magazine Commentary. The
son of Polish immigrants, he had successfully climbed the American educational
and social ladder. Podhoretz had famously described the painful but necessary
step of severing his ties with his immigrant roots as a means of clearing the path
to assimilation, as “a brutal bargain.” It was this combination of ethnic discon-
nection and high-cultural inclusion that Scheffer now prescribed to the Dutch
immigrant population, especially those who hailed from Muslim countries such
as Morocco and Turkey. As Podhoretz had done, these immigrants should discard
those ethnic values and practices incompatible with Dutch society and embrace
the culture of their newly adopted mother country. Scheffer seemed to agree with
Fortuyn that the Dutch elites should facilitate the assimilation of newcomers into
Western civilization by strongly affirming a shared Dutch national culture.15
The Dutch public discussion about diversity intensified after the terrorist at-
tacks against the United States on September 11, 2001. As the United States re-
sponded to the Muslim fundamentalists with a War on Terror and a reaffirmation
of national pride and identity, the comparatively recent debate in the Netherlands
about integration of non-Western minorities also acquired new relevance and ur-
gency as it focused more than ever before on Muslim minorities. In that sense,
the sudden rise and subsequent assassination of Fortuyn – who embodied the
Dutch anti-immigrant sentiment – can be seen as one of the transatlantic conse-
quences of 9/11. But it was the murder of Theo van Gogh that made these reper-
cussions more clearly visible to American observers, and prompted some to en-
gage in a reassessment of transatlantic differences.16
A Dutch 9/11?
When filmmaker Theo van Gogh was murdered by a radical Muslim on Novem-
ber 2, 2004, the fate of multiculturalism in Dutch society again became the sub-
ject of heated debate in the United States. American commentators and journal-
ists revisited what had become common ground when they deplored the loss of
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Dutch innocence, and described the political ineptitude and apparent limitations
of multiculturalism and tolerance in the Netherlands. As the New York Times elo-
quently put it: “The attacks have scratched the patina of tolerance on which the
Dutch have long prided themselves, particularly here, in a city where the scent of
hashish trails in the air, prostitutes beckon from red-lighted storefront brothels
and Hell’s Angels live side by side with Hare Krishnas.”17
There were many differences between the motives behind the two political
murders. While Van Gogh shared Fortuyn’s penchant for provocation and media
attention, and had supported Fortuyn on several occasions, he was not a profes-
sional politician with even a remotely consistent program. If anything, his agenda
was to insult and provoke Dutch bourgeois society. He ardently posed as a com-
mitted smoker on his weblog, which was published under the playful title The
Healthy Smoker. He insulted Jewish sensibilities by publicly making a distasteful
joke about the Holocaust, and was subsequently successfully sued for anti-Semit-
ism. Unsurprisingly, he was also offensive toward radical Islam, both in his col-
umns and his movies. In one instance, he notoriously used a neologism for fun-
damentalist Muslims insinuating sexual intercourse with goats.
First and foremost, though, he was a filmmaker. A distant relative of the fa-
mous Dutch impressionist painter Vincent van Gogh, he achieved moderate ac-
claim for the low-budget movies he had been making since the early 1980s,
although none were commercially successful. However, he became instantly fa-
mous when he directed the short television film “Submission, Part One” for
which Ayaan Hirsi Ali had written the script. The short movie was primarily a
moralizing video statement, criticizing the treatment of women under Islam. It
showed a woman addressing Allah and relating how, fully sanctioned by Islam,
she was systematically abused by her husband and other men. The movie was
especially provocative because it contained suggestive images of Koranic verses
written on the nude skin of women, and the main actress was visibly nude be-
neath see-through veils. “Submission, Part One” was consequently banned in the
Muslim world and sparked a heated public discussion in the Netherlands and
abroad.18 The November 22 issue of Newsweek, which carried the story under the
title “Clash of Civilizations,” was banned in Pakistan and other Muslim countries
because it was considered “blasphemous and highly provocative.”19 Both Van
Gogh and Hirsi Ali were threatened by enraged Dutch Muslims. Hirsi Ali has lived
under 24-hour police protection ever since, but Van Gogh refused bodyguards
because he was convinced that nobody would bother to hurt a “village idiot.”
Ironically, Van Gogh was about to finish a movie about the murder of Pim
Fortuyn when he was shot and stabbed to death by a Muslim radical, in broad
daylight, on a busy street in the city center of Amsterdam. His killer, Mohammed
Bouyeri, left a note threatening the lives of Hirsi Ali and other Dutch politicians,
and menacingly predicting that the United States, Europe, and the Netherlands
were doomed. As soon became clear, Bouyeri was in fact a fully assimilated and
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well-educated Muslim, who was born in Amsterdam and carried dual Moroccan-
Dutch citizenship. Disillusioned by personal and employment setbacks, he started
to meet with fundamentalist Muslims who had become active in the Netherlands
after 9/11, posted radical messages on websites, and joined a terrorist cell as a
Jihadist.20
After Van Gogh’s murder, conservative US media were quick to send film crews
and reporters to the Netherlands to visit inner cities and immigrant neighbor-
hoods, and interview Dutch pundits, commentators and academics. Not surpris-
ingly, these reporters were warmly received by members of the Edmund Burke
Foundation, a Dutch conservative think tank, and found their way to conservative
Dutch statesmen such as Frits Bolkestein, who for many years had warned about
the lack of integration of immigrant minorities in the Netherlands. They also
found a new hero in rebel Member of Parliament Geert Wilders, who broke away
from the right-wing liberal party VVD because of his stubbornly hostile position
toward immigration. Wilders was praised for “asking the right questions, some-
thing that few in Holland have been brave enough to do.”21 The conservative
press was particularly enamoured of Ayaan Hirsi Ali. Christopher Caldwell, for
instance, hailed Hirsi Ali, who had become a vocal critic of Islam from within the
conservative VVD party, as “a daughter of the Enlightenment” who “has been
dealt a full house of the royal virtues: courage, intelligence and compassion.”22
These conservative commentators churned out a series of articles, many of
which were later collected in what became a true industry of alarmist books with
titles such as The West’s Last Chance, While Europe Slept, and Surrender.23 Inspired by
Samuel Huntington’s thesis of a “Clash of Civilizations,” they described how
Europe was being infiltrated by radical Islam because the political elites, blinded
by their faith in multiculturalism, were simply failing to respond to the impeding
danger. Many of these commentators also described the murder of Van Gogh as a
significant turning point in the European attitude toward radical Islam because,
just like 9/11 had done in the United States, it opened the eyes of the public to the
realities political and intellectual leaders had tried to ignore. Their account of the
Netherlands accordingly emphasized the two related storylines of a “Dutch 9/11”
and the demise of Holland’s disastrous “multiculturalist experiment.” Both ob-
viously connect the dramatic event in the Netherlands to the recent discussions
in the United States. The theme of “Dutch September 11th”24 was especially ap-
pealing to the conservative commentators seeking to affirm that the United States
was justified in its war against radical Islam. They now hastened to explain how
finally the Dutch had lost their innocence and had awoken from their “cultural
naiveté.”25 More importantly, they argued that this rude awakening opened the
possibility of Europe finally joining in their War on Terror. Christopher Caldwell
of the Weekly Standard found that Van Gogh’s murder, exactly 911 days after that of
Pim Fortuyn, “[was] described by people in Holland as having had the same effect
on their country as the attacks that killed nearly 3,000 in the World Trade Center
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Towers.” The Dutch, he explained, used to have “a generous, no-questions-asked
welfare state” but were having second thoughts, now that they had discovered
that many Muslims in their country sympathized with the 9/11 terrorists, that Van
Gogh’s assassin was a member of an extensive terrorist network, and that a series
of “American-style shootouts” had taken place in schools attended by immigrant
children. With undisguised empathy, Caldwell observed that the Dutch Minister
of Justice Piet Hein Donner was planning “something like the Patriot Act in the
Netherlands.”26 In some conservative descriptions, the “retaliation” against the
murder of Van Gogh, which was reported to include violent attacks on “at least
fourteen Muslim buildings and schools,” was blown way out of proportion.27 In
emphasizing that this was a turning point from victimhood to resistance, neocon-
servatives suggested that the two political murders had brought the Netherlands
closer to the United States both in its experience with, and responses to, radical
Islam.
“This Christmastime,” conservative commentator Tony Blankley cheered in
The Washington Times, “would be the moment when Western Europe finally joins
our war on terrorism.” Although he was convinced that the population of Europe
had long been eager to do so, Blankley pointed out that the European elites had
been in full denial about who the true enemy was. But now, he reported, the
murder of Van Gogh and the subsequent violence in the Netherlands, “have
forced high European leaders and news outlets to begin to publicly face up to the
implications of September 11, 2001 and the migration of Muslims in large num-
bers into the heart of Europe.” Blankley, too, elaborated on his thesis that the Van
Gogh murder woke Europe from the nightmare of Muslim-dominated “Eurabia”
in a book, The West’s Last Chance. This book, which bore the alarming subtitle “Will
We Win the Clash of Civilizations?” and received accolades from prominent Re-
publicans such as Henry Kissinger, Rush Limbaugh, Bob Dole, and Tom Ridge,
argued that “the cultural arrogance of radical European Muslims” posed a greater
threat to the United States than did Nazi Germany during World War II. Although
he believes that the public anger after the assassination of Van Gogh “is evidence
that the European instinct for survival has not yet been fully extinguished,” Blank-
ley gloomily warns that this survival instinct is threatened by “multiculturalism
and political correctness that has been advocated in media and academe and in-
stitutionalized in national and European Union laws and regulations for half a
century.”28 Blankley’s dire warning is a perfect summary of conservative irrita-
tions over European governments and intellectuals who failed to share the Amer-
ican perspective on the War on Terror.
Yet the notion of a “Dutch 9/11” was also an expression of American hope –
that the growing transatlantic disenchantment might make way for a new alliance
against a common enemy. The emphasis on shared experience was symbolized by
the way the ominous numerical date notation of “9/11” was echoed in similar,
Europeanized nomenclature for later terrorist attacks in Europe. Van Gogh had
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used the title “06/05” for his movie about the murder of Pim Fortuyn on May 6,
the Madrid train bombings of March 11, 2004 became known as “11-M,” and the
London public transport bombings of July 7, 2005 were immediately identified as
“7/7” to emphasize the similarity with the attacks on the United States. The two
Dutch murders stand out in comparison to these later terrorist attacks: Fortuyn
was murdered by a lone animal-rights activist (as his followers would say: “the
bullet came from the left”) and the motives of Van Gogh’s attacker were complex
and largely owing to personal grievances. This makes it all the more significant
that conservative commentators in the United States interpreted the political mur-
ders in the Netherlands as an indication that the European public now shared the
pain of Islamic terrorism.
Attacking Multiculturalism and European Elites
American conservative journalists also hastened to conclude from the Fortuyn and
Van Gogh murders that the European approach to multiculturalism was a danger-
ous failure. Although the Dutch people had long been aware of its failings, these
journalists argued, they were kept from openly expressing their opinion by the
“multicultural elites from The Hague and Brussels.”29 By stressing this connec-
tion between the lenient attitude toward Islamic immigrants and the ideological
bias of bureaucratic elites, the neoconservatives opened a two-pronged attack on
the multicultural ideal and on European leaders. Andrew Stuttaford of the Na-
tional Review squarely blamed the “social pathologies” that led to Van Gogh’s mur-
der on “official Holland’s embrace of multiculturalism, a dogma that made inte-
gration impossible and alienation a certainty.”30 He and other conservative
commentators repeatedly argued that the specific Dutch form of multicultural-
ism, which conceived of immigrant communities as an autonomous “pillar” in
society, prevented the assimilation of non-Western immigrants. The only sensible
response to immigration, they insisted, seemingly oblivious of the academic and
political debate raging in the United States over the past century, was “the ideal of
the melting pot of assimilation, which nurtured the American dream for more
than two centuries.”31
It is remarkable that almost all of these conservative critics described multicul-
turalism as an experiment, a dogma, a mantra, a utopian dream, or “Holland’s
failed and feckless experiment in multiculturalism.”32 In their eyes, multicultural-
ism was forced upon an unwilling population by a hard-headed, haughty, and
undemocratic elite. Ordinary Dutch people, they argued, had already recognized
radical Islam as the true enemy and were opposed to such “social experiments.”
However, the multicultural rhetoric which “artificially undermined” Dutch iden-
tity was upheld by “official Holland,” the technocrats, the “Euro-establishment,”
or – to conflate all the parties – “the multicultural elites of The Hague and Brus-
sels.”33
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These American commentators were mostly well-informed about the heated
political and academic debates about immigration and integration in the Nether-
lands. Yet the context in which they discussed the growing doubts about multi-
culturalism in the Netherlands also testifies to their concern about national iden-
tity in the United States and the growing dissent within the Western alliance.
When they described how Fortuyn, Van Gogh, and Hirsi Ali had heroically at-
tacked the “intolerant left-wing hegemony of political correctness,” they almost
seemed to be discussing the United States. A play on words in the title of an
article in the National Review illustrates how the two struggles were intertwined.
Just as the founding father of neoconservatism Irving Kristol had famously de-
fined a neoconservative as “a liberal mugged by reality,” so Theodore Dalrymple
of the National Review now neatly summed up its neoconservative perspective on
Holland in the header: “The Dutch, mugged by reality, toughen up on radical
Islam.”34 As the left-leaning newspaper The Village Voice wryly observed, “Ameri-
can neocons, smugly gleeful at the so-called war on terror’s decisive entrench-
ment on European soil, are clamoring to install Van Gogh as a martyr.”35
Given their ideological mindset, conservative media in the United States found
it much easier to read meaning into the Dutch struggle over multiculturalism than
their liberal or left-leaning counterparts. The Village Voice, for instance, cautiously
distanced itself from Van Gogh’s movie “Submission, Part One” by deriding its
“laziness as both art and protest.” It was as if the alternative weekly found it
difficult to fully associate itself with the Dutch filmmaker and the conflict over
integration he had come to symbolize. Progressive voices in the United States
have been markedly silent about the turmoil over multiculturalism in Europe. Ty-
pically, the liberal magazine The New Yorker left it to Dutch author Ian Buruma to
make sense of the turbulence over Fortuyn, Van Gogh, and Hirsi Ali. He later
turned his elegant analysis into the book Murder in Amsterdam, which is still the
most well-informed and sensitive source in the English language on the back-
ground of Van Gogh and his murderer. The New York Times, too, leaned heavily on
its Dutch correspondent Marlise Simons in its reporting.36 The New Yorker was one
of the few exceptions, with a long article by senior reporter Jane Kramer on the
sad fate of the “Dutch Model.”37 Other bastions of progressive thinking such as
The New York Review of Books, The New Republic, and Tikkun have chosen not to
comment on the issue at all. Perhaps these periodicals had invested too much in
a cosmopolitan affinity with European diversity to be able to take part in what
amounted to a European “civil war” over multiculturalism.
By contrast, American conservatives proved eager to support what they per-
ceived as the main victims of radical Islam in Europe. In 2005, Time magazine
named Hirsi Ali as one of the hundred most influential people in the world, be-
cause she knew “the risks of standing up for one’s beliefs.”38 When Hirsi Ali felt
forced to leave the Dutch Parliament in May 2006, she was instantly recruited by
the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, an influential neo-
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conservative think tank which had formed a policy platform for conservative sup-
porters of the Bush government, such as Newt Gingrich, Paul Wolfowitz, John
Bolton, and Lynne Cheney. Ironically, Hirsi Ali had become a victim of tougher
anti-immigration rules in the Netherlands when the Minister of Immigration and
Integration, who was from her own party, accused her of having provided false
information on her naturalization application. Her new American colleagues,
such as the staunch neoconservative Richard Perle, were quick to chide the Dutch
government for not acting fast enough to reinstate her citizenship, which had
been revoked because of the alleged lie, and for refusing to pay for her personal
security detail outside the Netherlands.39 With Fortuyn and Van Gogh both “mar-
tyred,” Hirsi Ali and right-wing party leader Geert Wilders were the only remain-
ing counterpoints to illustrate the weaknesses of the Dutch political establish-
ment in fighting radical Islam.
Othering Europe
The American debate about Dutch multiculturalism was affected by the rhetoric
of antagonism and distinction which flourished after 9/11. When Edward Said
evaluated the significance of his seminal book on Orientalism in the wake of 9/11,
he argued that the confrontational tone of US foreign policy underlined the en-
durance of essentialist stereotypes of opposition that he had analyzed in his work.
He sadly concluded that these stereotypes were eagerly supported by journalists,
scholars, and intellectuals such as Samuel Huntington, who constructed the no-
tion of an inevitable and enduring “clash of civilizations.” Said emphasized that
the role of these polemical intellectuals illustrated the difference between “knowl-
edge of other peoples and other times that is the result of understanding, com-
passion, careful study and analysis for their own sakes, and on the other hand
knowledge … that is part of an overall campaign of self-affirmation, belligerency
and outright war.”40 He thus presented the American “War on Terror” as the
latest expression of a demeaning process of “othering,” the strengthening of
identity by constructing opposition.
If American “communities of interpretation” had adopted an Orientalism that
found its origin in Europe, as Said argued, then they were merely continuing a
mechanism of othering used to construct similar opponents in other parts of the
world. Paradoxically, however, the main cultural contestant of the United States
had been Europe itself. It is within this complicated transatlantic opposition that
the American reading of Dutch multiculturalism can best be understood.
American academics and commentators from a wide range of political persua-
sions discussed and analyzed the debate that erupted in the Netherlands after the
murder of Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh. It was the conservatives and neocon-
servatives who were most vocal and comfortable with drawing lessons from the
events.41 By posthumously embracing the controversial political outsiders Fortuyn
“how could this have happened in holland?” 201
and Van Gogh, and supporting kindred Dutch critics of Islam such as Ayaan Hirsi
Ali and Geert Wilders as libertarians, proponents of free speech, and martyrs in
their battle against multiculturalism and political correctness, these conservative
Americans applauded their opposition to the political establishment and the mul-
ticulturalist ideology it supported.
In celebrating “The Demise of Dutch Multiculturalism,” American commenta-
tors added a new dystopian chapter to a long history of American constructions of
the Netherlands.42 Remarkably, most of these constructions of Dutch identity –
whether utopian or dystopian – were informed by conservative agendas, although
perceptions of the Netherlands were incorporated in the national identity-build-
ing narrative in contradictory ways.43 Starting with the disappointed assessments
of the Federalists at the end of the eighteenth century, and the derisive stories by
satirical writers such as Washington Irving, the perception of Dutch heritage in
the United States changed into a utopian narrative of the Brahmin intellectuals
during the mid-nineteenth century, and then turned into an almost hysterical
Holland Mania of American pictorial fantasy and ethnic kinship at the end of the
century. Although this premodern pastoral of windmills and tulips has remained
firmly anchored in American popular culture up to the present day, another, dys-
topian image came into being during the 1960s, when the Netherlands became a
byword for a welfare state gone awry and permissiveness gone too far. The term
“Hollanditis” was suddenly coined for the contagious disease of pacifism and
anti-Americanism that threatened to infect Europe and could sour the long-stand-
ing transatlantic relationship.44 For centuries, the Dutch “other” has been used by
Americans to legitimize their own geopolitical ambitions or facilitate domestic
debates about the relationship between government and citizen, the moral and
ethical fabric of American society, and integration and diversity. In this sense,
“Dutchism” could be added to more familiar essentialist concepts such as Orient-
alism and Occidentalism. Differently put, the Holland of these discourses was an
imagined community, not to itself, but to others.45
The fate of what was dubbed the “Dutch Model” of patience and tolerance was
followed with particular interest in the United States, since it offered yet another
example of the European struggle with integration and assimilation. By looking at
the Netherlands, Americans were trying to find answers to those questions about
their own society which had became especially vexing and pertinent after the ter-
rorist attacks of 9/11. These debates revolved around the perennial questions of
national unity versus cultural diversity, and state power versus personal liberty,
but also brought about a reevaluation of America’s place in the world.
In embarking upon a “War on Terror,” the United States also recalibrated its
relationship with Europe, which in many respects still served as a touchstone of
American identity. Europe feared that the US government was jeopardizing civil
liberties at home and international law abroad. Americans who supported the
confrontational policy of President George W. Bush in turn blamed the European
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allies for their unwillingness to support the urgent war against militant Islam,
and for coddling potentially dangerous Islamic minorities at home. The case of
multiculturalism in the Netherlands became a usable example in their American
narrative about transatlantic contrasts. American anti-European nationalism has
been a persistent undercurrent in American thought, used to legitimize both do-
mestic cultural nationalism and global foreign policy. By constructing a distance
from the European “other,” conservative Americans have emphasized their own
social identity and created an illusion of unified citizenship.
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